In re Ylia
This text of 233 F. 476 (In re Ylia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
If there was an agreement entered into at the time this loan of $1,200 was made that the now bankrupt should pay, not $1,200 and lawful interest thereon, hut $1,284 and interest thereon, and pursuant thereto a note of $1,284, secured by a mortgage, the mortgage in evidence and claimed on here was given, and. this agreement was mutual, and understood by both the parties to the transaction, such agreement would be usurious, and the chattel mortgage in question would be void. It Is not questioned in the case that Ylia, the now bankrupt, intended to make such an agreement, and have it accepted, and become bound thereby so far as the papers executed under such an agreement would or could bind him.
In short, the referee finds as a fact on all the evidence that Powell never knowingly entered into or assented to any contract or agreement by which he was to receive for or on this loan an excessive rate of interest, more than 6 per cent., and that the directions to the attorney who drew the note and mortgage, and which directions came from [478]*478Ylia, were unknown to Powell and “emanated from generous and persistent impulses to reciprocate the kindness of his fellow countryman/' Pówell. The referee exonerates Ylia from any design or purpose to secure a usurious contract or agreement of which he could take advantage and escape payment of the principal and interest. It takes two to make a contract, and while, ordinarily, we would conclude that a person who takes a note and a chattel mortgage for $1,284, when the loan was $1,200 only, ought to understand and know what he was doing and receiving, we have here a finding by the referee, who saw and heard all the witnesses, that Powell did not in fact know or understand what was proposed by Ylia, and never made or assented to any agreement by which he was to have an excessive rate of interest or any bonus for the loan in any form.
I am not disposed to disturb this finding of the referee, which was based on evidence, and the truthfulness of those who gave the evidence was peculiarly for the referee, who had opportnuity to both see and hear. It cannot be said as matter of law that the finding of the referee was either contrary to or unsupported by the evidence, and it should be treated as the verdict of a jury. This court did not have an opportunity to either see or hear these witnesses. Then, again, an agreement to take usury ought to be clearly and satisfactorily proved.
There will be an order affirming the decision and order of the referee, and for the payment of the amount of the chattel mortgage from the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property now in court.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
233 F. 476, 1916 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1578, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-ylia-nynd-1916.