in the Estate of Johnnie Mae King

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided November 3, 2015·No. 04-15-00271-CV·Published

Opinion

ACCEPTED 04-15-00271-CV FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 11/3/2015 11:58:52 PM KEITH HOTTLE CLERK

Case No. 04-15-00271-CV

ROWLAND J. MARTIN ) IN THE COURT OF'APPEAL FILED IN Appellant ) 4th COURT OF APPEALS ) SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS v. ) FOR THE FOURTH11/3/2015 DISTRICT 11:58:52 PM ) KEITH E. HOTTLE BEXAR COUNTY, et al. ) Clerk Appellees ) BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS

APPELLANT’S OPPOSED MOTION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION, FOR REHEARING, FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE REPLY BRIEF, AND RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS FILED ON OCTOBER 21, 2015

TO THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS:

NOW COMES Appellant, Rowland J. Martin, Heir, Creditor, and De Facto

Administrator for the Estate of King, and files this, his "Appellant’s Opposed Motion For

Temporary Injunction, For Rehearing, For Extension Of Time To File Reply Brief, And

Opposition To Motions Filed On October 21, 2015” in support of which the following is shown:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Pursuant to T.R.A.P. 52.1, and in opposition to the motions filed on October 21, 2015.

Appellant moves the Court for a temporary injunction order to enjoin Bexar County from relying

on orders of the Bexar County Probate Court #1 that permit it to continue collection activities

and litigation in violation of the guiding principles of San Antonio Area Foundation v. Lang,

2000 WL 1675984 (Tex. 2000). Because Appellant desires to proceed with the filing of a reply

brief without prejudice from the county’s intervening motions on October 21, 2015, the proposed

temporary injunction is specifically intended to cover the attached Probate Court orders issued

on July 21, 2015 and July 30, 2015, as both are alleged to be void for reasons explained below.

Ex Parte Shaffer, 649 S.W. 2d 300 (Tex. 1983). Lastly, a rehearing on the Court’s orders of

1 October 20, 2015 and October 22, 2015, and an extension of time to file a reply brief until after

a final disposition of this motion are also requested.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

The County’s argument that Appellant’s brief somehow employs a new definition of real

property is transparently frivolous. In San Antonio Area Foundation, the Supreme Court noted

the guiding principle that “[t]he Probate Code defines personal property as ‘interests in goods,

money, choses in action, evidence of debts, and chattels real’ … Promissory notes, net-profit

agreements, and cash are personal property, not real property.” Id. (citing Tex. Probate Code §

58(c) (Vernon Supp. 1999)). By excluding real chattels from the re-codified definition in Estates

Code Section 1002.027, the Legislature continued the same fundamental definition of real

property that was approved by the Supreme Court thirteen years earlier in San Antonio Area

Foundation, Id. Both authorities teach that a probate claimant lacks prudential standing to assert

real property issues against interests that lie outside the statutory definition of real property. If so,

the County abused the judicial process in Case No. 2004-TA1-02802 from at least 2006 to 2013

because the res of that litigation included subject matter other than real property which the

County has authority to tax - namely governmentally demolished improvements to land. Equally

important, the County breached its contract with the voters by repeatedly and maliciously

hindering Appellant’s good faith attempts to remove the resulting clouds on title to estate

property prior to the vacatur of its default judgment in 2013. Gallagher Headquarters Ranch

Development, Ltd. v. City of San Antonio, 269 SW3d 628 (Tex. 2010).

2 ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

A. The Texas Supreme Court Has Probable Dominant Supervisory Jurisdiction Over Questions Of Law Relating To Appellant’s Standing Under Estates Code 1002.027.

Notice is given that the Texas Supreme Court retained jurisdiction in case No. 15-0541

on October 26, 2015, and that to preserve opportunities for effective relief in that case, Appellant

has filed a companion petition for a writ of mandamus in the Texas Supreme Court with requests

for extraordinary relief pursuant to Ex parte Shaffer and San Antonio Area Foundation. By this

motion, Appellant demonstrates the following: (1) that he has a prima facie void order claim with

which to challenge the removal order on July 30, 2015 for want of plenary jurisdiction following

the filing of a final supplemental notice of appeal on July 27, 2015 and as unsupported by

evidence insofar as it recites that no settlement was filed; (2) that he has a probable right to relief

for defective service due to the Probate Court’s prior reliance on a summons addressed to “The

Estate of Rafael G. Trevino” in connection with the show cause order dated July 21, 2015; and

(3) that his protected liberty and property interest in pending claims in the Texas Supreme Court,

in this Court, and in the 150th District Court and the 285th District Court will be exposed to

unlawful inverse condemnation without due process, unless he is allowed to wind up the

business of the estate administration in the same capacity with which he originally invoked the

Court’s appellate jurisdiction in this case.

B. The Probate Court Lacked Plenary Jurisdiction To Exercise Removal Authority In A Biased Prosecutorial Capacity.

In support of the requested relief, Appellant asserts the Probate Court’s recitals about

noncompliance with settlement deadlines are simply incorrect, as noted in Appellant’s brief and

supporting exhibits, and that the order purporting to remove him from his appointment as Estate

Administrator is void under Ex parte Shaffer, Id. In Shaffer, a probate court issued an order

3 covering an executor that was eventually declared by the Supreme Court to be void due to an

impermissible abridgment of the relator’s due process rights. Shaffer supports the principle that

an estate executor is under no obligation to comply with an order of a Probate Court that is void.

Id. Here, the void order issue arises from the Probate Court’s removal proceedings on July 21,

2015 and July 30, 2015, respectively. The proposition advanced by the County, that the Proabte

Court can deprive an administrator’s standing to prosecute an appeal from a disputed order, after

the filing of the notice of appeal, flies in the face of the due process principles upheld in Ex parte

Shaffer, Id.

Applying Shaffer, relief is necessary, first and foremost, to enforce Appellant’s privilege

to vindicate the judicially authorized definition of real property set forth in San Antonio Area

Foundation, Id. In Probate Court, the County expressly waived objections to Appellant’s tender

of undisputed evidence of demolished improvements though its private counsel Attorney

Elizabeth Conry Davidson. Yet, the Probate Court extended inexplicable preferential treatment

to the County by disregarding the jurisdictional facts bearing on the County’s non-compliance

with the real property definition in Estates Code 1002.027. Subsequently, the Probate Court

irrationally refused to issue findings of jurisdictional fact relevant to questions of law arising

under San Antonio Area Foundation, Id.

“Under our form of government, the legitimacy of the judiciary rests in large part upon a

stable and predictable decision making process that differs dramatically from that properly

employed by the political branches of government.” Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316, 320

(Tex. 1995).

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