In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-26-00054-CV
IN THE ESTATE OF GORDY CLINTON LYNCH, DECEASED
On Appeal from the 97th District Court Montague County, Texas1 Trial Court No. 25-169-DCCV-0224, Honorable Trish Coleman Byars, Presiding
March 31, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Appellant, Brian E. Powers, appeals from four orders issued in the probate
proceedings of the Estate of Gordy Clinton Lynch. Appellees, Kelli Alker, Kerri Hudson,
and Melody Hamilton, move to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, contending
Powers’s notice of appeal was untimely. We agree and dismiss the appeal.
1 This matter was transferred from the Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth pursuant to a docket
equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. We apply the Second Court’s precedent to the extent it conflicts with our own. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. BACKGROUND
In 2022, Powers filed an application to probate the will of Gordy Clinton Lynch,
deceased. The trial court probated the will and issued letters testamentary to Powers as
independent executor. Thereafter, Appellees began to challenge Powers’s administration
of the Estate and his compensation, including fees sought for services he provided as
both executor and a licensed attorney. Appellees moved to remove Powers, appoint a
successor independent executor, require Powers to deliver all Estate funds to the
successor executor, and deny Powers any attorney or executor fees from the Estate.
On May 15, 2025, the trial court signed an Amended Order Removing Independent
Executor,2 removing Powers as executor; ordering him to deliver all assets of the Estate
to his successor, once appointed; and directing him to surrender all letters testamentary. 3
On July 14, 2025, the trial court signed three additional orders concerning Powers’s
compensation: (1) an Order for Disgorgement of Attorney Fees, disgorging $240,000 of
attorney fees paid to Powers by Hamilton; (2) an Order Denying Executor’s Commission
and Expenses, denying Powers “any and all executor’s commissions and fees in his
capacity as Independent Executor”; and (3) an Order Authorizing Payment of Attorney’s
Fees and Expenses, directing the Estate to pay Powers $10,000 in attorney fees.
Hamilton later moved to sever the Order for Disgorgement of Attorney Fees. On
October 7, 2025, the trial court signed an order severing the Amended Order Removing
Independent Executor, Order for Disgorgement of Attorney Fees, Order Denying
2 The trial court previously signed an Order Removing Independent Executor on May 7, 2025.
3 L. Stephen Franscini posted bond as temporary administrator of the Estate on July 14, 2025.
2 Executor’s Commission and Expenses, and Order Authorizing Payment of Attorney’s
Fees and Expenses into a separate cause. Powers appealed all four orders on December
2, 2025.
ANALYSIS
A timely notice of appeal is essential to invoking this Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(b), 26.1; Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 616–17 (Tex.
1997). Absent a timely post-judgment motion extending the deadline, a notice of appeal
must be filed within thirty days after the trial court signs a final judgment. TEX. R. APP. P.
26.1(a).
As a general rule, appeals may be taken only from final judgments or from
interlocutory orders made appealable by statute. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39
S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Probate proceedings, however, are an established
exception to the “one final judgment” rule. Brittingham-Sada de Ayala v. Mackie, 193
S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006). Because probate administration often unfolds in discrete
stages, multiple orders may be final for purposes of appeal if they conclusively resolve a
particular phase of the proceeding. Id. This exception reflects the practical need to permit
appellate review of controlling intermediate decisions before error can affect later phases
of the administration. Id.
Accordingly, to determine whether Powers’s notice of appeal was timely filed, we
must first decide whether the trial court’s orders were final and appealable. In probate
matters, finality is evaluated under the two-part test articulated in Crowson v. Wakeham,
897 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1995). If a statute expressly declares a particular type of probate
3 order final and appealable, that statute controls. See TEX. ESTATES CODE § 32.001(c) (“A
final order issued by a probate court is appealable to the court of appeals.”); Crowson,
897 S.W.2d at 783. Otherwise, an order is appealable if it adjudicates a substantial right
and disposes of all issues in a discrete phase of the proceeding. Id. at 782–83.
Conversely, an order is interlocutory if it is part of a continuing proceeding in which other
pleadings remain pending that leave issues or parties unresolved. Id. at 783.
Applying that framework requires identification of the relevant phase of the probate
proceeding. The orders at issue removed Powers as independent executor, required
disgorgement of $240,000 in attorney fees, awarded $10,000 in attorney fees, and denied
any additional compensation. These rulings concern two discrete matters: Powers’s
status as independent executor and the determination of his compensation in that
capacity.
As to the first prong of the Crowson test, there is no express statute in the Estates
Code designating the removal of an independent executor or the determination of the
executor’s compensation as final and appealable. We therefore proceed to the second
prong and consider whether such orders adjudicate a substantial right and conclude a
discrete phase of the probate proceeding.
In this case, Appellees filed a joint motion seeking removal of Powers as
independent executor, asserting that he failed to file an accounting, engaged in gross
misconduct and mismanagement of the estate, and was incapable of fulfilling his fiduciary
duties due to material conflicts of interest. The motion sought both Powers’s removal and
the denial of his executor and attorney fees.
4 Texas appellate courts have consistently recognized that an order removing an
executor or administrator adjudicates a substantial right because it conclusively resolves
the specific issue for which that portion of the probate proceeding was initiated. See, e.g.,
Spies v. Milner, 928 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no writ)
(disqualification of executrix adjudicated her substantial right to serve and was a final,
appealable order); In re Estate of Boren, 268 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2008, pet. denied) (“The right to serve as the executor of an estate is a ‘substantial right’
and a denial of that right is a final and appealable order.”). Thus, to be appealable, the
order only has to finally dispose of the issue or controverted question for which that
particular part of the proceeding was brought. In re Estate of Boren, 268 S.W.3d at 845.
When the trial court issued its orders removing Powers and awarding him only
$10,000 in compensation, there were no ongoing proceedings relevant to that specific
issue.
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In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-26-00054-CV
IN THE ESTATE OF GORDY CLINTON LYNCH, DECEASED
On Appeal from the 97th District Court Montague County, Texas1 Trial Court No. 25-169-DCCV-0224, Honorable Trish Coleman Byars, Presiding
March 31, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Appellant, Brian E. Powers, appeals from four orders issued in the probate
proceedings of the Estate of Gordy Clinton Lynch. Appellees, Kelli Alker, Kerri Hudson,
and Melody Hamilton, move to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, contending
Powers’s notice of appeal was untimely. We agree and dismiss the appeal.
1 This matter was transferred from the Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth pursuant to a docket
equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. We apply the Second Court’s precedent to the extent it conflicts with our own. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. BACKGROUND
In 2022, Powers filed an application to probate the will of Gordy Clinton Lynch,
deceased. The trial court probated the will and issued letters testamentary to Powers as
independent executor. Thereafter, Appellees began to challenge Powers’s administration
of the Estate and his compensation, including fees sought for services he provided as
both executor and a licensed attorney. Appellees moved to remove Powers, appoint a
successor independent executor, require Powers to deliver all Estate funds to the
successor executor, and deny Powers any attorney or executor fees from the Estate.
On May 15, 2025, the trial court signed an Amended Order Removing Independent
Executor,2 removing Powers as executor; ordering him to deliver all assets of the Estate
to his successor, once appointed; and directing him to surrender all letters testamentary. 3
On July 14, 2025, the trial court signed three additional orders concerning Powers’s
compensation: (1) an Order for Disgorgement of Attorney Fees, disgorging $240,000 of
attorney fees paid to Powers by Hamilton; (2) an Order Denying Executor’s Commission
and Expenses, denying Powers “any and all executor’s commissions and fees in his
capacity as Independent Executor”; and (3) an Order Authorizing Payment of Attorney’s
Fees and Expenses, directing the Estate to pay Powers $10,000 in attorney fees.
Hamilton later moved to sever the Order for Disgorgement of Attorney Fees. On
October 7, 2025, the trial court signed an order severing the Amended Order Removing
Independent Executor, Order for Disgorgement of Attorney Fees, Order Denying
2 The trial court previously signed an Order Removing Independent Executor on May 7, 2025.
3 L. Stephen Franscini posted bond as temporary administrator of the Estate on July 14, 2025.
2 Executor’s Commission and Expenses, and Order Authorizing Payment of Attorney’s
Fees and Expenses into a separate cause. Powers appealed all four orders on December
2, 2025.
ANALYSIS
A timely notice of appeal is essential to invoking this Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(b), 26.1; Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 616–17 (Tex.
1997). Absent a timely post-judgment motion extending the deadline, a notice of appeal
must be filed within thirty days after the trial court signs a final judgment. TEX. R. APP. P.
26.1(a).
As a general rule, appeals may be taken only from final judgments or from
interlocutory orders made appealable by statute. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39
S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Probate proceedings, however, are an established
exception to the “one final judgment” rule. Brittingham-Sada de Ayala v. Mackie, 193
S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006). Because probate administration often unfolds in discrete
stages, multiple orders may be final for purposes of appeal if they conclusively resolve a
particular phase of the proceeding. Id. This exception reflects the practical need to permit
appellate review of controlling intermediate decisions before error can affect later phases
of the administration. Id.
Accordingly, to determine whether Powers’s notice of appeal was timely filed, we
must first decide whether the trial court’s orders were final and appealable. In probate
matters, finality is evaluated under the two-part test articulated in Crowson v. Wakeham,
897 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1995). If a statute expressly declares a particular type of probate
3 order final and appealable, that statute controls. See TEX. ESTATES CODE § 32.001(c) (“A
final order issued by a probate court is appealable to the court of appeals.”); Crowson,
897 S.W.2d at 783. Otherwise, an order is appealable if it adjudicates a substantial right
and disposes of all issues in a discrete phase of the proceeding. Id. at 782–83.
Conversely, an order is interlocutory if it is part of a continuing proceeding in which other
pleadings remain pending that leave issues or parties unresolved. Id. at 783.
Applying that framework requires identification of the relevant phase of the probate
proceeding. The orders at issue removed Powers as independent executor, required
disgorgement of $240,000 in attorney fees, awarded $10,000 in attorney fees, and denied
any additional compensation. These rulings concern two discrete matters: Powers’s
status as independent executor and the determination of his compensation in that
capacity.
As to the first prong of the Crowson test, there is no express statute in the Estates
Code designating the removal of an independent executor or the determination of the
executor’s compensation as final and appealable. We therefore proceed to the second
prong and consider whether such orders adjudicate a substantial right and conclude a
discrete phase of the probate proceeding.
In this case, Appellees filed a joint motion seeking removal of Powers as
independent executor, asserting that he failed to file an accounting, engaged in gross
misconduct and mismanagement of the estate, and was incapable of fulfilling his fiduciary
duties due to material conflicts of interest. The motion sought both Powers’s removal and
the denial of his executor and attorney fees.
4 Texas appellate courts have consistently recognized that an order removing an
executor or administrator adjudicates a substantial right because it conclusively resolves
the specific issue for which that portion of the probate proceeding was initiated. See, e.g.,
Spies v. Milner, 928 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no writ)
(disqualification of executrix adjudicated her substantial right to serve and was a final,
appealable order); In re Estate of Boren, 268 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2008, pet. denied) (“The right to serve as the executor of an estate is a ‘substantial right’
and a denial of that right is a final and appealable order.”). Thus, to be appealable, the
order only has to finally dispose of the issue or controverted question for which that
particular part of the proceeding was brought. In re Estate of Boren, 268 S.W.3d at 845.
When the trial court issued its orders removing Powers and awarding him only
$10,000 in compensation, there were no ongoing proceedings relevant to that specific
issue. See In re Estate of Washington, 262 S.W.3d 903, 905–06 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2008, no pet.). These orders, thus, concluded a discrete phase of the probate
proceedings, disposing of every issue raised in the pleadings for that part of the probate
proceeding. See In re Estate of Byrom, No. 12-09-00279-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS
1081, at *8–9 (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 16, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (determining that
probate order that removed independent executor for cause and awarded attorney’s fees
disposed of all issues in the phase of the proceeding); Wittner v. Scanlan, 959 S.W.2d
640, 642 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (“Because the administration
of the estate in this case is an ongoing process; and because it would be unfair to defer
appellate review of the order until the estate is closed, we hold that the order awarding
attorney’s fees to appellant is final for the purposes of appeal.”).
5 Consequently, the orders removing Powers as executor and determining his
compensation became final and appealable on July 14, 2025, when the trial court
disposed of all issues remaining in that phase of the proceedings. Powers’s deadline to
file a notice of appeal was therefore triggered upon the trial court’s signing of the July 14,
2025, orders. Because he did not file a motion for new trial, motion to modify the
judgment, or requests for findings, his notice of appeal was due within thirty days, by
August 13, 2025. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a). Powers did not file a notice of appeal until
December 2, 2025, rendering it untimely. See In re Estate of Davidson, No. 05-15-00432-
CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 8801, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 11, 2016, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (holding that the trial court’s order removing appellant as co-executor was final and
appealable, and that appellant waived any challenge to the order by failing to timely
appeal).
In his response to Appellees’ motion to dismiss, Powers argues that the appellate
deadline did not begin to run until the trial court later signed a severance order. But a
severance is not required to render an otherwise final probate order appealable; it merely
eliminates uncertainty when finality is unclear. See Crowson, 897 S.W.2d at 783.
Because the orders here were already final under the Crowson test, the subsequent
severance did not restart or extend the appellate timetable.
Because Powers filed an untimely notice of appeal, we grant Appellees’ motion to
dismiss and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).
The appeal is dismissed.
Per Curiam