J-S18002-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: X.Q.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: B.M., MOTHER : : : : : No. 72 WDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered December 19, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at No(s): No. CP-02-AP-24-2024
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: August 4, 2025
Appellant, B.M. (“Mother”) appeals from the December 19, 2024 order
entered in Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas that terminated her
parental rights to three-year-old X.Q.M (“Child”).1 Upon review, we affirm.
The Office of Children Youth and Families of Allegheny County (“the
Agency”) has been involved with Mother and her children since 2009. Mother
is diagnosed with a moderate intellectual disability. She has a history of
mental health issues, drug and alcohol abuse, intimate partner violence, and
lack of consistent housing. Mother has seven living children, none of which
are in her care. The trial court has involuntarily terminated her parental rights
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Child’s father is C.D.M. (“Father”). On November 19, 2024, the trial court confirmed Father’s consent to termination of parental rights. Father is not a party to this appeal. J-S18002-25
to two of the children, three of the children are in a subsidized permanent
legal custodianship, and two are currently in foster care (including Child). An
additional two children are deceased.
The Agency obtained emergency custody of Child at birth because
Mother failed to obtain prenatal care throughout her pregnancy, had an open
case with the Agency involving another one of her children, failed to comply
with court-ordered services in the open case, and lacked stable housing. The
Agency placed Child in a pre-adoptive foster home with J.E. (“Foster Mother”)
where he remains.
On May 31, 2022, the trial court adjudicated Child dependent and
ordered Child to remain in foster care. At the time of adjudication, Mother’s
goals were to obtain services from the Office of Developmental Supports
(“ODS”), engage in appropriate mental health services, address intimate
partner violence (“IPV”) issues, and obtain and maintain safe and appropriate
housing. In February 2023, the court ordered Mother to participate in a drug
and alcohol evaluation after concerns that Mother was intoxicated during a
phone visit with another child.
The Agency referred Child for early intervention services through
Alliance for Infants. The necessary services were delayed for three months
due to Mother’s refusal to sign consent forms. As a result, the trial court
ordered the Agency to be the educational and medical decisionmaker for Child.
Once the services were implemented via court order, Child benefitted greatly
from physical, occupational, and speech therapy.
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The Agency referred Mother to POWER2 for a drug and alcohol evaluation
but Mother failed to participate. Mother only participated in one drug and
alcohol screen, despite the Agency’s requests for more.
The Agency implemented services through the ODS, Achieva, NOVA3,
and Mon Yough to assist Mother with her court-ordered objectives. Mother
began receiving services from ODS on April 2, 2023. The services were
delayed due to Mother’s refusal to obtain her school transcript. NOVA assisted
Mother with obtaining appropriate housing, but she was not able to maintain
it. Achieva caseworker Chantel Hernandez specializes in supporting parents
with intellectual disabilities and, through her agency, was assisting Mother
with parenting. Mother met with Ms. Hernandez five times but was eventually
discharged from the program due to lack of participation. Mother failed to
complete a parenting support program.
Mother completed IPV treatment prior to Child’s birth but continued to
experience IPV issues. Following Child’s birth, the Agency referred Mother for
additional treatment at the Women’s Center and Shelter, but Mother failed to
comply with the recommended IPV education and treatment. On April 9,
2024, the McKees Rocks Police were called for a domestic disturbance at
Mother’s home where an intimate partner had lit a bonfire in the toilet and
assaulted Mother, including urinating on her. ____________________________________________
2 POWER is an acronym for Pennsylvania Organization for Women in Early
Recovery.
3 NOVA is an acronym for No Violence Alliance.
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Mother inconsistently attends weekly supervised visits with Child.
Between April 2022 and May 2023, Mother attended only four visits. From
May 2023 until September 2024, Mother attended nine in-person visits and
three virtual visits. Mother has failed to progress from supervised visitation
with Child. Mother neglected to schedule any medical appointments for Child
and attended only one medical appointment for Child, despite being informed
of each medical appointment through a text or phone call.
On March 18, 2024, the Agency filed a petition to terminate Mother’s
parental rights. The trial court appointed Kids Voice to serve as Child’s legal
counsel and guardian ad litem, after finding that there was no conflict in Kids
Voice serving in the dual role. On September 13, 2024, the trial court held a
contested termination of parental rights hearing. The Agency presented
testimony from Cassandra Guthrie4, Agency caseworker; Police Officer David
Finnerty; Chantel Hernandez, Achieva caseworker; Beth Bliss, Ph.D., who
testified as expert in child and forensic psychology; Clare Chiaverini, Mon
Yough Assistant Program Supervisor for foster care; Rhona Ray, Mon Yough
caseworker. Mother testified on her own behalf.
The Agency’s witnesses testified in accordance with the above-stated
facts. In addition, Dr. Bliss explained that she had evaluated Mother on five
separate occasions over the past ten years. Dr. Bliss testified that Mother has
been diagnosed with a moderate intellectual disability and anger issues. Dr. ____________________________________________
4 Court documents refer to her as Cassandra Guthrie; the transcript incorrectly
refers to her as Cassandra Duphrie.
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Bliss further testified that Mother does not exhibit an understanding of why
her children have been removed from her care. She explained that this lack
of insight makes it hard for Mother to accept services or make any progress
because she is unaware of what issues she is supposed to be addressing. Dr.
Bliss further testified that Mother has not shown improvement over the past
ten years. Dr. Bliss also explained that Mother fails to show an understanding
of how intimate partner violence impacts her parenting and “greatly minimizes
the context or the severity of the domestic violence and how it is impacting
her life or her relationships.” N.T. Hearing, 9/13/24, at 55.
Dr. Bliss testified that she observed interactions between Mother and
Child. She explained that it was overall a “pretty positive interaction[.]” Id.
at 57. Dr. Bliss stated that Child initially cried when he entered the room and
tried to leave once, but Child was responsive to “imaginative play and they
picked out appropriate toys.” Id. at 58. Dr. Bliss explained that she did not
observe signs of a “secure attachment” between Child and Mother and did not
observe a “necessary and beneficial relationship.” Id. Dr. Bliss further
explained that if Mother’s parental rights were terminated, it “would not cause
[Child] undue trauma, that it is not a necessary relationship for him, for his
psychological well-being.” Id. at 76. In contrast, Dr. Bliss testified that Child
does have a secure attachment with Foster Mother and removing Child from
the foster home “could cause trauma” and be “extremely detrimental” to Child.
Id. at 60, 80.
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Dr. Bliss testified to her concerns regarding Mother’s ability to parent
Child, including the fact that, “despite working with Achieva, when I ask any
of the parenting knowledge questions she really doesn’t have the information
necessary or knowledge about basic knowledge for care and shelter.” Id. at
75. Dr. Bliss also expressed ongoing concerns about IPV and Mother’s inability
to protect herself or her children. Finally, Dr. Bliss testified that Mother has
difficultly taking care of her own basic needs let alone taking care of Child’s
needs. Dr. Bliss testified that, in her professional opinion, she would
recommend terminating Mother’s parental rights.
Ms. Chiaverini explained that Child resides in a pre-adoptive foster home
with Foster Mother, Foster Mother’s mother, two adult sons, a 15-year-old
daughter, and another 16-year- old foster child family.” Id. at 95. She further
testified that Child is very “bonded” and “close” to the entire family. Id. Ms.
Chiaverini testified that Child receives physical, occupational, and speech
therapy for developmental and vocal delays. Ms. Guthrie testified that Foster
Mother is meeting all of Child’s educational, psychological and developmental
needs.
Mother testified that there was not a “real reasonable cause” why Child
was removed from her care and the only reason she could think of was
because her other children were in foster care. Id. at 182. When asked to
explain some examples of parenting skills that she has learned from Achieva,
Mother responded that “like she will have like a little paper and she will go to
take what is on the paper and she will read it, and then she will ask me
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questions about what to do – not what to do or not to do, but like empathy.
Like I write the question, like my opinion on the question.” Id. at 174. Mother
testified that she is working with ODS over the phone because she cannot
meet in person and explained that ODS is trying to assist her with housing.
Mother testified that she found a support coordinator through The Hosana
House and explained that they were helping her in meetings, meeting with
her for dinner, and “they will do like activity with Disney and for like [Child]
whenever I would see him and stuff like that.” Id. at 176.
Mother testified that POWER came out to assess her drug and alcohol
use after Child was born and gave her a urine sample and told her she was
clean but did not give her any documentation. Mother testified that she did
not receive any texts or phone calls to complete any additional drug and
alcohol screens. Mother explained that alcohol has never been a problem for
her “because if it was, the doctor would have said something.” Id. at 183.
Mother testified that she has not completed IPV counseling since Child
was born, that she did not consider the April 9, 2024 assault incident that
required police intervention to be IPV, and that she has not experienced any
other IPV incidents since Child was born. Mother testified that she tried to
enroll in a coached parenting class on her own but that she is on a waiting list.
Mother testified that she worked with various individuals from ODS and
Achieva, but was unable to give an example of anything that she learned,
stating “I don’t know. . . I’m done. I can’t think. I can’t think right now.” Id.
at 182.
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Mother testified that she plans to start school in the fall. She explained
that she is anemic and sometimes her iron will be so low that she cannot get
out of bed and attend visits. Mother explained that she initially refused to
sign authorizations for Child to receive early intervention services because “I
didn’t think he needed it because he was so young and like I didn’t see that
because he was so young.” Id. at 185. Mother stated that she has only been
notified about one medical appointment where Child was supposed to have a
procedure and she does not know the names of Child’s doctors. Mother
testified that she is capable of caring for Child and the only thing stopping her
is appropriate housing. She testified that she was currently staying in “the
Carolinas” but was trying to obtain appropriate housing in Pittsburgh. Id. at
201, 206. Mother explained that she is “trying to do better for myself, trying
to find me a house, trying to find me a job, trying to go back to school.” Id.
at 188. When asked if she has friends or social groups that she uses for
support, she explained that she watches church on YouTube every Sunday.
Mother testified that the last time she visited with Child was during the
evaluation with Dr. Bliss, which occurred in May 2024.
Mother testified that since she is doing virtual visits her relationship with
Child “is not the same because I don’t really get to see him as much as I
should see him because my visits [are] like [every other month].” Id. at 190-
91. Mother testified that Child does not have a name that he calls her, but
that she calls him “Little Peewee.” Id. at 191.
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Mother testified that terminating her parental rights was not best for
Child, that Child needs to maintain a relationship with her, and that Child
“obviously needs to have me in his life.” Id. at 193.
On December 19, 2024, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental
rights to Child.
Mother timely appealed. Mother and the trial court both complied with
Pa.R.A.P 1925.
Mother raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2)?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5)?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8)?
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in concluding that [the Agency] met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of [Child] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?
Mother’s Br. at 6.
In cases involving the involuntary termination of parental rights, this
Court’s review is limited to determining whether the trial court’s conclusion is
supported by competent evidence. In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580,
591 (Pa. 2021). When we review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a
petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, we must accept the findings
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of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if the record supports
them. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “If the factual findings
are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an
error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. (citation omitted). “Absent an abuse
of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial
court’s decision, the decree must stand.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276
(Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). We may not reverse merely because
the record could support a different result. T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. We give
great deference to the trial courts “that often have first-hand observations of
the parties spanning multiple hearings.” Id. Moreover, “[t]he trial court is
free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise
free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the
evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation
omitted).
It is axiomatic that “[p]arents enjoy a fundamental right to make
decisions regarding the care, custody and control of their children. It cannot
be denied that significant and permanent consequences for both the parent
and child can follow the termination of parental rights, as there is an
undeniable importance in a child’s relationship with a biological parent.”
L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, “[i]n
recognition of the gravity attendant to the termination of parental rights, the
moving party must establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing
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evidence; that is, evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as
to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of
the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. at 592 (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, governs
termination of parental rights, and requires a bifurcated analysis. “Initially,
the focus is on the conduct of the parent.” In re Adoption of A.C., 162 A.3d
1123, 1128 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). As discussed above, “[t]he
party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated
in Section 2511(a).” Id. (citation omitted). If the court determines that the
parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights, the court
then engages in “the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best
interests of the child.” Id. (citation omitted). Notably, we need only agree
with the court’s decision as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well
as Section 2511(b), to affirm the termination of parental rights. In re K.Z.S.,
946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa. Super. 2008).
With regards to Mother, we concentrate our analysis on Section
2511(a)(2). Section 2511(a)(2) provides for termination of parental rights
where the petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that
“[t]he repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the
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parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions
and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2); see In re Adoption of
S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 827 (Pa. 2012). The grounds for termination of parental
rights under Section 2511(a)(2) due to parental incapacity are not limited to
affirmative misconduct; those grounds may also include “acts of refusal as
well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 100
(Pa. Super. 2011). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the
reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties.” In re C.M.K., 203
A.3d 258, 262 (Pa. Super. 2019). Notably, a “parent’s vow to cooperate, after
a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of
services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” In re Z.P.,
994 A.2d 1108, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Finally, sincere efforts to perform parental duties may still be insufficient
to remedy an incapacity. Id. at 1117. This is because subsection (a)(2)
“emphasizes the child’s present and future need for essential parental care,
control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being[,]”
especially “where disruption of the family has already occurred and there is
no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.” Id. (citation omitted).
Mother avers that the Agency failed to provide sufficient evidence to
terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). Mother’s
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Br. at 21. Mother argues that the record was devoid of evidence as to how
her intellectual disability affected her capacity to parent. Id. Mother further
argues that her visits with Child went well and did not present safety concerns,
that the Agency failed to present sufficient evidence that Mother had ongoing
drug and alcohol or IPV issues, and that Mother’s visitation schedule never
provided Mother with an ability to provide for Child’s basic needs. Id. at 23.
Mother’s arguments are unavailing.
In its opinion, the trial court emphasized that the Agency has been
involved with Mother for ten years, that Mother’s seven living children have
all been removed from her care, and that Mother still does not have insight
into why her children have been removed from her care. Trial Ct. Op.,
2/28/25, at 15. The trial court credited Dr. Bliss’ expert testimony that Mother
lacks insight into why her children keep being removed from her care and Dr.
Bliss’s opinion that Mother has not made any progress in ten years. The trial
court opined:
Throughout the proceedings in this case, it has become clear that Mother’s intellectual disability, interposed with her drug and alcohol issues and mental health needs, as well as her continued intimate partner violence problems, remain insurmountable barriers to her ability to parent a child. These barriers have existed for at least a decade.
Mother’s history, when combined with her inability to make progress during the pendency of the instant case, paints a stark picture. She has no insight into why any of her children have been removed from her care, and as a result, has never been in a position to meaningfully address why removal occurred in this case. It bears repeating, Mother’s lack of insight is so profound that she equated Dr. Bliss’ statement that she interacted well with
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the Child to an inability of this Court to terminate her rights: “[b]y her [Dr. Bliss] saying that my rights should be terminated but on the same token when I was there she said that I was interacting good with [Child], so how can they terminate it if I was like interacting with him and it wasn’t making sense.”
Id. at 14-15 (internal citations omitted). The trial court concluded, “[a]s to
Section 2511(a)(2), Mother has repeatedly and consistently lacked the
capacity to provide proper and essential parental care and control for her
[c]hildren’s wellbeing for at least ten years. Her history demonstrates that
she cannot or will not remedy this incapacity.” Id. at 16.
Our review of the record supports the trial court’s findings, and we
decline to usurp the trial court’s credibility determinations or reweigh the
evidence. Mother’s own testimony is compelling. By her own admission, she
has only had nine in-person visits with Child over a two-and-a-half-year
period. At the time of the hearing, Mother was only having virtual visits with
Child because of her choice to leave Pittsburgh and stay in “the Carolinas.”
Mother was unable to express anything that she has learned about parenting
from the multiple agencies that have been assisting her and was unable to
articulate the reasons why Child was not in her care. The record demonstrates
that Mother has failed to fulfill her affirmative obligation to provide for the
physical and emotional needs of Child on a consistent basis. Accordingly, we
find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that Mother does not
have the capacity to provide proper and essential parental care and control
for Child and she cannot or will not remedy this incapacity.
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With respect to Section 2511(b), our analysis focuses on the effect that
terminating the parental bond will have on the child. This Court reviews
“whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of
J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). It is well settled that
“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the
inquiry into needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284,
1287 (Pa. Super. 2005).
“One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the
nature and status of the emotional bond” that the child has with the parent,
“with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing
any such bond.” In re Adoption of N.N.H., 197 A.3d 777, 783 (Pa Super.
2018) (citation omitted). The fact that a child has a bond with a parent does
not preclude the termination of parental rights. In re A.D., 93 A.3d 888, 897
(Pa. Super. 2014). Rather, the trial court must examine the depth of the bond
to determine whether the bond is so meaningful to the child that its
termination would destroy an existing, necessary, and beneficial relationship.
Id. at 898. Moreover, the trial court may consider intangibles, “such as the
love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have” with the adoptive
resource. N.A.M., 33 A.3d at 103. Ultimately, the concern is the needs and
welfare of the child. Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121.
The trial court concluded that it was in Child’s best interest to terminate
Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(b). The trial court found that
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Child does not have a beneficial bond with Mother and credited Dr. Bliss’s
testimony that Child would not experience undue trauma if Mother’s parental
rights were terminated. The court opined:
The bond with Mother is not necessary nor beneficial to the Child. Maintaining the bond does not serve the Child’s needs. The Child does not receive care or support in any fashion from Mother. She does not provide the stability of a home, safety, emotional support, or even the most basic care for the child such as food, education, medical care, toys, clothes, or entertainment.
Trial Ct. Op. at 19-20. The court further found that Child had a secure
attachment to Foster Mother and his foster family. The court opined:
In contrast to the failings of Mother, the Child has a positive and secure attachment with Foster Mother and others in the home. Dr. Bliss opined that if the Child were to be removed from Foster Mother’s care, trauma would be caused to the Child. All of the Child’s needs are met in the foster home. They feed, clothe, and provide for the Child’s education. Child has benefited greatly from physical, occupational, and speech therapy while in the care of Foster Mother.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
The record supports the trial court’s findings, and, thus, we discern no
abuse of discretion. As always, we decline to reweigh the evidence or usurp
the trial court’s credibility findings.
In conclusion, our review of the record supports the trial court’s findings.
We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion with respect to the trial
court’s conclusion that the Agency presented clear and convincing evidence to
terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b). In
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light of our disposition, we decline to address Mother’s arguments as they
relate to other subsections of Section 2511.
Order affirmed.
DATE: 08/04/2025
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