In re Z.L.

2024 Ohio 2913

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 1, 2024
• Docket: 113547
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re Z.L., 2024-Ohio-2913.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE Z.L. : No. 113547 A Minor Child :

[Appeal by D.W., Father] :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: DISMISSED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 1, 2024

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case No. FA-18706353

Appearances:

Marc L. Stolarsky Law LLC, and Marc L. Stolarsky, for appellant.

Milton and Charlotte Kramer Law Clinic, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Hannah Christ, Supervising Attorney, and Bryce Schlenker and Martin Shin, Legal Interns, for appellee.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:

This cause came to be heard on the accelerated calendar pursuant to

App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 11.1. Defendant-appellant, D.W. (“Father”), appeals

from the juvenile court’s judgment vacating a settlement agreement previously entered into with plaintiff-appellee, C.L. (“Mother.”). Father raises the following

assignments of error for review:

1. The trial court erred in vacating the parties binding settlement agreement without holding an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Ohio Civil Rule 60(B), an evidentiary hearing must be held if there is any dispute concerning the terms of the settlement.

2. The trial court’s erroneous judgment to vacate the parties’ settlement agreement without stating in the order the grounds upon which the judgment was made violates O.R.C. 2505.02(C) by asserting a declaratory judgment which adversely impacts the mandatory speedy relief standard of the rule.

3. The trial court erred in vacating the parties’ settlement agreement without either party filing a motion for such a judgment clearly violating Ohio Civil Rule 41(B) and 7(B), because there was no justiciable means to make such a ruling and it was done without notice.

After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we dismiss this

appeal for lack of a final, appealable order.

I. Procedural and Factual History

Father and Mother are the parents of the minor child, Z.L., born July

30, 2014. Following the establishment of Father’s paternity in 2018, the parties

engaged in extensive litigation regarding the issues of custody, parenting time, and

support. See In re Z.L., 2022-Ohio-1234, ¶ 2-14 (8th Dist.).

Ultimately, the parties entered into a handwritten agreement, dated

December 13, 2022, to resolve the issue of child support. The agreement, which was

signed by Mother and Father, states as follows:

The two parties agree that [Father] pays [Mother] $225 every two weeks. [Mother] agrees to dismiss all motions as to child support. [Mother] agrees to $0 all child support arrearages owed to [Mother]. On December 14, 2022, the agreement was adopted by the juvenile

court and incorporated into a journal entry. All other pending motions were

dismissed.

On May 2, 2023, the Office of Child Support Services (“OCSS”) filed a

motion titled “Notice of Inability to Comply and Request for Hearing.” In pertinent

part, OCSS advised the juvenile court that it was unable to “administer or otherwise

enforce” the court’s adoption of the parties’ agreement. OCSS explained its position

as follows:

The reason for this inability results from the fact that the Agreed Judgment Entry executed by the parties and adopted by the court as currently ordered does not comply with the requirements set forth by R.C. 3119. There is no child support computation worksheet attached to [the] journal entry and no designation of factors for deviation from the child support computation worksheet. In addition, the judgment entry is ambiguous as to whether the agreed payment of $225.00 every two weeks includes the agency’s processing fee. Lastly, the judgment entry failed to address health insurance for the child and cash medical support. Efforts were made by counsel for OCSS to facilitate an amended agreement; however, no resolution was reached.

On December 5, 2023, the juvenile court issued a journal entry vacating

the December 14, 2022 journal entry in its entirety. The juvenile court further

ordered the parties to appear before a magistrate to address the concerns raised by

OCSS.

Father now appeals from the trial court’s judgment. II. Law and Analysis

A. Final, Appealable Order

Before considering the merits of the assigned errors, we must first

consider whether we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. On April 17, 2024, this

court ordered the parties to brief the issue of “whether the judgment of the trial

court, that vacated a purported settlement agreement between the parties,

constitutes a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02.” The parties filed

corresponding briefs on April 30, 2024, and May 6, 2024.

The jurisdiction of an appellate court to review a trial court’s decision

is limited to final appealable orders. Rae-Ann Suburban, Inc. v. Wolfe, 2019-Ohio-

1451, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), citing Ohio Const., art. IV, § 3(B)(2); R.C. 2505.02 and 2505.03.

““‘If an order is not final and appealable, then an appellate court has no jurisdiction

to review the matter, and the appeal must be dismissed.’”” Id., quoting Scheel v.

Rock Ohio Caesars Cleveland, L.L.C., 2017-Ohio-7174, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.), quoting Assn.

of Cleveland Firefighters, #93 v. Campbell, 2005-Ohio-1841, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.). A

reviewing court must examine, sua sponte, potential deficiencies in jurisdiction. Id.

A final appealable order exists only when it meets “‘the requirements

of both R.C. 2505.02 and, if applicable, Civ.R. 54(B) . . . . ’” Gehm v. Timberline Post

& Frame, 2007-Ohio-607, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), quoting State ex rel. Scruggs v. Sadler,

97 Ohio St.3d 78, ¶ 5 (2002).

R.C. 2505.02(B) sets forth several types of final, appealable orders.

The statute provides, in relevant part: An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following:

(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment;

(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment;

(3) An order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial[.]

Relying on the foregoing provisions, Father argues the trial court’s

December 5, 2023 judgment constitutes a final “appealable order under Ohio

Revised Code Section 2505.02.” Father contends that by vacating the judgment

previously entered on December 14, 2022, the trial court arbitrarily affected his

substantial rights by extinguishing the terms of the binding settlement agreement.

Mother counters that this court is without jurisdiction to hear this

appeal because “the judgment entry does not comply with the statutory

requirements of R.C. 2502.02, and no language in the order certifies it as final under

Civ.R. 54(B).” Specifically, Mother contends that the December 5, 2023 judgment

entry (1) “does not determine an action or prevent a judgment”; (2) does not prevent

either party from obtaining appropriate relief “following the trial court’s issuance of

a proper final child support order”; and (3) did not vacate a final, appealable order.

Upon review, we agree with Mother’s interpretation of R.C. 2502.02 and its

application to the procedural posture of this case.

Under both R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) and (2), a final order is one that must

“affect a substantial right.” A “substantial right” is “a right that the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of

procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect.” R.C. 2505.02(A)(1). Generally,

“[d]ecisions involving the care and custody of a child implicate substantial rights of

the natural parents.” Moir v. Denkewalter, 2015-Ohio-3171, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.), citing

State ex rel. V.K.B. v. Smith, 2013-Ohio-5477, ¶ 16. Thus, there is no dispute that

the trial court’s December 5, 2023 judgment relates to the parties’ substantial rights.

With that stated, however, we must resolve whether the court’s judgment affected

the parties’ substantial rights as contemplated under the statute.

“An order affects a substantial right if, in the absence of an immediate

appeal, one of the parties would be foreclosed from appropriate relief in the future.”

Cooney v. Radostitz, 2021-Ohio-2521, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), citing Crown Servs. v. Miami

Valley Paper Tube Co., 2020-Ohio-4409, ¶ 16 (“An order affects a substantial right

‘only if an immediate appeal is necessary to protect the right effectively.’”), quoting

Wilhelm-Kissinger v. Kissinger, 2011-Ohio-2317, ¶ 7, citing Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med.

Ctr., 67 Ohio St.3d 60, 63 (1993). “It is not enough that an order merely restricts or

limits that right. Rather, there must be virtually no future opportunity to provide

relief from the allegedly prejudicial order.” In re Estate of Tewksbury, 2005-Ohio-

7107, ¶ 10 (4th Dist.).

After careful consideration, we find the trial court’s judgment did not

affect a substantial right. Although the order related to Father’s child-support

obligations, the issue of child support has not been fully resolved and the parties will

have the opportunity to seek appropriate relief, if necessary, in the future. Contrary to the legal precedent cited by Father on appeal, this case does not involve the denial

of a motion for modification of support that would prevent the retroactive benefit of

a potential reduction in support. C.L.A. v. D.P.M., 2024-Ohio-836 (8th Dist.).

Rather, as discussed further below, the juvenile court has yet to enter a final child-

support order and the parties will not be precluded from presenting legal challenges

to the terms of the support order or the implications of the handwritten agreement

signed in December 2022, once a final order is entered. The matter of child support

is currently pending before a magistrate below, and Father has not demonstrated

the necessity of an immediate appeal from the juvenile court’s latest judgment.

Accordingly, we find the juvenile court’s judgment did not constitute a final,

appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) 0r (B)(2). See also Radostitz, 2021-

Ohio-2521, at ¶ 24 (8th Dist.) (A court’s “judgment that leaves issues unresolved and

contemplates further action is not a final, appealable order.”).

We are equally unpersuaded by Father’s reliance on R.C.

2505.02(B)(3). Father correctly states that a trial court’s order vacating a prior

judgment is ordinarily considered a final, appealable order. However, Ohio courts

have consistently recognized that a judgment vacating a prior judgment is not a

final, appealable order if the vacated judgment did not constitute a final order itself.

Jarrett v. Dayton Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 20 Ohio St.3d 77, 78 (1985). See also

Wolford v. Newark City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 73 Ohio App.3d 218, 220 (5th

Dist.) (“We conclude that because the judgment vacated was itself not a final,

appealable order, the judgment vacating the partial incomplete judgment is not a final appealable order.”); Baumeister Family Trust v. Jackson Properties, Ltd.,

2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4787 (6th Dist. Oct. 18, 2001); Poronczuk v. Stockman, 1996

Ohio App. LEXIS 592, *4-5 (6th Dist. Feb. 20, 1996).

With respect to the finality of the December 14, 2022 judgment, we

recognize that, as a general proposition, the use of settlement agreements is

encouraged under Ohio law because they are a means by which the parties can

resolve their differences without further litigation. Thus, subject to the discretion of

the court, parties are ordinarily permitted to enter into settlement agreements to

resolve the issue of child support. DePalmo v. DePalmo, 78 Ohio St.3d 535, 540

(1997). However, child support consists of more than just the amount of support to

be paid periodically and contemplates other factors, including health insurance,

childcare expenses, and cash medical support. See R.C. 3119.02 and 3119.30.

Relatedly, Ohio courts have held that “an order that fails to fully

determine the rights and obligations [of the parties] in an unambiguous manner is

not a final, appealable order.” Lathan v. Andrews, 2015-Ohio-1249, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.),

citing Edwards v. Vito Gironda Constr. Co., 2008-Ohio-5974, ¶ 11-12 (9th Dist.);

Landis v. Associated Materials, Inc., 2006-Ohio-5060, ¶ 7-15 (9th Dist.). See also

Udelson v. Udelson, 2009-Ohio-6462, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.). In this case, the trial court’s

December 14, 2022 journal entry incorporated a brief, handwritten agreement that

failed to contemplate or otherwise resolve all rights and obligations of Father and

Mother. As noted by OCSS, the parties’ agreement failed to address certain aspects of a child-support order that are necessary to prevent future litigation and

adequately protect the best interests of the child.

At this time, it is premature to assess whether the trial court’s decision

to vacate the handwritten agreement in its entirety constituted an appropriate

exercise of the court’s continuing jurisdiction. See Hardesty v. Hardesty, 16 Ohio

App.3d 56, 58, (10th Dist. 1984); Singer v. Dickinson, 63 Ohio St.3d 408, 413 (1992)

(“It has long been recognized in Ohio that a [juvenile] court retains continuing

jurisdiction over its orders concerning the custody, care, and support of

children . . . .”). This issue will be subject to further review in the future depending

on the terms of the final order and whether the court deviates from the terms that

were resolved by the settlement agreement. Nevertheless, we find the settlement

agreement incorporated into the December 14, 2022 judgment failed to determine

the rights and obligations of the parties in an unambiguous manner, and therefore,

was not a final order. As such, the court’s decision to vacate this previous order does

not constitute a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(3).

Based on the foregoing, we find the juvenile court’s December 5, 2023

entry is not a final appealable order. Thus, we lack jurisdiction to consider the

merits of Fathers’ assignments of error. The appeal is dismissed.

It is ordered that the appellant and appellee share the costs herein taxed. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J., and ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR