In Re_ Guardianship of G.F.G

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: December 30, 2025
• Docket: 2025 CW 0850
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2025 CW 0850

IN RE: GUARDIANSHIP OF G.F. G.

Judgment Rendered: DEC 3 0 2025

On Appeal from the 23rd Judicial District Court Parish of Ascension, State of Louisiana Trial Court No. 142996

The Honorable Toni F. Menard, Judge Presiding

Todd E. Gaudin Attorneys for Appellants, Bailey Hennesy Samuel and Sarah Heck Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Mary " Katie" Shoenfelt Attorney for Appellees, Baton Rouge, Louisiana Dennis Parkinson, Jr. and Kimberly Parkinson

Joseph Manning Attorney for Appellees, Baton Rouge, Louisiana Dennis Parkinson, Sr. and Rhonda Parkinson

BEFORE: LANIER, WOLFE, and RESTER, Ji. WOLFE, I

Plaintiffs/ appellants, Samuel and Sarah Heck (" the Hecks"), appeal a trial

court judgment, which granted a declinatory exception raising the objection of lack

of subject matter jurisdiction, filed by defendants/ appellees, Dennis Parkinson, Sr.

and Rhonda Parkinson, and further granted a peremptory exception of lack of subject

matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and

Enforcement Act found at Louisiana Revised Statutes 13: 1801, et seq., filed by

defendants/ appellees, Dennis Parkinson, Jr. and Kimberly Parkinson. For the

following reasons, we convert the appeal to an application for supervisory writ, grant

the writ, and deny the relief requested.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter concerns guardianship of a minor child, G.F.G., born July 16,

2021, after the deaths of both of her parents.' Following G.F. G.' s mother' s death,

the child lived in Maryland with her maternal grandparents, Dennis Parkinson, Sr.

and Rhonda Parkinson, who filed an initial guardianship petition on October 27,

2021. Subsequently, however, multiple guardianship petitions were filed by various

relatives of G.F. G., including the Hecks. Following several contested hearings and

a trial, on May 30, 2024, a " Guardianship Order" was issued by the circuit court in

Wicomico County, Maryland, ultimately appointing the Hecks ( G.F.G.' s aunt and

uncle, domiciled in Louisiana) as G.F. G.' s guardians. The Guardianship Order also

set forth periods when G.F. G. would reside in Louisiana, and when she would visit

her relatives in Maryland — including holidays and summer periods — and further

outlined how this order would change once G.F. G. began school. This order also

required the Hecks to file an Annual Report in accordance with Md. Rule § 10- 206

within ninety days of the issuance of the order, as well as annually, in accordance

1 To protect the privacy of the minor child, we will use initials throughout the opinion herein. See Uniform Rules —Courts of Appeal, Rules 5- 1 and 5- 2.

2 with Md. Rule § 10- 206( b). On August 27, 2024, the Maryland court issued an order

that the Hecks' guardianship over G.F. G. continue; in a subsequent order, signed on

October 10, 2024, the Maryland court accepted the fiduciary report submitted by the

Hecks.

On January 30, 2025, the Hecks filed the instant Motion to Revise Visitation Schedule in the 23rd Judicial District Court, Parish of Ascension, claiming that

G.F. G. had consistently lived in Louisiana since the May 30, 2024 Guardianship

Order, and, as the Hecks live in Louisiana and act as her parents, Louisiana is

therefore a more convenient forum than Maryland to consider their request.

Specifically, due to behavioral and emotional challenges exhibited by G.F.G., as

well as alleged familial tension between the Hecks and other family members, the

Flecks requested a modification of the May 30, 2024 Guardianship Order as it relates

to G.F. G.' s visitation with her Maryland relatives.

On April 11, 2025, Dennis Parkinson, Sr. and Rhonda Parkinson filed a

declinatory exception raising the objection of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and,

on April 14, 2025, Dennis Parkinson, Jr. and Kimberly Parkinson filed a peremptory

exception of lack of jurisdiction. Although filed separately and captioned

differently, each pleading objected to the district court' s lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

UCCJEA"), La. R.S. 13: 1801, et seq., and asserted that Maryland, not Louisiana,

maintains continuing jurisdiction over the matter as the appropriate forum to bring

any modification request. The Flecks did not file an opposition to either exception.

The matter came for hearing on April 14, 2025, at which time the trial court

took the matter under advisement. On May 12, 2025, the trial court issued a written

judgment ruling, in pertinent part:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Motion to Revise Visitation Schedule filed by Todd E. Gaudin is

9 DENIED based on 28 U.S. C. A. § 1738A ( PKPA) preempting the UCCJEA.

IT IS HEREBY ORDS ED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Peremptory Exception of Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Katherine Shoenfelt is GRANTED based on 28 U.S. C. A. § 1738A ( PKPA) preempting the UCCJEA.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Declinatory Exception of Lack of Jurisdiction field by Nicole G. Corville is GRANTED based on the UCCJEA 1738A ( PKPA)

preempting the UCCJEA.

Additionally, on the same date, the trial court issued written reasons for judgment,

in which it stated, in pertinent part:

In summary, under the [ Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act], a court retains jurisdiction over a child custody matter as long as it meets the jurisdictional requirements of its own state law and the state remains the residence of the child or any contestant, even if another state is considered the home state of the child under visitation schedule. [... ] I]n this situation, Maryland retains jurisdiction according to its own state laws, and four of the contestants still reside in that state. After previous explanation, this court [ does not] deem it necessary to go through the analogy of the UCCJEA.

It is from this ruling that the Hecks filed a suspensive appeal.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

On October 9, 2025, this court, ex proprio motu, issued a rule to show cause

order finding the May 12, 2025 judgment at issue " appears to lack appropriate

decretal language as it fails to name specific parties who the ruling is against and

identify the relief awarded as required by [ La. Code Civ. P.] art. 1918( A)." On

October 16, 2025, the parties supplemented the record with an October 15, 2025

amended judgment, signed by the trial court, which substituted the names of the

parties for the attorneys that were listed in the original judgment, clarifying that the

exceptions for lack of jurisdiction filed by Kimberly Parkinson, Dennis Parkinson,

Jr., Dennis Parkinson, Sr., and Rhonda Parkinson were granted. The amended

judgment also denied the Motion to Revise Visitation Schedule filed by the Hecks.

However, the amended judgment, while denying the Motion to Revise Visitation

rd Schedule, it does not dismiss the litigation filed by the Hecks due to lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.

Appellate courts have the duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua

sponte, even when the parties do not raise the issue. Kelly v. Kelly, 2016- 0206 ( La.

App. 1st Cir. 10/ 31/ 16), 233 So. 3d 620, 622. This court cannot determine the merits

of an appeal unless our appellate jurisdiction is properly invoked by a valid final

judgment. Doctors for Women Medical Center, L.L.C. v. Breen, 2019- 0582 (La.

App. 1st Cir. 5/ 11/ 20), 303 So. 3d 667, 671. A final judgment is appealable in all

cases in which appeals are given by law, while an interlocutory judgment is

An appealable only when expressly provided by law. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2083.

interlocutory judgment does not determine the merits, but only preliminary matters in the course of the action, while a final judgment determines the merits in whole or

in part. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1841.

A judgment must be precise, definite, and certain. Kelly, 233 So. 3d at 622,

citing, Laird v. St. Tammany Parish Safe Harbor, 2002- 0045 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 12/ 20/ 02), 836 So. 2d 364, 365. Moreover, a final appealable judgment must name

the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling

is ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied. See Carter v. Williamson Eye

Center, 2001- 2016 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 27/ 02), 837 So. 3d 43, 44. These

determinations should be evident from the language of the judgment without

reference to other documents in the record. Laird, 836 So. 2d at 366.

