In re X.B.

2025 IL App (4th) 250225-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: July 30, 2025
• Docket: 4-25-0225
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 250225-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is July 30, 2025 NOS. 4-25-0225, 4-25-0226 cons. Carla Bender not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re X.B. and N.B.-B., Minors ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Sangamon County Petitioner-Appellee, ) Nos. 23JA105 v. ) 23JA197 Shayla B., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) Honorable ) Karen S. Tharp, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Harris and Justice Knecht concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court’s fitness and best-interest determinations were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶2 In October 2024, the State filed motions to terminate the parental rights of

respondent Shayla B. as to her minor children, X.B. (born in 2023) and N.B.-B. (born in 2021).

The children’s fathers are not parties to this appeal. In March 2025, the trial court granted the

State’s motions and terminated respondent’s parental rights.

¶3 Respondent appeals, arguing the trial court’s fitness and best-interest

determinations were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 In May and October 2023, the State filed petitions to adjudicate the children

neglected under section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2022)), alleging that they were in an environment injurious to their

welfare. Between the two petitions, the State alleged that (1) respondent had unresolved domestic

violence issues, (2) respondent engaged in drug use, (3) the putative father of one of the children

engaged in drug use, and (4) one of the children did not receive proper care and supervision

necessary for her well-being.

¶6 In each case, respondent stipulated that the State could prove the allegations in the

petitions. The trial court adjudicated the children neglected, found respondent unfit, made the

children wards of the court, and placed guardianship and custody of the children with the Illinois

Department of Children and Family Services.

¶7 On October 3, 2024, the State filed motions for termination of parental rights,

alleging respondent was unfit under sections 1(D)(a), (b), (c), (g), (k), (m)(i), and (m)(ii) of the

Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(a), (b), (c), (g), (k), (m)(i), (ii) (West 2024)) for (1) abandonment

of the children; (2) failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as

to the children’s welfare; (3) desertion of the children for more than three months preceding the

commencement of the action; (4) failure to protect the children from conditions within their

environment injurious to their welfare; (5) habitual drunkenness or addiction to drugs, other than

those prescribed by a physician, for at least one year immediately prior to the commencement of

the unfitness proceeding; (6) failure to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were

the basis for the removal of the children during a nine-month period after the adjudication of

neglect; and (7) failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the children to her care

during a nine-month period after the adjudication of neglect. As to X.B., the State alleged a nine

month period of December 13, 2023, to September 13, 2024. As to N.B.-B., the State alleged a

nine-month period of August 23, 2023, to May 23, 2024.

-2- ¶8 On January 23, 2025, the trial court held a fitness hearing. Caseworker Darcy

Garrett testified that the children originally came into care due to parental substance abuse, and

there were additional untreated mental health and domestic violence issues in the home.

Respondent’s goals included addressing (1) visitation, (2) cooperation, (3) housing and income,

(4) mental health services, (5) substance abuse services, (6) parenting, and (7) domestic violence.

¶9 Respondent was also required to participate in random drug testing. In October

2023, respondent tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and cocaine. In December 2023,

respondent tested positive for THC, benzodiazepines, methamphetamines, and cocaine. In October

2024, she tested positive for THC, methamphetamines, and high levels of cocaine. Between

November 8, 2023, and May 2, 2024, respondent failed to appear for 26 random tests. After that,

she failed to appear for 13 more random tests.

¶ 10 Respondent initially was rated satisfactory on her service plan because she had been

referred to initial services and had started to participate in them. Subsequently, however,

respondent was generally rated unsatisfactory because she failed to engage in services. Respondent

failed to complete the required substance abuse treatment and was unsuccessfully discharged from

parenting classes after she stopped attending. Respondent also failed to engage in mental health

services and was unsuccessfully discharged from domestic violence classes because she stopped

attending. Garrett testified that respondent was not cooperative with services and did not

consistently maintain employment. She also lived with and was supported by her paramour despite

repeated instances of domestic violence. Garrett reviewed police reports that reflected ongoing

domestic violence in the relationship and mentioned prostitution. Respondent sometimes stayed

with her mother but was unable to continue to do so due to respondent’s substance abuse.

¶ 11 Respondent engaged in 83 supervised visits with the children but missed 20.

-3- Respondent asked to have the missed visits rescheduled. In August 2024, visitation was stopped

because respondent exhibited a paranoid belief that one of the children was being sexually abused

in foster care, and she needed to progress in substance abuse services before visitation could

resume. Visitation resumed in November 2024. Respondent was never considered suitable for

unsupervised visitation because of her lack of progress in services. Garrett testified respondent

showed love and affection toward the children.

¶ 12 Respondent testified she had difficulty contacting Garrett, who did not answer her

phone when respondent called. Respondent testified that she called Garrett when she could not

attend visits and asked to reschedule, but she was told she could not do so. Respondent brought

things such as food, formula, clothes, and gifts to the visits with the children. Respondent said she

passed some drug tests and engaged in services on multiple occasions. However, she left inpatient

substance abuse services because she was unable to sleep there. Respondent admitted she

attempted outpatient services and relapsed. At the time of the hearing, she had been free of drugs

for two days. Respondent was not currently taking prescribed medication for her mental health

conditions because she did not like to take the medication when engaged in substance abuse.

However, she was willing to start taking the medication and stop abusing drugs.

¶ 13 Respondent admitted she still lived with her paramour, explaining that she had

nowhere else to go. Respondent testified that she wanted to enter a substance abuse treatment

facility and then go to a shelter. She expressed a desire to “start over” and said she was willing to

engage in services. Respondent said she loved her children and asked the trial court to give her

another chance.

¶ 14 The trial court found that the State proved respondent unfit by clear and convincing

evidence based on respondent’s (1) failure to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that

-4- were the basis for the removal of the children during a nine-month period after the adjudication of

neglect; (2) failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the children to her care during

a nine-month period after the adjudication of neglect; (3) failure to maintain a reasonable degree

of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the children’s welfare; and (4) habitual drunkenness or

addiction to drugs, other than those prescribed by a physician, for at least one year immediately

prior to the commencement of the unfitness proceeding.

¶ 15 On March 6, 2025, the trial court held the best-interest hearing. Garrett testified that

the children had been in the same foster placement since the case was opened. The children were

well cared for and happy. The children were bonded to their foster parent and called her “mama”

and “mommy.” The foster parent provided for the children’s educational, medical, emotional, and

other needs, and she had signed a permanency commitment to adopt the children. Garrett believed

the foster parent would continue to allow respondent to have contact with the children but said “it

hasn’t been a discussion.” To Garrett’s knowledge, respondent still had not engaged in substance

abuse services. Garrett believed it was in the best interest of the children to terminate respondent’s

parental rights.

¶ 16 Respondent testified she reached out to Garrett for assistance with obtaining

services and that Garrett was not helpful. She testified she tried to reach a service recommended

by Garrett and the service did not respond. She no longer lived with her paramour and said she

was currently homeless. However, she also said her paramour would probably let her sleep on his

couch if she had nowhere to go. Respondent said she had “no stability right now” because no one

was helping her. Respondent expressed a desire to enter a treatment program.

¶ 17 The trial court found the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence it was in

the best interest of the children to terminate respondent’s parental rights. The court addressed the

-5- required statutory best-interest factors, finding that they supported termination of parental rights.

The court noted the children needed permanence, they were well cared for, and their placement

provided them with security. The court expressed sympathy for respondent’s struggles with drug

addiction but noted her lack of progress in obtaining treatment and her willingness to return to her

paramour’s home. The court terminated respondent’s parental rights and set the permanency goal

for the children to adoption.

¶ 18 This appeal followed.

¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 20 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court erred in finding the State proved her

unfit by clear and convincing evidence and that it was in the best interest of the children to

terminate her parental rights.

¶ 21 A. Fitness Determination

¶ 22 Under section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West

2024)), the involuntary termination of parental rights is a two-step process. First, the State must

prove by clear and convincing evidence the parent is “unfit,” as defined in the Adoption Act. In re

Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234, 244 (2006). If the State proves unfitness, it then must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the

children. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 363-66 (2004).

¶ 23 A determination of parental unfitness involves factual findings and credibility

determinations that the trial court is in the best position to make because its “opportunity to view

and evaluate the parties *** is superior.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re M.I., 2016 IL

120232, ¶ 21. A trial court’s finding of parental unfitness will not be reversed unless it is against

the manifest weight of the evidence. In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 29. A decision is against the

-6- manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Id. “As the

grounds for unfitness are independent, the trial court’s judgment may be affirmed if the evidence

supports the finding of unfitness on any one of the alleged statutory grounds.” In re H.D., 343 Ill.

App. 3d 483, 493 (2003).

¶ 24 Among the grounds the trial court found for unfitness, the court found respondent

failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the children during any nine-month period

following the adjudication of neglect. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024). Illinois courts

have defined “reasonable progress” as “demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Reiny S., 374 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1046 (2007). This court

has explained reasonable progress exists when a trial court “can conclude that *** the court, in the

near future, will be able to order the child returned to parental custody.” (Emphasis in original.)

In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 461 (1991). “ ‘Reasonable progress’ is measured by an objective

standard.” In re A.R., 2023 IL App (1st) 220700, ¶ 70.

¶ 25 Here, there was ample evidence respondent failed to make reasonable progress

toward reunification. Respondent repeatedly failed to engage in services. While she attempted to

begin services, she never completed them. She also engaged in a pattern of behavior in which she

continued her relationship with her paramour, despite repeated instances of domestic violence.

Respondent failed to show progress in obtaining suitable housing and maintaining employment,

failed drug tests, and had visitation suspended. Given respondent’s lack of progress on nearly all

of her goals, the State showed respondent could not progress to a return of the children in the near

future. Accordingly, the trial court’s determination respondent failed to make reasonable progress

toward the return of the children was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 26 B. Best-Interest Determination

-7- ¶ 27 Respondent next contends the trial court’s best-interest determination was in error,

arguing that the court misapplied or disregarded some of the statutory factors.

¶ 28 When a trial court finds a parent unfit, “the court then determines whether it is in

the best interests of the minor that parental rights be terminated.” D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 352. “[A]t a

best-interests hearing, the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield

to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” Id. at 364. The State must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence termination of parental rights is in the minor’s best interest. Id. at

366. In making the best-interest determination, the court must consider the factors set forth in

section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2024)). These factors

include:

“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of

the child’s identity; (3) the child’s background and ties, including

familial, cultural, and religious; (4) the child’s sense of attachments,

including love, security, familiarity, and continuity of affection, and

the least-disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes;

(6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for permanence,

including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with

parental figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and

child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences

of the persons available to care for the child.” In re Jay. H., 395 Ill.

App. 3d 1063, 1071 (2009) (citing 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West

2008)).

“The court’s best interest determination [need not] contain an explicit reference to each of these

-8- factors, and a reviewing court need not rely on any basis used by the trial court below in affirming

its decision.” In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19. On review, “[w]e will not disturb

a court’s finding that termination is in the [child’s] best interest unless it was against the manifest

weight of the evidence.” In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953, 961 (2005).

¶ 29 Here, the evidence demonstrated the children had strong bonds with their foster

parent. The children needed permanence, and the foster parent provided for the children’s needs

and provided safety and security. While respondent testified that she wanted to seek treatment, the

record shows she had repeatedly failed to do so and would be unable to care for the children. The

trial court specifically referenced the statutory best-interest factors and found that they weighed in

favor of terminating respondent’s parental rights. Respondent’s arguments amount to contentions

that the court’s ruling goes against her wishes for the children. However, at the best-interest

hearing, “the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s

interest in a stable, loving home life.” D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364. Once the court found respondent

unfit, all considerations necessarily yielded to the best interest of the children and their interest in

a stable, loving, and safe home environment. Id. We conclude that the court did not disregard or

misapply the statutory factors.

¶ 30 Given the evidence that respondent was unable to provide for the children’s needs,

we cannot conclude the evidence in the record “clearly calls for the opposite finding” or is such

that “no reasonable person” could find as the trial court found. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 68. Accordingly, the court’s best-interest determination

was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 32 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

-9- ¶ 33 Affirmed.

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