In re Young

140 F. 728, 1905 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. North Carolina
DecidedOctober 6, 1905
StatusPublished

This text of 140 F. 728 (In re Young) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Young, 140 F. 728, 1905 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107 (E.D.N.C. 1905).

Opinion

PURNELL, District Judge.

This cause coming on to be heard on •the report of the special master herein under district rule 8 in bankruptcy (33 C. C. A. xi), and being fully heard and argued by counsel, and duly considered, it is ordered that the report of the special master herein, as follows, both as to findings of facts and conclusions of law,, be, and the same is hereby, in all respects confirmed:

“First. The first specification in opposition to discharge does not purport to set out an' objection to the granting of the discharge.
“Second. ‘That such application should not be granted because of the following facts: That during" the pendency of these proceedings in bankruptcy against said E. F. Young, and before a notary public authorized by law to administer oaths, the said E. F. Young did knowingly and fraudulently take and subscribe a false oath in and in relation to said proceedings in bankruptcy, to wit, in a paper writing and pleading by him designated as a further-defense to the original petition in bankruptcy, and article 7 thereof, viz: “That the conveyance of February 4, 1904, to D. F. Hodges, for $569, and duly recorded on February 18, 1904, in Book 162, p. 229, of the records of Harnett county, N. C., was not an act of bankruptcy as alleged, nor within the meaning of the statute relating to bankruptcy, in that the said land was sold by the respondent to said Hodges upon credit for the consideration of $569, for-which the said Hodges executed and delivered to the respondent his promissory note for the sum of $569, secured by a mortgage deed of even date with said conveyance, conveying to the respondent the said tract of land, which said' mortgage has been duly recorded in the register’s office of Harnett county, N. .0.,- which' promissory note and mortgage the respondent still holds, and which is-yet due, no part of the same having yet been paid” — your objectors specifying that said allegation and oath is false in fact, for that, at the time same was made and taken, the note and mortgage therein alleged were not held by the said bankrupt.’
“The undersigned finds the following facts upon the second specification:
“(1) That article 7 of the further answer, referred to in the above specification, is therein correctly quoted.
“(2) That this said further answer was verified by bankrupt on August 18, 1904.
[729]*729“(3) That at- the time of this verification, to wit, August 18, 1004. the bankrupt had discounted all of the Hodges notes, except one, with Geo. L. Canady, who indorsed the same to the First National Bank. One was turned over to the trustees.
“(4) That "the statement contained in the seventh section of the fourth answer, to wit, ‘That thé bankrupt at the time of the verification of said further answer held the said notes in his possession,’ was false.
“(5) That the said further answer was filed four days after the time permitted for the filing of an answer within the bankruptcy act, and upon a final hearing in the matter before the district judge it was ordered and adjudged that this answer was not properly filed.
“The undersigned concludes as a matter of law, as follows:
“That as the further answer, which contained the false statement, was filed after the time allowed by the bankruptcy act, and was not considered, it was not material then to the issue before the court, and he recommends that the second specification in objection to discharge be overruled. (Objectors except to the above conclusion of law.)
“Third. The third specification in objection to discharge was abandoned by the objectors.
“Fourth. ‘That such application should not be granted because of the following facts: For that in this proceeding in bankruptcy the said E. F. Young, before a person authorized to administer oaths, did knowingly and fraudulently take and subscribe a false oath in relation to said proceeding in bankruptcy, viz., in a paper writing and pleading designated by said bankrupt as his motion to dismiss, and in article 1 thereof, to wit: “* * * It is not true that the respondent moved from the state or concealed himself for the purpose of avoiding service of the subpoena or other process, or that he in fact attempted to avoid service of the same. It is a fact that on Monday, the 6th day of June, without having knowledge or intimation that any creditor had filed a petition asking that he be adjudged a bankrupt, and without knowledge of any facts that would put him on notice of same, he left his home and went to Norfolk, Va., upon urgent business * * *” ’ — your .objectors specifying and alleging that said allegation is false in fact, in that it is res adjudicata in this proceeding that said E. F. Young was aware of the fact that petition in bankruptcy had been by creditors filed against him in this court, and that such knowledge came to him on the evening of June 5, 1904, and. such judgment and finding ‘is particularly and specifically here pleaded and alleged.’
“The undersigned finds the following facts upon the fourth specification:
“(1) That so much of the first section of the bankrupt’s motion to dismiss, filed June 29, 1904, as is pertinent to this specification is correctly quoted in the above specification. The motion to dismiss was duly verified by E. F. Young, before Robt. R. Boyd, notary public, on June 29, 1904. Said motion to dismiss is herewith sent and marked ‘G.’ The answer to the said motion to dismiss was filed ‘H’ in due time, to wit, July 2, 1904, and the first section is traversed.
“(2) That E. F. Young, the bankrupt, left Dunn, and the state of North Carolina, on the 6th day of June, 1904, for the purpose of avoiding service of process.
“(3) That at the time he had knowledge of the fact that bankruptcy proceedings had been instituted against him.
“(To this third finding of fact the bankrupt excepts.)
“ (4) That at the time the said motion to dismiss was filed, service of subpoena and petition in bankruptcy had been made by personal service on the 25th' day of June.
“The undersigned concludes as a matter of law as follows:
“That the bankrupt has committed an offense punishable by imprisonment under Bankr. Act, July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 29b (2) 30 Stat. 554 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3433], ‘made a false oath * * * in relation to any proceeding in bankruptcy, * * * ’and he therefore recommends that the fourth specification in objections to discharge be not granted.
“Fifth. The undersigned will proceed to find the facts under the fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and tenth specifications, but as the legal effect of all these [730]*730specifications is the same, the conclusions of law bearing upon all of said specifications will appear just after the tenth specification.
“ ‘That such application should not be granted because of the following facts: That within the four months immediately preceding the,filing of the petition in bankruptcy against said E. F. Young, to wit, on the 5th day of February, 1904, the said B. F. Young did transfer unto said J. C.

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Bluebook (online)
140 F. 728, 1905 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-young-nced-1905.