Additionally, a final appealable judgment must contain appropriate decretal

language disposing of or dismissing claims in the case. Kelly, 233 So. 3d at 622- 23,

citing, Costanza v. Snap- On Tools, 2013- 0332 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 3/ 5/ 14), 2014 WL 886021 ( unpublished). The October 15, 2025 amended judgment granted the

separate exceptions raising the lack of subject matter jurisdiction filed by Dennis

Parkinson, Sr., Rhonda Parkinson, Dennis Parkinson, Jr., and Kimberly Parkinson,

WI and denied the Heck' s Motion to Revise Visitation Schedule, but failed to decree the

dismissal of the Hecks' action. The absence of the necessary decretal language

means that the judgment is not final and appealable, and thus for us to reach the rather than appellate merits of this matter, we must exercise our supervisory,

jurisdiction. See Kelly, 233 So. 3d at 623; see also Johnson v. Mount Pilgrim

Baptist Church, 2005- 0337 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 3/ 24/ 06), 934 So. 2d 66, 67.

Since the judgment lacks decretal language, which actually dismisses the

Hecks' Motion to Revise Visitation Schedule, it is an interlocutory judgment. The

proper procedural vehicle to contest an interlocutory judgment is an application for

supervisory writs. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2201. When a party improperly appeals a

non -appealable interlocutory judgment, this court has discretion to convert that

appeal to an application for supervisory writs; however, this court may only do so if

the appeal would have been timely had it been filed as a supervisory writ. Jones v.

Fogg, 2024- 1048 (La. App. 1 st Cir. 5/ 30/ 25), 413 So.3d 580, 583, writ denied, 2025- 01069 ( La. 11/ 19/ 25), So. 3d , 2025 WL 3227545. A supervisory writ must

be filed within thirty days of notice of judgment. See La. URCA, Rules 4- 2 and 4-

3. When the interlocutory judgment is rendered in open court, its rendition

constitutes notice to all parties, unless certain exceptions apply. La. Code Civ. P.

art. 1914( A); Fogg, 413 So. 3d at 583. Those exceptions are, if the trial court orders

that an interlocutory judgment be reduced to writing, or if the trial court takes the

interlocutory matter under advisement, or if a party requests that the interlocutory judgment be reduced to writing within ten days of its rendition in open court. La.

Code Civ. P. art. 1914( B).

The decision to convert an appeal to an application for supervisory writ of

review is within the discretion of the appellate court. Stelluto v. Stelluto, 2005-

0074 ( La. 6/ 29/ 05), 914 So.2d 34, 39. Judicial efficiency and fundamental fairness

to the litigants can dictate that the merits of an application for supervisory writs be

G decided especially when, as here, a decision by us will terminate the litigation. See

Herlitz Const. Co., Inc. v. Hotel Investors of New Iberia, Inc., 396 So. 2d 878 ( La.

198 1) ( per curiam). Herein, following the trial court' s April 14, 2025 hearing on the

Hecks' motion, the matter was taken under advisement. A written judgment was

later issued and signed by the trial court on May 12, 2025, notice of signing of

judgment was mailed to all parties on May 13, 2025, and the Hecks filed a Motion

for Suspensive Appeal on June 10, 2025. Since this litigation would have been

terminated had the trial court judgment included the proper decretal language

dismissing the Hecks' motion, and because the appeal would have been timely if filed as an application for supervisory review, we exercise our discretion and convert

this appeal to an application for supervisory writ. Additionally, we grant the writ

application so that we may properly review the merits of the trial court' s judgment

sustaining the exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Kelly, 233 So.3d

at 623.

The Hecks assert the following sole assignment of error:

Despite statutory support in both Louisiana and Maryland, the Louisiana [ t] rial [ c] ourt misinterpreted the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act and erroneously concluded it lacked authority to modify the Maryland Circuit Court' s 2024 guardianship judgment.

DISCUSSION

Subiect Matter Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine

an action or proceeding involving the legal relations of the parties, and to grant the

relief to which they are entitled. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1. Jurisdiction over the subject

matter is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine a particular

class of actions or proceedings, based upon the object of the demand, the amount in

dispute, or the value of the right asserted. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2. The jurisdiction

7 of a court over the subject matter of an action or proceeding cannot be conferred by

consent of the parties or waived; a judgment rendered by a court which has no

jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or proceeding is void. See La. Code 170 Civ. P. arts. 3 and 925; In re D.C.M., 2013- 0085 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 11/ 13),

So. 3d 165, 169, writ denied, 2013- 1669 ( La. 7/ 17/ 13), 118 So. 3d 1102. The issue

of subject matter jurisdiction addresses the court' s authority to adjudicate the cause

before it; the issue may be considered at any time, even by the court on its own

motion, at any stage of an action. Id.

A court' s power to grant relief is premised upon its subject matter jurisdiction

over the case or controversy before it. Louisiana Land Acquisition, LLC v.

2011- 2037 ( La. App. 1st Cir. Louisiana Dept. of Environmental Quality,

7/ 18/ 12), 97 So. 3d 1144, 1145, writ granted on otherrogi unds, 2012- 1872 ( La.

11/ 16/ 12), 103 So. 3d 358. In fact, before considering the merits in any appeal,

appellate courts have a duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Whether a

trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case is subject to a de novo review.

D.C.M., 170 So. 3d at 169.

Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act

28 U.S. C. § 1738( A), entitled, " Full faith and credit given to child custody

determinations" and referred to as the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act

PKPA"), was enacted to establish a national system for locating parents and

children who travel from one such jurisdiction to another and are concealed in

connection with such disputes, to establish national standards under which the courts

of such jurisdiction will determine their jurisdiction to decide such disputes, and the

effect to be given by each such jurisdiction to such decision by the courts of other

such jurisdictions. Shamp v. Jezek, 2002- 1346 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 8/ 02), 836

So. 2d 185, 188- 89. Of the many purposes of the PKPA, we especially note that it

was designed to " discourage continuing interstate controversies over child custody

N. in the interest of greater stability of home environment and of secure family

relationships for the child[,]" to " facilitate the enforcement of custody and visitation

decrees of sister States[,]" as well as to " avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict

between State courts in matter of child custody and visitation which have in the past

resulted in the shifting of children from State to State with harmful effects on their

well-being[.]" Id., citing PL 96- 611 ( HR 8406), PL 96- 611, December 28, 1980, 94

Stat 3566. Ultimately, the PKPA was designed to prevent jurisdictional conflicts and

competition between states over child custody and to deter parents from abducting

children for purposes of obtaining custody awards. Jezek, 836 So. 2d at 191.

The PKPA imposes a duty on the states to enforce a child custody

determination entered by a court of a sister state if the determination is consistent

with the provisions of the PKPA. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 175- 77,

108 S. Ct. 513, 514- 15, 98 L.Ed.2d 512 ( 1988). Generally, once a state exercises

jurisdiction consistently with the provision of the PKPA, no other state may exercise

concurrent jurisdiction over the custody dispute even if it would have been

empowered to take jurisdiction under state law, and all states must accord full faith

and credit to the first state' s ensuing custody decree. Id.; Jezek, 836 So. 2d at 189.

Under the PKPA, a state court is required to enforce a child custody or

visitation order entered by a foreign state court and, generally, cannot modify the

order if the foreign state court initially had jurisdiction and continued to exercise

jurisdiction to modify its own order under the laws of its state. 28 U.S. C. § 1738A( a),

d), and ( h). However, under the PKPA, such jurisdiction is retained until the initial

state declines jurisdiction as permitted by subsections ( f)and (h) of the Act. This is

a discretionary call to be made by the issuing court after considerations of all relevant

facts and circumstances. Jezek, 836 So. 2d at 191.

28 U.S. C. § 1738A(d) expressly states that "[ t] he jurisdiction of a court of a

State which has made a child custody or visitation determination consistently with

7 the provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement of subsection

c)( 1) of this section continues to be met and such State remains the residence of the

child or of any contestant." For clarity, § 1738A( c)( 1) provides that "[ a] child

custody or visitation determination made by a court of a State is consistent with the

provisions of this section only if such court has jurisdiction under the law of such

State[.]". Additionally, a " contestant" is defined as " a person, including a parent or

grandparent, who claims a right to custody or visitation of a child." 28 U.S. C.

1738A( b)( 2). Herein, it is undisputed that four contestants who were awarded

visitation reside in Maryland: Dennis Parkinson, Sr., Rhonda Parkinson, Dennis

Parkinson, Jr., and Kimberly Parkinson. The Hecks do not dispute that this second

prong of the § 1738A(d) analysis is met.

Regarding the first prong of the § 1738A( d) analysis, the Hecks focus on MD

Code, Family Law, § 9. 5- 202 as their basis to claim Maryland no longer retains

exclusive and continuing jurisdiction. MD Code, Family Law, § 9. 5- 202 states, in

pertinent part:

A] court of this State that has made a child custody determination consistent with § 9. 5- 210 or § 9. 5- 203 of this subtitle has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until: ( 1) a court of

this State determines that neither the child, the child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have significant connection with this State and that the substantial evidence is no longer available in this State concerning the child' s care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or (2) a court of this State or a court of another state determines that the child, the child' s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this State.

emphasis added).

The Hecks focus on the fact that G.F. G. and the Hecks have not lived in Maryland

since May 30, 2024, the date of the Guardianship Order and, by simply moving back

to Louisiana, Maryland has completely lost all jurisdiction. The Hecks argue,

u] nder Maryland state law, the Maryland court lost its exclusive and continuing

jurisdiction over [ G.F. G.' s] case because neither she [ n] or the Hecks reside in

10 Maryland. [ ... ] [ G.F. G.] has not lived in Maryland since May 30, 2024[,] but has

lived exclusively in Louisiana, with the Hecks, her permanent guardians who have been acting as parents." We disagree.

Maryland has never made a judicial determination that G.F. G. or any person

acting as a parent lacked a significant connection to the state with no substantial

evidence in Maryland, nor has there been a judicial determination that G.F. G. or any

person acting as a parent no longer resides in Maryland. For this statute to divest

Maryland of its own exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, it plainly requires a judicial

determination by a Maryland court, which has not occurred herein. To the contrary,

Maryland is actively exercising its jurisdiction under Md. Rule § 10- 206, which

requires guardians to file annual and fiduciary reports, which the court is then

required to review and either accept them and continue the guardianship or take other

appropriate action. Thus, the Hecks' Guardianship Order is not permanent; it is

expressly contingent upon the Hecks' compliance with these annual reporting

requirements. In fact, the Maryland court reviewed and acted upon such reports only

three months before the Hecks initiated the in- state Louisiana action, making clear

Moreover, that Maryland was actively overseeing their guardianship of G.F. G.

pursuant to the terms of the Guardianship Order, G.F. G. does continue to reside in

Maryland for over two months each year.

While we recognize that, for the Hecks, Louisiana is a more convenient forum

and is where G.F. G. currently resides, to allow a Louisiana court to unilaterally

divest Maryland of its jurisdiction would be contrary to the purposes of the PKPA,

which is premised on the assumption that parties to such child and family matters

will naturally be spread across multiple states. Moreover, the Hecks are not

precluded from seeking a modification of the Guardianship Order but must do so in

Maryland.

11 Accordingly, we do not find that the facts of the instant proceeding have given

rise to Maryland divesting itself of jurisdiction pursuant to MD Code, Family Law,

9. 5- 202 and, as such, find, pursuant to § 1738A( d) of the PKPA, Maryland retains

its jurisdiction over G.F. G.' s guardianship. Therefore, the Louisiana trial court did

not err in granting the exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction filed by Dennis Parkinson, Sr., Rhonda Parkinson, Dennis Parkinson, Jr., and Kimberly

Parkinson.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we convert the appeal to an application for a

supervisory writ of review, which we grant. However, we deny the relief requested

by plaintiffs/appellants, Samuel and Sarah Heck, as we find no error in the trial court' s judgment granting the exceptions of lack of jurisdiction filed by

defendants/ appellees, Dennis Parkinson and Rhonda Parkinson, as well as Dennis

Parkinson, Jr. and Kimberly Parkinson. All costs of this proceeding are assessed to

Samuel and Sarah Heck.

APPEAL CONVERTED TO A SUPERVISORY WRIT; WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED.