J-A19017-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: A.D., MOTHER : : : : : No. 38 WDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered December 5, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Juvenile Division at No: CP-02-AP-0000009-2024
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: November 5, 2025
A.D. (Mother) seeks review of an order of the Allegheny County Juvenile
Division (trial court) which involuntarily terminated her parental rights to the
juvenile, A.C. (Child), under subsections 2511(a)(2), 2511(a)(5), and 2511(b)
of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-8415. She argues that the
termination order was erroneously entered because the trial court’s factual
grounds for its ruling were not supported by the record. We affirm.1
The Allegheny County Office of Children Youth and Families (CYF) was
first alerted to disturbances in Child’s household in February 2020, before
Child was born. At that time, Mother was arrested for stabbing Child’s father
after the two had gotten into an argument. Child’s older sibling, J.C., was
____________________________________________
1 The parental rights of J.C. (Father) were also involuntarily terminated as to
Child. Father is not a party to this appeal, so that related termination order will not be addressed here. J-A19017-25
present in the home during that episode, and the child was soon thereafter
placed in foster care. Mother became pregnant with Child while J.C.’s
dependency case was still pending.2
When Child was born, on January 7, 2022, CYF petitioned for an
emergency custody order, which the trial court granted on January 10, 2022.
The trial court did so because Mother had already been found non-compliant
with her court-ordered mental health, substance abuse, and intimate partner
violence (IPV) goals in J.C.’s case.
Child was adjudicated dependent on February 2, 2022, and as of that
date, she has been removed from Mother’s care. Child was placed with her
current foster parents in December 2022.
Since the beginning of the present dependency matter, Mother has been
required to submit to random drug screenings, and to continue making
progress on her court-ordered goals, including mental health treatment, drug
and alcohol treatment, IPV treatment, and visits with Child. Mother also was
ordered to attend Child’s medical and developmental service appointments.
CYF developed a family plan which was meant to address the conditions that
led to the removal and placement of Child.
The trial court held permanency review hearings on May 10, 2022;
August 9, 2022; November 15, 2022; February 14, 2023; May 9, 2023; June
2 Mother’s parental rights as to J.C. were involuntarily terminated on March 1,
2022, and this Court upheld the termination. See In Int. of J.C., No. 334 WDA 2022 (Pa. Super. filed March 1, 2022) (unpublished memorandum).
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27, 2023, November 8, 2023; February 13, 2024; June 11, 2024; and
September 17, 2024. At each of these hearings, Mother was found to be non-
compliant with at least one of her court-ordered goals, and overall, Mother’s
progress was, at best, inconsistent. The trial court therefore repeatedly
ordered that Child would remain in foster care.
CYF’s petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights over
Child was filed on January 29, 2024. In the petition, CYF asserted that Mother
had not made adequate progress toward reunification with Child, and that the
conditions which caused the Child to be placed in care had not been, and would
not soon be, remedied. See CYF Petition for Involuntary Termination,
1/29/2024, at paras. 8-10.
The trial court held the termination hearing on November 1, 2024, and
November 20, 2024. Several witnesses testified at the hearing regarding
Mother’s progress on her court-ordered goals, as well as the best interests of
Child. The testimony of these witnesses established the following facts.
As to Mother’s IPV goal, a CYF caseworker (Ruth Weaver) testified that
there had been no recent IPV incidents between Mother and Father, and that
Mother was no longer required to participate in IPV treatment. As Child’s case
progressed, as of June 2023, IPV was no longer a court-ordered goal for
Mother. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 11/20/2024, at 325-26.
Despite her progress on her IPV goal, however, Mother did not
consistently make progress with other goals or address the circumstances that
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necessitated Child’s placement in foster care. As of February 2020, CYF has
referred Mother three times to the Pennsylvania Organization for Women in
Early Recovery (POWER), to assist Mother with her drug and alcohol goals. At
the termination hearing, the intake supervisor at POWER, Kevin Hoover,
testified that Mother had an initial evaluation in February 2020. POWER
diagnosed Mother with alcohol use disorder (mild), and cannabis use disorder
(mild), and POWER recommended that Mother receive intensive outpatient
treatment. POWER was unable to verify whether Mother had complied with
these recommendations. See id., at 10-13.
Mother completed a second POWER evaluation on March 11, 2022, and
she was diagnosed with alcohol use disorder (mild); cannabis use disorder (in
sustained remission); and an unspecified anxiety disorder. As a result of this
evaluation, it was recommended that Mother receive dual diagnosis treatment
for her mental health and substance issues. Hoover testified that POWER was
again unable to verify whether Mother had complied with these
recommendations. See id., at 13-16.
Mother completed her third and final POWER evaluation on February 26,
2024, at which time Mother was diagnosed with alcohol use disorder (mild),
in early remission; cannabis use disorder (mild), sustained remission; an
unspecified anxiety use disorder; and a major depressive disorder/unspecified
depressive disorder. POWER once more recommended that Mother should
undergo dual diagnosis treatment, but again, POWER could not verify that
Mother had complied with its recommendations. See id., at 15-16.
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Between January 2022 and the date of the termination hearing, Mother
attended 53 out of 131 court-ordered drug screens, missing 78 of them in that
span. On nine of the occasions on which Mother was screened, she tested
positive for marijuana metabolites, cocaine, and other controlled substances.
See id., at 46-50. As of the date of the termination hearing in November
2024, Mother had not submitted to a screen since July 10, 2024. See id., at
51.
Mother began mental health treatment at the Chartiers Center some
time in 2023. In July 2023, Mother’s outpatient therapist at the Chartiers
Center indicated that Mother likely needed to be in a higher level of care, such
as intensive outpatient treatment. Also around this time, Mother disclosed to
CYF that she had engaged in self-harming behaviors most of her life and that
she had recently re-engaged in such behavior in the summer of 2023 due to
stress stemming from the adoption of Child’s sibling, J.C. See id., at 121. In
April 2024, Mother was discharged from the Chartiers Center due to lack of
engagement with her treatment programs. Mother did not re-engage in
mental health treatment again until July 2024, at which time she entered a
dual diagnosis intensive outpatient treatment program through Positive
Pathways. See id., at 297-98.
Other goals for Mother were for her to consistently visit with Child and
participate in and attend Child’s medical and developmental service
appointments. Since her birth, Child has had special needs and medical
needs. Child has been diagnosed with Von Willebrand and neutropenia, and
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Child’s conditions frequently require her to receive emergency medical care
and to be seen by several different medical specialists. See id., at 227-28.
Further, Child receives developmental, occupational, and speech-related
therapies. See id. at 227-33.
At the termination hearing, the CYF permanency caseworker, Ciera
James, testified that at the time of Child’s birth, Mother was not compliant
with her court-ordered goals concerning Child. See id., at 194-96. This
testimony was corroborated by the CYF direct services caseworker, Jason Van
Ness, who stated that Mother had only attended four of 16 scheduled medical
appointments for Child. See id., at 216. CYF caseworker, Ruth Weaver,
testified that Mother also did not attend Child’s therapeutic services or hospital
visits, including one occasion when Child was being treated in a hospital
emergency room for pneumonia. See id., at 298-301.
Finally, visitation with Child was both court-ordered and set as a goal
for Mother in CYF’s family plan for reunification. Since January 2022, Mother
had been permitted to have four-hour long periods of unsupervised visits at
Child’s foster home. By May 2022, Mother was allowed to have overnight
visits with Child if she could consistently attend court-ordered drug screens.
However, Mother’s failure to consistently attend drug screens prevented her
from progressing to overnight visits. See id., at 300-01
Nevertheless, Mother continued to have unsupervised visits until July
11, 2023, at which point the trial court ordered that Mother’s visits with Child
would have to be fully supervised. The trial court did so in part out of concern
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for severe bruising discovered on the Child’s buttocks during an unsupervised
visit with Mother. These injuries required medical attention, and they were
sustained by Child during an unsupervised visit with Mother, who
subsequently refused to visit Child in the hospital emergency room, telling
caseworkers the injury “was not a big deal.” Id., at 238-39, 301. Mother’s
visits with Child remained fully supervised until February 2024, when the trial
court permitted Mother to have “bookended” visits so long as she consistently
submitted to drug screens. See id., at 97-98.3
Ultimately, by the spring of 2024, Mother’s visits again became fully
supervised due to Mother missing two drug screens. Further, throughout this
case, Mother did not attend visits consistently, and she never progressed to
overnight visits. Despite intermittent periods of unsupervised visits, Mother’s
visits have remained supervised since the spring of 2024. See N.T.
Termination Hearing, 11/20/2024, at 302-05. CYF was concerned that for the
past two years, Mother’s inconsistent visits with Child, lack of progress with
her own treatment, and lack of participation in Child’s medical needs and
therapies were detrimental to Child’s well being. See id., at 307.
As of the date of the instant termination hearing, Child had been in CYF
care for almost three years, having been removed from Mother’s care at the
time of her birth on January 7, 2022. Ciera James, who had observed Child
in her current foster home, testified that Child seems very comfortable with ____________________________________________
3 Bookended visits allow for a period of unsupervised time in between supervised portions of a visit.
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her foster parents, whom the Child looks to for comfort. James described
Child’s foster parents as being “very strong advocates for [Child].” N.T.
Termination Hearing, 11/1/2024, a 201. James opined that Child’s foster
parents are meeting all of Child’s needs, including her special needs, and the
foster home is a pre-adoptive resource for Child. See id., at 201-02.
Further, CYF caseworker Ruth Weaver testified that, in her view,
termination of Mother’s parental rights would best serve Child’s needs and
welfare, as Child requires permanency. It was Weaver’s opinion that, as of
the date of the termination hearings, Mother would be unable to provide for
Child’s needs and overall well-being. See N.T. Termination Hearing,
11/20/2024, at 310-12.
The opinions of CYF caseworkers in this regard were consistent with
those of Dr. Eric Bernstein, who conducted multiple psychological evaluations
in this case and testified as to his observations and assessments, as well as
his findings and conclusions based on these evaluations. In September 2023,
Dr. Bernstein performed an individual evaluation of Mother and an
interactional evaluation of Child with Mother. In February 2024, Dr. Bernstein
performed an interactional evaluation of Child with her current foster parents.
Most recently, in July 2024, Dr. Bernstein performed an updated individual
evaluation of Mother and an updated interactional evaluation of Child with
Mother. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 11/1/2024, at 79-82.
Based on the initial individual evaluation of Mother, Dr. Bernstein
diagnosed her with major depressive disorder (moderate). At the second
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individual evaluation, Mother was diagnosed with adjustment disorder (with
anxiety). Although it appeared that Mother had made some progress with her
mental health goal between her initial evaluation and her most recent
evaluation, Dr. Bernstein believed Mother’s mental health remained a major
concern. See id., at 83.
In fact, Dr. Bernstein was especially concerned that Mother continued
to lack accountability for the circumstances that led to Child’s removal from
her care. He explained that, “[o]ther than [Mother’s] own acknowledgement
of her mental health challenges historically, she has attributed responsibility
to the father for his misjudgment and violence.” Id., at 93. Dr. Bernstein
opined that Mother was minimizing her own alcohol usage and responsibility
for the episodes of domestic violence between her and Child’s father.
Dr. Bernstein testified that, in his opinion, termination of Mother’s
parental rights would best meet Child’s needs:
[Mother’s] condition to indulge in substance use in . . . interactions [with Child’s Father] . . . seems to be a notable factor which result seems to be correlated to violence, too. There’s issues regarding [Mother’s] investments in the attendance of visits, which is a pretty clear measure of [Mother’s] commitment and responsibility to work towards reunification. There is the matter that [C]hild is well connected to or attached to, if you will, the foster parents, that they provide [C]hild with a safe and stable home environment. To place [C]hild or to return [C]hild, excuse me, to one parent or the other’s care would not only compromise [C]hild’s established stability and security and even perhaps her thriving in adjustment but place her at risk given [Mother’s] own . . . struggles.
Id., at 101-102.
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From his interactional evaluations of Child with Mother in September of
2023 and July of 2024, Dr. Bernstein concluded that there was no significant
parental bond. Although he found Mother to exhibit some positive parenting
skills, he noted that on several occasions throughout the interactions, Child
pointed towards the door of the waiting room door, where her foster mother
was sitting. Although the interactions between Mother and Child appeared to
go well, Dr. Bernstein believed that Child’s primary bond and attachment was
with her foster parents. See id., at 117.
Dr. Bernstein’s opinion in this regard was in part based on his
interactional evaluation of Child with and her current foster parents in
February 2024. Dr. Bernstein found Child to have a “secure, healthy, and
strong” bond with Foster Parents and that Child views Foster Parents as her
psychological parents. Id., at 100. During the evaluation, Dr. Bernstein
observed that Child referred to her foster parents as “mama” and “dada.” Id.,
at 99. Dr. Bernstein also testified that Child’s foster parents are providing for
all of Child’s needs, and that Child appeared to be thriving in her foster home.
At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the trial court found that
CYF had proven by clear and convincing evidence that there existed grounds
for the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights under subsections
2511(a)(2) and 2511(a)(5) of the Adoption Act. See Trial Court 1925(a)
Opinion, 4/17/2025, at 6-10. The trial court also found that terminating
Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs of Child under subsection
2511(b). See id., at 11-13.
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Mother timely appealed the termination order, and in her brief, she now
raises two issues for our consideration:
I. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion by finding grounds to terminate the parental rights of Mother under 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), of the Adoption Act, where conditions that led to the removal of Child did not exist at the time of the filing of the petition or six months prior to the filing of [the petition to terminate parental rights].
II. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion in finding, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) of the Adoption Act, finding that the bond between Mother and Child was not necessary and beneficial.
Mother’s Brief, at 4-5 (numbering added).
At a hearing on a petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, the
party seeking termination has the burden of proving by “clear and convincing
evidence” that there are grounds which support the granting of the petition.
In re Adoption of B.G.S., 245 A.3d 700, 705 (Pa. Super. 2021). This
standard requires evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as
to enable the trier of fact to come to clear conviction, without hesitation, of
the truth of the precise facts at issue.” In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.
Super. 2000) (en banc) (citations omitted).
On review of an order granting or denying a petition to involuntarily
terminate parental rights, this Court must “accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the
record.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (quoting In re Adoption
of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012)). “If the factual findings are supported,
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appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or
abused its discretion.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (quoting In re Adoption
of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826).
A termination order cannot be vacated solely on the ground that the
record could support a different result. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “Absent
an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for
the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273,
276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). As the finder of fact at a termination
hearing, “[t]he trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and
resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super.
2004) (citation omitted).
Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, governs the
termination of parental rights, and requires a bifurcated analysis. See In re
L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007). “Initially, the focus is on the
conduct of the parent.” In re Adoption of A.C., 162 A.3d 1123, 1128 (Pa.
Super. 2017) (citation omitted). “The party seeking termination must prove
. . . that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
delineated in Section 2511(a).” Id. (Citation omitted).
If the trial court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants the
termination of parental rights over a child as to any single subsection of
section 2511(a), then the court must then engage in “the second part of the
analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare
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of the child under the standard of best interests of the child.” Id. (citation
omitted). In order to affirm a termination order, it is only necessary for this
Court to uphold the trial court’s decision as to a single subsection of Section
2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 758
(Pa. Super. 2008); see also In re K.R., 200 A.3d 969, 979 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(en banc) (stating that once a reviewing court has found that a trial court’s
determination as to one subsection of section 2511(a) is supported by the
record, it is unnecessary for the reviewing court to further consider the trial
court’s determinations as to additional subsections).
Mother’s first claim is that the trial court’s findings as to subsections
2511(a)(2) and 2511(a)(5) of the Adoption Act are unsupported by the record.
These provisions allow the rights of a parent in regard to a child to be
involuntarily terminated on the following grounds:
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
****
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of
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time and the termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (a)(5).
Here, we find that the record supports the trial court’s determination
that termination was warranted. Under subsection 2511(a)(2), termination
may be found proper where the party seeking termination has proven “(1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In re
Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).
Grounds for termination pursuant to section 2511(a)(2), however, “are
not limited to affirmative misconduct, but concern parental incapacity that
cannot be remedied.” Id. (citation omitted). “Parents are required to make
diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental
duties.” Id. (citation omitted). When a parent cannot do so, or cannot provide
a safe environment for the child, termination of parental rights is justified. In
re Adoption of Michael J.C., 486 A.2d 371, 375 (Pa. 1984).
The record establishes in the present case that Mother has had several
years to make progress on her goals for reunification. While she did make
some limited progress in her goals as to IPV, substance abuse, and mental
health, this did not occur prior to the filing of CYF’s petition for termination.
In fact, Mother’s progress was not evident until six months after the petition
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was filed. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother had only received a
few months of consistent dual diagnosis treatment.
Mother herself acknowledged that this was the longest period of stability
she has had since this case began. See N.T. Termination Hearing,
11/20/2024, at 438. Yet, Mother still refused to acknowledge that her drug,
alcohol, and mental health issues might require significant treatment in the
future. See id.
Since the inception of this case, CYF has attempted to assist Mother in
meeting her court-ordered goals and reunifying with her Child. CYF referred
Mother to POWER to address her substance abuse and mental health needs.
Mother failed to utilize her drug screens to prove consistent sobriety. She was
kept informed of all of Child’s many appointments and therapies, but Mother
did not consistently attend them. Nor has Mother consistently attended visits
with Child.
As of the date of Child’s birth, Mother has been either unwilling or
incapable of completing her goals and doing what was necessary for
reunification with Child. Moreover, Mother was unable to progress to
overnight visits with Child. At the time of the termination hearing, her visits
had been supervised for nearly a year. While visits generally went well,
Mother’s involvement with Child has been inconsistent throughout the case.
In sum, almost five years after CYF originally became involved with
Mother due to substance abuse, IPV, and mental health instability, and almost
three years after Child was born, Mother had still not completely remedied her
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substance abuse and mental health concerns, has not invested in Child’s many
needs, and has not consistently visited Child.
The trial court heard credible testimony that, after many years of
attempted services, Mother had only recently begun to make significant
progress on several of her goals. The record supports the trial court’s
conclusion that Mother’s repeated and continued incapacity, neglect, or refusal
has caused Child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for her physical and mental well-being. The record also confirms
that the causes of Mother's incapacity, neglect or refusal cannot or will not
soon be remedied. See id. Thus, the trial court did not err in finding
termination to be proper under subsection 2511(a)(2).
In light of our disposition as to subsection 2511(a)(2), it is not necessary
for this Court to consider the trial court’s rulings as to subsection 2511(a)(5).
See B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384; In re K.R., 200 A.3d at 979.4 We therefore
turn to the trial court’s findings as to subsection 2511(b), which gives “primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
When determining whether termination meets the needs and welfare of
the Children, courts “should consider the matter from the child’s perspective,
placing her developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare above ____________________________________________
4 We add that Mother has not briefed the discrete issue of whether the trial
court erred in finding termination to be warranted under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5). Accordingly, there are no specific contentions on the part of Mother to address as to that ruling.
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concerns for the parent.” Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023).
While the bond between parent and child is an important factor, courts must
ultimately determine whether the bond is necessary and beneficial to the child,
“i.e., whether maintaining the bond serves the child’s developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare.” Id., at 1113. Additionally,
[t]he determination of the child's particular developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare must be made on a case-by-case basis. We have observed the law regarding termination of parental rights should not be applied mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best interests and the needs and welfare of the particular children involved. Thus, the court must determine each child's specific needs.
Moreover, the child's emotional needs and welfare include intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability. As further guidance, we have identified factors, i.e., specific needs and aspects of the child's welfare, that trial courts must always consider. The courts must consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents. And, if the child has any bond with the biological parent, the court must conduct an analysis of that bond, which is not always an easy task.
Id., at 1105-06.
“The extent of any bond analysis . . . necessarily depends on the
circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63
(Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). “[O]nly a necessary and beneficial”
parental bond should be maintained. Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1009.
Such a bond is considered to be “necessary and beneficial” if severing it would
result in “extreme emotional consequences” or significant, irreparable harm
to the child. Id. at 1109-10.
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Further, “bond, plus permanency, stability and all ‘intangible’ factors
may contribute equally to the determination of a child's specific
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare, and thus are all of
‘primary’ importance in the [s]ection 2511(b) analysis.” Id., at 1109. It is
“within the discretion of the [trial] court to prioritize the safety and security
needs of [children] over their bonds with their parents[.]” Interest of M.E.,
283 A.3d 820, 839 (Pa. Super. 2022).
Here, the evidence established that Child was removed from Mother’s
care at the time of Child’s birth. CYF filed the petition to terminate Mother’s
parental rights when Child was almost three years old.
CYF caseworkers, Ciera James and Ruth Weaver, both testified that they
had observed Child in her pre-adoptive foster home on many occasions. The
Child was seen seeking comfort and affection from her foster parents, and all
of Child’s needs were met. Similarly, Dr. Bernstein testified that determining
the bond between a child and a caregiver includes not only observations of
the interaction between them, but also measuring investment and
responsivity of the caregiver. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 11/1/2024, at
124.
As to the bond between Child and Mother, Dr. Bernstein testified that
the interaction between them was positive. However, considering the
inconsistency of Mother’s visits, compounded by the lack of providing parental
responsibility on a regular basis, that bond was compromised. The bond he
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observed between Child and her foster parents was “strong, healthy, and
secure.” Id., at 100.
Dr. Bernstein testified that, in his expert opinion, termination would
serve Child’s best interests. He opined that the bond that exists between her
and Mother is not necessary, as Child is otherwise in full-time care with foster
parents whom she views as her psychological parents, and who meet her
everyday needs. See id., at 150. Dr. Bernstein opined further that severing
the bond that exists between Child and Mother would not have a significant
impact on her. See id. at 152.
Conversely, to remove Child from the home in which she has such
stability “could be tantamount to traumatic, and it could have a negative effect
on her emotional security, felt comfort, and her overall functioning emotionally
and developmentally as well.” Id., at 179.
In sum, the record establishes that Child has benefitted from the
stability of her pre-adoptive home for two years. The bond between Child and
her foster parents is strong and stable, and Child’s foster parents have met all
of Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs. The record also
shows that the bond between Mother and Child is not necessary, and that
terminating that bond would not result in extreme emotional consequences or
significant, irreparable harm to Child. Thus, as the record supports the trial
court’s findings, we discern no abuse of discretion, and the termination order
must be upheld.
Order affirmed.
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DATE: 11/5/2025
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