In re Z.P.

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 19, 2026
• Docket: 2025 CA 00151, 2025 CA 00152, 2025 CA 00153, 2025 CA 00156, 2025 CA 00157, 2025 CA 00158
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re Z.P., 2026-Ohio-1847.]

IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT STARK COUNTY, OHIO

IN THE MATTER OF: Zo.P. Case No. 2025 CA 00151 (DOB: 7-7-15)

(Alonzo P., Appellant)

IN THE MATTER OF: Zu.P. Case No. 2025 CA 00152 (DOB: 3-31-17)

IN THE MATTER OF: Zi.P. Case No. 2025 CA 00153 (DOB: 4-30-20)

IN THE MATTER OF: Zo.P. Case No. 2025 CA 00156 (DOB: 7-7-15)

(Mercedee C., Appellant)

IN THE MATTER OF: Zu.P. Case No. 2025 CA 00157 (DOB: 3-31-17)

IN THE MATTER OF: Zi.P. Case No. 2025 CA 00158 (DOB: 4-30-20)

(Mercedee C., Appellant) Opinion & Judgment Entry

Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Family Court Division, Case Nos. 2023 JCV 00392, 2023 JCV 00393, and 2023 JCV 00394

Judgment: Affirmed

Date of Judgment: May 19, 2026

BEFORE: Andrew J. King, Robert G. Montgomery, and David M. Gormley, Judges

APPEARANCES: Richard D. Hixson (Micheli, Baldwin, Mortimer, McLendon, & Whitacre LLP), Zanesville, Ohio, for Appellant Alonzo P. (the children’s father); Kathaleen S. O’Brien, Canton, Ohio, for Appellant Mercedee C. (the children’s mother); James B. Phillips Jr., Canton, Ohio, for Appellee Stark County Job & Family Services

Gormley, J.

{¶1} Mother Mercedee C. and Father Alonzo P. each challenge the judgment of

the Stark County Family Court awarding permanent custody of their three children —

Zo.P., Zu.P., and Zi.P. — to Stark County Job and Family Services (the “Agency”). In her

appeal, Mother contends that the evidence presented at the permanent-custody hearing

did not support either the trial court’s best-interest findings or its overall conclusion that

custody of the children should not be placed with her. Father, in his appeal, contends that

the trial court erred by failing to appoint replacement legal counsel for Mother and by

denying his motion to continue the second day of the hearing. For the reasons explained

below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Key Facts

{¶2} A lengthy history exists between the Agency and this family, stretching back

to 2019 and consistently centering on the same set of concerns: Mother’s mental health,

multiple incidents of domestic violence between the parents, homelessness, a lack of

necessities for the children, and Mother’s failure to follow through on case-plan services.

Those concerns resurfaced in 2023, when the Agency once again became involved with

the family on the same grounds, this time compounded by safety concerns tied to

Mother’s disciplinary practices with her children.

{¶3} The Agency took emergency temporary custody of the children in 2023, and

two months later the trial court adjudicated them dependent, placed them in the Agency’s

temporary custody, and approved a case plan. Mother’s case plan called for her to

complete a parenting assessment at Lighthouse Family Center (a counseling and therapy provider in Canton), complete mental-health and substance-abuse treatment, submit to

random drug testing, complete a parenting-skills program at Goodwill Industries in

Canton, and maintain stable housing and employment. Father’s case plan called for him

to complete assessments at CommQuest and Melymbrosia Associates — both of which

offer mental-health and addiction-recovery services in Canton — and to follow the

resulting recommendations.

{¶4} Over the next two years, Mother made what the trial court described as

partial but ultimately insufficient progress. She completed two parenting assessments

and an anger-management assessment, engaged with mental-health providers Phoenix

Rising and Ever Well, and completed a substance-abuse assessment. Yet she did not

consistently comply with her drug-testing obligation, continued to use marijuana in a

manner that was medically ill-advised because she was taking prescribed psychiatric

medication, and never stabilized on her medications to the point where she could

participate in the parenting-skills program at Goodwill. Her conduct when she visited the

Agency’s office was likewise a recurring problem. After repeated disruptive incidents, she

was barred from the Agency’s premises, and her visits with her children were suspended.

And all three of her treatment providers voiced continuing concerns about her ability to

regulate her anger. Mother last visited the children on February 7, 2024.

{¶5} Father’s progress was even more limited. He did not complete his

assessment at CommQuest, and though he completed his Melymbrosia assessment, he

never attended the recommended anger-management program there. He was convicted

in April 2025 on a felonious-assault charge and is now serving an indefinite prison term

with a minimum length of eight years. Father last visited the children on March 29, 2024. {¶6} The Agency sought permanent custody of the children in early 2025, and

the two-day hearing began in April of that year with both parents present and with Father

represented by counsel. The second day of the hearing was originally scheduled for July

2025 but was continued at Father’s request after the prison where he was then housed

failed to make him available by video. On the rescheduled date in October of that year,

the prison again failed to move Father into the room where inmates can participate in

video hearings. Father’s counsel asked that Father’s portion of the hearing be continued

so that he could testify, but the trial court denied that request, finding that Father’s

interests could be adequately represented by his counsel. Father’s counsel then cross-

examined the Agency’s witnesses and assisted Mother during the best-interest portion of

the hearing. Mother herself testified at length during the best-interest phase. After the

hearing, the trial court issued judgment entries terminating both parents’ parental rights

and granting permanent custody of the children to the Agency. Both parents now appeal.

The Trial Court Did Not Err When It Terminated Mother’s Parental Rights

{¶7} In her first assignment of error, Mother argues that the Agency failed to

support its permanent-custody request with clear and convincing evidence, and she

argues, too, that the trial court’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

In her second assignment of error, Mother similarly challenges the trial court’s best-

interest finding.

{¶8} The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained that the appropriate appellate

standard of review of a trial court’s permanent-custody decision is the manifest-weight

standard or a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard (or both), depending on the nature of

the arguments presented by the parties. In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 11. {¶9} For manifest-weight review, an appellate court must “weigh the evidence

and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine

whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a

new trial ordered.” Id. at ¶ 14. Our review of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, on

the other hand, “is generally limited to considering whether sufficient credible evidence

exists to support the juvenile court’s determination.” In re D.P., 2020-Ohio-6663, ¶ 13

(12th Dist.).

{¶10} A trial court “may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the

court determines . . . by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the

child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency” and that any one of the five

factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applies. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).

R.C. 2151.414(B), therefore, “establishes a two-pronged analysis.” In re K.H., 2025-Ohio-

21, ¶ 30 (5th Dist.). “In practice, the trial court will usually determine whether one of the

. . . circumstances delineated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through [(e)] is present before

proceeding to a determination regarding the best interest of the child.” Id.

{¶11} Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that “‘will produce in the mind of

the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” In re

Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 7, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph

three of the syllabus. “‘Where the proof required must be clear and convincing, a

reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had

sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.’” In re Z.C. at ¶ 8,

quoting State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1990). A. The Trial Court’s Five-Factor Findings Are Supported by Clear and Convincing Evidence

{¶12} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) lists five scenarios that can serve as a prerequisite for a

trial court’s consideration of a permanent-custody request. “As long as one of these

factors is present, then the first prong of the test is satisfied.” In re A.S., 2024-Ohio-2099,

¶ 36 (5th Dist.).

{¶13} The trial court here found that three of those factors were established: (1)

under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), that the children cannot or should not be placed with

Mother because of her lack of progress on the case plan; (2) under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b),

that Mother had abandoned the children; and (3) under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), that the

children had been in the Agency’s temporary custody for more than 12 months during a

consecutive 22-month period. Mother’s brief challenges only the (B)(1)(a) finding, and

neither the (B)(1)(b) nor the (B)(1)(d) finding is mentioned anywhere in her argument.

Because only one R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) factor must be established, the unchallenged

findings are independently sufficient to satisfy the first prong, and Mother’s failure to

address them is dispositive. In re C.P., 2025-Ohio-5705, ¶ 9 (5th Dist.).

{¶14} The record amply supports both unchallenged findings in any event. The

children were placed in the Agency’s temporary custody on April 6, 2023 and remained

there through both days of the permanent-custody hearing in 2025, a period well in excess

of 12 months. And Mother last visited the children on February 7, 2024: more than 20

months before the second day of the two-day hearing. Under R.C. 2151.011(C), a child is

“presumed abandoned when the parents of the child have failed to visit or maintain

contact with the child for more than ninety days.” {¶15} The contested R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) finding is likewise supported. An

Agency caseworker testified at the hearing in 2025 that Mother had not completed her

case plan and had not reduced the risk that she posed to the children when the case had

started in 2023. Both Phoenix Rising and Ever Well Community Health — two

behavioral-healthcare providers in northeast Ohio — voiced continuing concerns about

Mother’s mood regulation and her anger, and Mother could not be referred to Goodwill

for a parenting class because her mental-health symptoms were never sufficiently

controlled through her medications to allow her to engage effectively in therapy.

Psychologist Aimee Thomas — who evaluated Mother’s parenting skills — testified that

Mother’s issues with mood regulation and anger control were negatively affecting her

ability to parent and that Mother was “not safe to parent children” as of the first hearing

date in April 2025.

{¶16} After weighing all of these matters, we find that clear and convincing

evidence in the record supports the trial court’s finding that Mother failed to remedy the

conditions causing the children to be placed outside her care.

{¶17} We further conclude that the trial court’s finding was not against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Mother’s only substantive argument to the contrary is

that she “substantially complied” with her case plan. But substantial compliance does not

in itself entitle a parent to reunification. In re A.F., 2022-Ohio-3753, ¶ 46 (5th Dist.) (“A

parent’s successful completion of the terms of a case plan is not dispositive on the issue

of reunification . . . [T]he case plan is simply a means to a goal, but not the goal itself”).

{¶18} Mother’s first assignment of error is overruled.

B. Granting Permanent Custody Is in the Children’s Best Interest {¶19} As for the second prong of the permanent-custody test — whether

permanent custody is in a child’s best interest — the trial court must consider all relevant

factors, including those listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). “A child’s best interests are served”

when the child is placed in a permanent situation that “fosters growth, stability, and

security.” In re M.K., 2023-Ohio-3786, ¶ 36 (5th Dist.).

{¶20} The children have been placed since April 2024 with their paternal

grandmother in Louisiana. Testimony at the hearing indicated that they are safe, stable,

and happy, and they have told the caseworker that they wish to remain there. No

emotional connection appears to exist between the children and Mother, and the children

have indicated that they do not want to see or visit her. The children have been in the

Agency’s custody without interruption since April 2023. The paternal grandmother

wishes to adopt the children rather than receive only legal custody, citing concerns about

Mother’s behavioral history. A guardian ad litem for the children also recommended a

grant of permanent custody to the Agency. Clear and convincing evidence supports the

trial court’s conclusion that permanent custody serves the children’s best interests, and

that conclusion is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶21} Because both prongs of the permanent-custody test are met, both of

Mother’s assignments of error are overruled.

C. We Need Not Address Mother’s Suggestion That She Was Improperly Denied Legal Representation

{¶22} We note that Mother’s first assignment of error briefly mentions that she

was “denied legal representation.” She gives us no developed argument on that question,

though, including no citation to any legal authorities, no analysis of the trial court’s

rulings on her requests for appointed counsel (after she refused to work with her first attorney and after her second attorney withdrew, citing a breakdown in communication),

and no explanation of any harm she may have suffered by representing herself.

{¶23} Under App.R. 16(A)(7), an appellant must support each assignment of error

with “[a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each

assignment of error . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record

on which appellant relies,” and an appellate court “may disregard an assignment of error

. . . if the party raising it . . . fails to argue the assignment separately in the brief.” App.R.

12(A)(2). We decline to address an argument that Mother has not developed for us.

The Trial Court Did Not Err When It Terminated Father’s Parental Rights

{¶24} Father also raises two assignments of error of his own. In one, he argues

that the trial court erred and caused harm to him by failing to appoint a third attorney for

Mother after she clashed with her first two court-appointed attorneys. And in his other

argument, Father claims that the trial court violated his right to due process by declining

to delay the second day of the permanent-custody hearing.

A. Father Has Not Shown That He Was Harmed by Mother’s Lack of Legal Counsel

{¶25} Father concedes — as he must — that he cannot prevail in his challenge to

the trial court’s rulings on Mother’s requests for additional appointed counsel unless

those rulings “actually prejudiced” him. In re X.H., 2022-Ohio-779, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.).

{¶26} Father’s theory of prejudice is that he was unexpectedly absent from the

second day of the hearing because the prison failed to facilitate his video appearance, and

thus, he says, his only remaining avenue to advance his own interests at that hearing was

through Mother herself. Had she been assisted by counsel that day, the argument goes, Mother could have presented evidence and arguments in furtherance of the position

Father wished to advance.

{¶27} That theory is far-fetched and not supported by the record. Father’s own

counsel acknowledged on the second day of the hearing that he was unaware of the

content of Father’s intended testimony. The record does not establish what different

evidence or arguments a represented Mother would have presented and does not support

Father’s view that the trial court would have reached a different conclusion had Mother

had counsel. We see no actual prejudice to Father flowing from the trial court’s refusal to

provide a third appointed attorney to Mother after she could not get along with her first

two attorneys.

{¶28} Father’s first assignment of error is overruled.

B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Father’s Motion to Continue the Hearing

{¶29} We review under the abuse-of-discretion standard a trial court’s decision to

grant or deny a continuance request. Hartt v. Munobe, 67 Ohio St.3d 3, 9 (1993). An

abuse of discretion connotes more than a mere error in law or judgment and entails an

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable attitude on the part of the trial court.

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).

{¶30} In evaluating whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a

continuance request, we apply a balancing test and consider (1) the length of the

requested delay, (2) whether other continuances had been requested and granted, (3) the

convenience or inconvenience to the parties, witnesses, counsel, and court, (4) whether

the delay was for legitimate reasons or was instead dilatory, purposeful, or contrived, (5)

whether the party contributed to the circumstances giving rise to the request, (6) whether denying the continuance resulted in identifiable prejudice to the party’s case, and (7) the

complexity of the case. In re Gibby, 2004-Ohio-2708, ¶ 28-29 (5th Dist.).

{¶31} And where — as in this case — the denial of a continuance request implicates

a parent’s fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of his or her child or

children, we examine whether the proceeding as a whole was fundamentally fair under

due-process principles. Id. at ¶ 24-25.

{¶32} We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion here by declining to

delay the second day of the hearing. The case had been pending for more than two and a

half years, the permanent-custody motion had been pending for more than seven months,

and the children — placed out of state and awaiting adoption — had a substantial interest

in finding a permanent home. The trial court had already granted one similar

continuance request from Father, prompting the court to push back the second day of the

hearing from July 2025 until October of that year. The trial court could reasonably have

doubted on that latter date whether yet another delay would have enabled Father to

participate in the hearing, given the seemingly recurring difficulties he was having in

lining up the video-conferencing option at the prison where he was housed.

{¶33} Nor did the denial of a continuance offend due process. An incarcerated

parent’s right to be present at a permanent-custody hearing is not absolute, and that right

is adequately protected when the parent is represented by counsel who actively

participates in the proceedings. In re T.B., 2019-Ohio-1742, ¶ 22 (5th Dist.); In re R.H.,

2012-Ohio-1811, ¶ 10 (5th Dist.).

{¶34} Father was represented throughout both days of the hearing by an attorney

who fully participated in cross-examining Agency witnesses, attacking the abandonment

allegation, examining the guardian ad litem about Father’s contacts with the children, and assisting Mother during the best-interest portion. The trial court expressly found that

Father’s interests could be protected through his counsel, and the record supports that

finding.

{¶35} Father’s second assignment of error is overruled.

{¶36} For the reasons explained above, the judgment of the Family Court Division

of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County is affirmed. Costs in each case are to be

paid by appellants Mercedee C. and Alonzo P.

By: Gormley, J.;

King, P.J. and

Montgomery, J. concur.