Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-18-00900-CV
IN THE ESTATE OF Marjorie A. CHILDS, Deceased
From the Probate Court No. 2, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2014PC0056 Honorable Tom Rickhoff, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Irene Rios, Justice Beth Watkins, Justice
Delivered and Filed: April 22, 2020
AFFIRMED
Mollie Allen Childs appeals a judgment declaring an agreement between Mollie and her
two sisters regarding the ownership of two brokerage accounts to be valid and enforceable based
on a jury’s findings. The jury found the agreement was supported by consideration and Mollie’s
failure to comply with the agreement was not excused by a mutual mistake. On appeal, Mollie
challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s findings. Mollie
also challenges the award of attorney’s fees. We affirm the probate court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
This is the second appeal to this court from the underlying probate case. In the first appeal,
this court reversed a summary judgment in Mollie’s favor holding “Mollie did not conclusively
establish either the lack of consideration or a mutual mistake of material fact.” In re Estate of 04-18-00900-CV
Childs, No. 04-15-00623-CV, 2016 WL 3452624, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 22, 2016,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (Childs I). We then remanded the cause for further proceedings. Id.
Mollie, Susan Addison, and Pamela McCaskill are the three daughters of Marjorie Allen
Childs. Marjorie was the only daughter of Bertha Allen.
Bertha’s friend, Alma Fehr, bequeathed Bertha some shares of stock in Fehr Baking
Company. By the time Bertha executed her will in 1980, the shares of stock in Fehr Baking
Company had been converted into shares of stock in Campbell Taggart Associated Bakeries, Inc.
Bertha’s will devised those shares of stock under the following provision of her will:
II. I give all shares of stock owned by me in Campbell Taggart Associated Bakeries, Inc. at the time of my death to my daughter, Marjorie Allen Childs, with the request that she use only the income in cash dividends from said shares during her lifetime and that on her death she make provision for said shares to be divided equally among her daughters, or the issue of any deceased daughter. Should it become wise at any time to sell these shares, it is my desire that the proceeds, or any reinvestment of the proceeds, be held and disposed of by my daughter at her death in the same manner.
Bertha passed away in 1981. At some point, Campbell Taggart was acquired by Anheuser Busch
Companies, and the Campbell Taggart shares then held by Marjorie were converted into shares of
stock in Anheuser Busch.
In 1992 or 1993, Marjorie placed some of the Anheuser Busch shares into a joint brokerage
account which she and Mollie could use as leverage to borrow and invest in other stock. Mollie
testified the purpose of opening the brokerage account was to diversify Marjorie’s assets. While
the shares were held in the brokerage account, Marjorie continued to receive the income from the
dividends paid on the shares while Mollie received all other income generated by the brokerage
account. At some point, the brokerage account was closed. Some of the shares transferred to the
brokerage account were sold to pay the brokerage account debt that was owed, and the remaining
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shares were placed into an account held by a revocable trust. Marjorie and Mollie were the co-
trustees of the trust, and Mollie, Pamela, and Susan were the beneficiaries.
On November 20, 2008, Marjorie executed a will containing the following provision
regarding the shares of stock she was bequeathed by Bertha:
Pursuant to the requirements of the life estate created for my benefit under Section II of the Will of Bertha Allen, the Anheuser Busch stock, which is derived from the Campbell Taggart Associated, Inc., stock addressed in the aforementioned Section II of Bertha Allen’s Will, shall be distributed to my daughters and their descendants, per stirpes. Furthermore, and also pursuant to the requirement of the life estate created for my benefit under Section II of Bertha Allen’s Will, if at the time of my death I no longer own the Anheuser Busch stock, then the proceeds or reinvestment of the proceeds shall be distributed to my daughters and their descendants, per stirpes.
In late 2008, Anheuser Busch was acquired by another company, and the Anheuser Busch
shares held by Marjorie were redeemed by the acquiring company for approximately $5.8 million.
The Anheuser Bush shares then held by the trust were apparently redeemed in a separate
transaction than the shares that were never transferred to the brokerage account. The money paid
for the shares held by the trust, approximately $1 million, was used to open a transfer on death
brokerage account with Raymond James & Associates, Inc. The money paid for the other shares,
approximately $4.8 million, was used to open a transfer on death brokerage account with RBC
Correspondent Services which the parties generally refer to as the Federated Securities account. 1
Mollie testified she prepared the account applications for both accounts which Marjorie
then signed. The Raymond James account listed Mollie as the only beneficiary. The Federated
Securities account listed Mollie, Pamela, and Susan as beneficiaries. Although Pamela and Susan
received statements for the Federated Securities account and were able to request trades in that
account, they did not receive any information regarding the Raymond James account.
1 The account application refers to RBC Correspondent Services while the account statements refer to Federated Securities.
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After the Anheuser Busch stock redemption, Pamela, Susan, and Mollie began exchanging
e-mails regarding the transfer on death accounts and the terms of Bertha’s and Marjorie’s wills.
Pamela, Susan, and Mollie all initially believed Bertha’s will gave Marjorie a life estate in the
shares of stock she received under Bertha’s will with Pamela, Susan, and Mollie as equal
remaindermen. In the e-mails, Pamela and Mollie discussed whether the transfer on death accounts
altered that disposition in the wills. Although Susan was not as involved in the discussion, she
was copied on several e-mails, and sent at least one e-mail asking about the Raymond James
account. As a result of their discussions, Pamela, Mollie, and Susan entered into an agreement in
2012 which provided, in pertinent part as follows:
Agreement Regarding Remainder Interests Of Bertha Allen Life Estate
Pamela Ann Childs McCaskill (Pam), Susan Kaye Childs Addison (Susan), and Mollie Allen Childs (Mollie) are the three daughters and only children of Marjorie A. Childs. For value received and hereby acknowledged Pam, Susan and Mollie hereby agree as follows: The entire assets subject to the life estate created by the will of Bertha Allen and referenced in the will of Marjorie A. Childs signed November 20, 2008, are contained within 2 brokerage accounts styled “Mollie Childs POA U/W Bertha Allen DTD 12/5/2008 FBO Marjorie Childs Life Tenant”. One brokerage account is held under account [number] at Federated Securities, the other under account [number] at Raymond James & Associates. In the event Pamela, Susan and Mollie are living at the time of death of Marjorie A. Childs, the accounts are to be divided and distributed as follows: The Federated Securities account to be split equally and distributed between Pam and Susan; the Raymond James account to be distributed in its entirety to Mollie. In the event one or two of the distributees predeceases Marjorie A. Childs, that portion of the assets subject to the life estate that would have been distributed to the heir/heirs shall be distributed in equal parts to the surviving heir/heirs named under the wills of Bertha Allen and Marjorie A. Childs.
Marjorie died on December 17, 2013. After Marjorie’s will was admitted to probate,
Mollie filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the 2012 agreement was unenforceable
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based on mutual mistake or lack of consideration. Pamela and Susan filed various counterclaims
including counterclaims seeking to declare the 2012 agreement was valid and enforceable. As
previously noted, the probate court initially granted summary judgment in Mollie’s favor;
however, this court reversed the judgment and remanded the cause to the probate court for further
proceedings. See id.
Prior to trial, Pamela and Mollie settled their claims against each other. After three days
of evidence was presented to the jury, the jury was charged with answering the following questions
on the issues of consideration and mutual mistake:
QUESTION NO. 1:
With respect to the 2012 Agreement [PX26], do you find that Mollie did receive a benefit or Susan did incur a detriment?
Answer “Yes” or “No.”
Answer: ___________
QUESTION NO. 2:
Was Mollie Child’s failure to comply with the 2012 Agreement [PX26] excused?
Failure to comply with an agreement is excused if the agreement was made as the result of a mutual mistake.
A mutual mistake results from a mistake of fact common to both parties if both parties had the same misconception concerning the fact in question. A mistake by one party but not the other is not a mutual mistake.
A mistake of persons as to their private legal rights and interests is a mistake of fact.
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The jury answered the first question “yes” and the second question “no.” 2 After denying Mollie’s
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the probate court entered judgment declaring
the 2012 agreement to be valid and enforceable and awarding Susan attorney’s fees. The probate
court subsequently denied Mollie’s motion for new trial. Mollie appeals.
SUFFICIENCY
In her first two issues, Mollie challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence
to support the jury’s findings.
A. Burden of Proof
Mutual mistake is an affirmative defense. Santos v. Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co., 471
S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex. 1971) (per curiam); Garza v. Villarreal, 345 S.W.3d 473, 483 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2011, pet. denied). “‘The hallmark characteristic’ of an affirmative defense ‘is that
the burden of proof is on the defendant to present sufficient evidence to establish the defense and
obtain the requisite [jury] findings.’” Teal Trading & Dev., LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Prop.
Owners Ass’n, 593 S.W.3d 324, 333 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Zorrilla v. Aypco Constr. II, LLC, 469
S.W.3d 143, 156 (Tex. 2015)).
“The existence of a written contract . . . presumes consideration for its execution.” TLC
Hosp., LLC v. Pillar Income Asset Mgmt., Inc., 570 S.W.3d 749, 761 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2018, pet.
denied); accord Doncaster v. Hernaiz, 161 S.W.3d 594, 603 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no
pet.). “[T]he party alleging lack of consideration has the burden of proof to rebut th[e]
presumption.” 3 TLC Hosp., LLC, 570 S.W.3d at 761; accord Doncaster, 161 S.W.3d at 603.
2 Because the jury answered “no” to the second question, the jury did not answer the following additional question because it was premised on a “yes” answer to the second question: “Did Susan Addison substantially rely to her detriment on Mollie Childs’ promise, if any, and was this reliance foreseeable by Mollie Childs?” 3 We disagree with Mollie’s contention that the jury charge altered this burden of proof. We also note this court has generally stated “what constitutes consideration is a question of law.” Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. White, No. 04-12- 00721-CV, 2017 WL 32899, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 4, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). But see Hous. Med. Testing Servs., Inc. v. Mintzer, 417 S.W.3d 691, 696 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (“As an initial
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B. Standard of Review
“The test for legal sufficiency is ‘whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable
and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.’ We credit evidence favoring the finding
if a reasonable factfinder could and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder
could not.” Teal Trading & Dev., LP, 593 S.W.3d at 333 (quoting City of Keller v. Wilson, 168
S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005)). “A legal sufficiency challenge fails if more than a scintilla of
evidence supports the finding.” Tex. Outfitters Ltd., LLC v. Nicholson, 572 S.W.3d 647, 653 (Tex.
2019).
In reviewing a factual sufficiency issue, we consider all the evidence supporting and
contradicting the finding. Plas–Tex., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex. 1989).
“When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which she has
the burden of proof, she must demonstrate on appeal that the adverse finding is against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence.” Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex.
2001). In our review, we “must consider and weigh all of the evidence, and can set aside a verdict
only if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance
of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust.” Id.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury’s findings, “we do not
serve as a fact finder, pass upon the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of
the trier of fact, even if there is conflicting evidence upon which a different conclusion could be
matter, it was unnecessary for the jury to find that consideration supported the parties’ agreement because the question of consideration, while sometimes based upon ultimate facts found by the jury, is generally a question of law.”); Sibley v. Lawson, No. 11-12-00235-CV, 2014 WL 4347837, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 29, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op) (“The parties’ dispute regarding the consideration supporting the 2006 note is a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment.”). However, both the Texas Supreme Court and this court in Childs I have reversed summary judgments, holding the absence of consideration was not conclusively established, and, in its decision, the Texas Supreme Court remanded the cause for “a trial on the merits.” Roark v. Stallworth Oil & Gas, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 492, 496 (Tex. 1991); In re Estate of Childs, 2016 WL 3452624, at *4. On appeal, neither party raises a challenge to the submission of the issue to the jury.
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supported.” Hausman v. Hausman, 199 S.W.3d 38, 41 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.).
“Jurors are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony.
They may choose to believe one witness and disbelieve another.” City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at
819 (footnote omitted).
C. Consideration
As this court asserted in Childs I:
“Consideration is a bargained-for exchange of promises or return performance and consists of benefits and detriments to the contracting parties. . . . The surrender of a legal right constitutes valid consideration to support a contract.” Marx v. FDP, LP, 474 S.W.3d 368, 378 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. denied). “The compromise of doubtful and conflicting claims is good and sufficient consideration to uphold a settlement agreement.” Garza v. Villarreal, 345 S.W.3d 473, 483 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied). “To constitute valid consideration, forbearance to sue must be upon a right asserted in good faith, and as to a contention which the party relying on the forbearance had reasonable grounds for believing would be upheld.” S.A. Dome, L.L.C. v. Maloney Dev. P’ship, Ltd., No. 04-04- 00586-CV, 2005 WL 1398106, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 15, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.).
2016 WL 3452624, at *3.
Under the facts of this case, we find the Eastland court’s decision in Iden v. Ackerman, 280
S.W.2d 643 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1955, writ ref’d), instructive. In Iden, Ellis and Dorothy Iden
filed a suit against Mildred Ackerman and Helen Clanton seeking to rescind and cancel a mineral
deed which conveyed to Mildred and Helen a mineral interest in an eighty-acre tract of land. Id.
at 644–45. Mildred and Helen were the daughters of Clyde and Effie McKee, and Dorothy was
the sister of either Clyde or Effie. Id.
In 1934, Clyde and Effie purchased an eighty-acre tract of land, executing two vendor’s
lien notes as part of the consideration for the purchase which notes constituted community debt.
Id. After Effie died intestate in 1935, Clyde was unable to pay the vendor’s lien notes, so he
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conveyed the eighty-acre tract of land to Ellis who assumed the debt as partial consideration for
the conveyance. Id. at 645. Ellis subsequently paid the vendor’s lien notes in full. Id.
In 1954, Mildred filed an affidavit in the deed records reciting that she and Helen owned
and claimed an interest in the eighty-acre tract of land as Effie’s heirs. Iden, 280 S.W.2d at 645.
A few days later, Ellis and Dorothy executed a mineral deed conveying a mineral interest in the
land to Mildred and Helen, and, in exchange, Mildred and Helen executed a quitclaim deed
conveying to Ellis and Dorothy any interest they had in the surface estate of the land. Id. In their
subsequent suit, Ellis and Dorothy asserted the quitclaim deed did not convey any interest to them
because Mildred and Helen did not have any interest in the land. Id. Therefore, Ellis and Dorothy
alleged the mineral deed and the quitclaim deed lacked consideration. Id.
After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Mildred and Helen, finding
the parties entered into a settlement agreement which they made effective by executing the deeds.
Id. at 646. On appeal, Ellis and Dorothy asserted no evidence existed of a dispute between the
parties at the time the settlement was purportedly consummated. Id. Iden rejected the assertion:
We cannot agree with the contention that the contract of compromise and settlement was without consideration. Generally, a mutual agreement to compromise a dispute is of itself a valuable consideration sufficient to support the contract. It was found by the court and appellants concede that Mildred Ackerman and Helen Clanton, in good faith, believed that they, as heirs of their mother, owned an interest in the land. The evidence shows that appellees were pressing their claim. Under such circumstances there was a valuable consideration for a contract of compromise in compliance with which deeds were exchanged vesting in the parties agreed interests in the land.
Id. (citations omitted). The court further noted the disputed claim was sufficient consideration
even though Mildred and Helen’s claim was in fact “unfounded.” Id. (quoting 15 C.J.S.
Compromise & Settlement § 11); see also Burgamy v. Davis, 313 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 1958, no writ) (“The test is not whether the debtor was correct in his contention, in
that he really had a legal or equitable defense to the claim in whole or in part, but consists in the
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fact that he in good faith urged or asserted a defense which he really believed was substantial.”);
In re Swift, 198 B.R. 927, 939 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996) (“It is settled law that an agreement to
release a claim held in good faith, even if the claim in fact turns out to be without merit, is sufficient
consideration to support a compromise and settlement.”). Therefore, having found “there was
evidence of a dispute between the parties at the time of the compromise agreement,” the court held
the agreement was supported by consideration. Iden, 280 S.W.2d at 646. After further rejecting
Ellis and Dorothy’s argument regarding a mutual mistake, the court stated the law and equity favor
settlements among family members:
Voluntary compromise settlements, . . . among members of the same family . . . where a claim is asserted in good faith by one or more of the parties and they intentionally put an end to all controversy by a voluntary transaction in the way of a compromise, are highly favored by courts of equity. They will not be disturbed for any ordinary mistake either of law or fact. Where all parties have the same knowledge, or means of obtaining knowledge, in respect to the circumstances concerning their rights, and there is no fraud, misrepresentation, concealment or conduct otherwise inequitable on the part of the other party, voluntary settlements entered into should be upheld, although the final issue may be different from that which was anticipated, and although the disposition made by the parties in their agreement may not be that which the court would have decreed had the dispute been brought before it for decision.
Id. at 647 (quoting Wedegartner v. Reichert, 218 S.W.2d 304, 309 (Tex. App.—Waco 1948, writ
ref’d n.r.e.)).
In the instant case, the e-mails exchanged between Mollie, Pamela, and Susan are evidence
of a dispute between them regarding their respective rights under the wills and the effect of the
transfer on death accounts on those rights. Although Susan may have been less vocal in the
dispute, there is sufficient evidence that she had the same dispute and concern as evidenced by her
specific request for information regarding the Raymond James account. 4 We recognize that the
4 We note the evidence included Pamela’s response to an e-mail from Mollie dated March 4, 2012. In Mollie’s e- mail, she pleads with Pamela not to “do this” in response to Pamela’s e-mail informing Mollie she would be hearing from her “directly” after she had spoken with Susan “or you and mother will be hearing from someone representing
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probate court subsequently entered a partial summary judgment concluding that the bequeath of
the Campbell Taggert stock in Bertha’s will conveyed the stock “outright to her daughter, Marjorie
Childs, and did not create a life estate.” But the fact that the dispute was unfounded under the law
does not affect the jury’s finding that consideration existed. See Iden, 280 S.W.2d at 646. Just as
Mildred and Helen were “pressing their claim” that they owned an interest in the land in Iden, see
id., the jury could find from the evidence in the instant case that Susan was also “pressing [her]
claim” that she was entitled to one-half of the Federated Securities account. Susan based her claim
on the life estate she believed was created by Bertha’s will and the prior conveyance of stock into
the joint brokerage account—from which Mollie received income of an undisclosed amount and
which resulted in the sale of some shares of stock to pay off the account debt at the time the account
was closed. 5
In her reply brief, Mollie asserts the 2012 agreement was not a family settlement agreement
as that term is used in the probate context. We agree. See In re Estate of Lee, 551 S.W.3d 802,
816 n.10 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (“The Agreement is not properly classified as a
family settlement agreement because it does not dispose of all of the estate’s property.”); In re
Estate of Halbert, 172 S.W.3d 194, 200 n.11 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. denied) (noting
family settlement agreements “must contain both an agreement not to probate a will and an agreed
plan of distribution to replace the plan set forth in the will”). We disagree, however, that this
affects the jury’s finding. A settlement agreement is favored in law and equity in the probate
context even if the agreement is not considered a “family” settlement agreement. See
us.” In Pamela’s response to Mollie’s plea, Pamela informed Mollie that Susan’s attorney told her she had a case three years ago, and Susan had not spoken to Pamela since Pamela would not join her in a lawsuit. Pamela further noted, “She said that you would probably continue to try and screw us—and based upon the last four years of doing battle with you over almost everything to do with the RBC account and your last e[-]mail it is clear to me that perhaps she was correct.” 5 The jury could also have found from the evidence that one-third of the total number of shares of Anheuser Busch stock then held by Marjorie had been transferred to the joint brokerage account.
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Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 178 (Tex. 1997) (“Texas law favors and
encourages voluntary settlements and orderly dispute resolution.”).
We overrule Mollie’s first issue.
D. Mutual Mistake
Mollie next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s finding that her
compliance with the 2012 agreement was not excused by a mutual mistake of fact. Specifically,
Mollie contends Pamela’s, Susan’s, and her belief—that Bertha’s will created a life estate—was a
mutual mistake of fact.
The jury was properly instructed in the charge that “[a] mistake of persons as to their private
legal rights and interests is a mistake of fact.” 6 See Herrmann v. Lindsey, 136 S.W.3d 286, 292
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.) (“[I]f the parties at issue enter into the contract based on
a mutual mistake about some legal right a party possesses or does not possess prior to the contract
at issue, the party may be entitled to rescission of the contract on equitable grounds.”); Furnace v.
Furnace, 783 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ dism’d w.o.j.)
(quoting Columbian Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Dixie Co-op, 276 S.W. 219, 221–22 (Tex. Comm’n App.
1925, judgm’t adopted)) (noting a contract may be set aside if it was based on a mutual mistake as
to private legal rights and interests). One of the factual issues the jury was required to consider in
answering this question was whether Mollie was actually mistaken about the existence of the life
estate.
6 We note “it is the court’s charge, not some other unidentified law, that measures the sufficiency of the evidence when the opposing party fails to object to the charge.” Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 55 (Tex. 2000). Although we acknowledge this instruction was discussed during the jury charge conference, it is unclear whether Susan was objecting to the instruction as not being a correct statement of the law as opposed to not being law applicable to the facts of the case. On appeal, Susan contends the question regarding mutual mistake should not have been submitted, not that the instruction was an erroneous statement of the law.
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At trial, Mollie initially testified she first discovered Bertha’s will contained “precatory
language,” which resulted in an outright bequest of the stock to Marjorie as opposed to the creation
of a life estate, when the probate court judge made reference to that term during the hearing on
Susan’s contest to her appointment as independent executor. See Knopf v. Gray, 545 S.W.3d 542,
547 n.7 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) (“Precatory language requests, recommends, or expresses a desire
rather than a command.”). Evidence was presented, however, that Mollie referenced that term in
an e-mail to Pamela on March 1, 2009, more than three years before the 2012 agreement was
signed. In that e-mail, Mollie referred to Marjorie choosing “to pass [the stock] on to us” and
asserted “you may or may not accept that she had a choice but the precatory language of the will
[Bertha] wrote did leave mom the choice.” In an earlier e-mail to Pamela dated February 28, 2009,
Mollie asserted “please understand that when mom revised her will this year, she decided to follow
grandmother’s will but she was not obligated to do so . . . . [I]t is and always has been mother’s
money.” Finally, in a subsequent e-mail to Pamela also dated February 28, 2009, Mollie quotes
an e-mail she sent to Susan which stated, “Please keep in mind the account is and always has been
mother’s property . . . .”
Mollie’s brief cites to evidence the jury could consider in finding she believed Bertha’s
will created a life estate and that Marjorie’s will controlled over the transfer on death accounts,
including e-mails in which Mollie reassures Pamela and Susan that Marjorie’s will controls over
the transfer on death accounts. 7 The jury, however, was free to believe Mollie took actions and
made reassurances despite believing the “precatory” language in Bertha’s will did not create a life
estate and that the transfer on death accounts would control. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at
819. Such a finding was particularly within the jury’s province given Mollie’s initial testimony
7 In her reply brief, Mollie emphasizes the references to life estate in the 2012 agreement; however, the jury was required to consider all the evidence.
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that she first heard the term “precatory” from the probate court judge. See id. Because we defer
to the jury’s assessment regarding the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given the
evidence, and because the jury may choose to believe some statements made by Mollie and to
disbelieve others, we conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s
finding that Mollie was not excused from complying with the 2012 agreement. See id.
We overrule Mollie’s second issue.
ATTORNEY’S FEES
In her final issue, Mollie contends the probate court abused its discretion in awarding Susan
$184,319.20 in attorney’s fees because (1) the award was not just and equitable, 8 and (2) Susan
failed to segregate her fees among her various counterclaims.
Because Susan sought a declaratory judgment, Mollie concedes the probate court was
statutorily authorized to award “reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.”
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009. Under section 37.009, “[t]he decision of
whether to award attorney’s fees is within the discretion of the trial court, but the question of
whether attorney’s fees are equitable and just is a question of law.” City of Lorena v. BMTP
Holdings, L.P., 409 S.W.3d 634, 646 (Tex. 2013). “The determination of what fees are equitable
and just is ‘not susceptible to direct proof but is rather a matter of fairness in light of all the
circumstances.’” Minihan v. O’Neill, No. 04-18-00847-CV, 2020 WL 444381, at *9 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio Jan. 29, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Ridge Oil Co. v. Guinn Invs., Inc., 148
S.W.3d 143, 162 (Tex. 2004)).
8 The parties stipulated the fees were reasonable and necessary.
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A. Equitable and Just Fees
Here, Susan prevailed at a jury trial, and based on the jury’s findings, the probate court
declared the 2012 agreement to be valid and enforceable. Accordingly, we conclude the award of
attorney’s fees was equitable and just. See id.
B. Segregating Fees
“[A] claimant must segregate legal fees accrued for those claims for which attorney’s fees
are recoverable from those that are not.” Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 427 (Tex. 2017)
(citing Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 314 (Tex. 2006)). “[T]he need to
segregate fees is a question of law.” Tony Gullo Motors I, 212 S.W.3d at 312. However, “when
discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim [such] that they are so
intertwined [then] they need not be segregated.” Id. at 313–14.
Here, all of Susan’s claims were based on the same facts regarding the 2012 agreement and
Mollie’s statements relating to that agreement, including her statements relating to the stock, the
wills, and the transfer on death accounts. Accordingly, we conclude segregation was not required.
We overrule Mollie’s third issue.
CONCLUSION
Having concluded the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s
findings, and the probate court did not err in awarding attorney’s fees, we affirm the probate court’s
judgment.
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
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