In Re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation

598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54518, 2009 WL 424149
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 19, 2009
Docket21 MC 100(AKH)
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 598 F. Supp. 2d 498 (In Re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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In Re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation, 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54518, 2009 WL 424149 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

Opinion

OPINION DISCUSSING METHODOLOGY FOR DISCOVERY AND TRIALS OF SAMPLE CASES

ALVIN K. HELLERSTEIN, District Judge.

In the months following September 11, 2001, thousands of workers participated in New York City’s effort to clean up the vast destruction caused by terrorists. The airplane crashes and explosions at the World Trade Center left acres of twisted metal and crumbled concrete. Noxious dust blanketed the rubble and hung in the air for weeks, producing an acrid smell throughout downtown Manhattan. Those who helped in the search and rescue oper *499 ations, and in the effort to clear the mountains of debris, had to breathe this air as they worked. According to the allegations, protective masks, when worn, filtered this air in varying degrees.

Overlapping government agencies managed the workers, as did private contractors engaged by the City’s Department of Design and Construction. Nine thousand and ninety of these workers have filed suits in this court claiming various respiratory injuries and cancers resulting from their exposures to worksite contaminants. 1 They claim inadequate safety procedures and supervision.

I. Procedural History

Most of the cases were initiated in the New York Supreme Court and then removed to this court. They were assigned to me as related to docket 21 MC 97, which contained September 11th wrongful death actions that I had grouped into one coordinated proceeding. I denied class status because of the variety of illnesses alleged by the plaintiffs, the varying severity of their illnesses, the transient nature of the worksites, the varying levels of supervision governing plaintiffs’ work, the variety of defendants, and the complexity of determining and evaluating pre-existing medical conditions. See Transcript of Status Conference at 31-34 (Oct. 28, 2004).

I organized the cases into their own master docket, 21 MC 100, and considered the issue of jurisdiction. The aggregate demands of the lawsuits — those already filed and the hundreds more that were expected — promised far to exceed the maximum liability set by the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (“ATSSSA”), 49 U.S.C. § 40101. ATSSSA capped liability at $350 million or the City’s insurance protection, whichever was larger. The latter, at the time, seemed not to exist.

I ruled, in an extensive opinion, that claims arising from the search and rescue operations, extending for two weeks after September 11th, arose from the terrorist-related aircraft crashes and were subject to the district court’s exclusive jurisdiction. However, claims arising from work and exposures thereafter were much more akin to the activities and risks of construction worksites and to issues addressed by the New York Labor Law, on which the New York Supreme Court had developed a century of expertise. Accordingly, I remanded these later claims to that court. Hickey v. City of New York, 270 F.Supp.2d 357 (S.D.N.Y.2003). 2 An appeal followed and, after lengthy consideration, the Court of Appeals ruled that all the cases were to be considered subject to the district court’s exclusive jurisdiction. McNally v. Port Auth., 414 F.3d 352 (2d Cir.2005). See Robin J. Effron, Event Jurisdiction and Protective Coordination: Lessons from the September 11th Litigation, 81 S. Cal. L.Rev. 199 (2008).

Following remand of the cases to me, I turned to their organization. I appointed Liaison Counsel for plaintiffs and for defendants. Case Management Order No. 2 (Feb. 7, 2005). At plaintiffs’ request, I ordered master pleadings to be filed that alleged the issues common to all plaintiffs. Case Management Order No. 4 (May 12, 2005); see Master Complaint (Sept. 16, 2005). And, I ordered the parties to file short form complaints. Case Management *500 Order No. 4 (May 12, 2005). These complaints were intended to set out where, when, and for which contractors plaintiffs worked, as well as the causes of their injuries and the defendants’ alleged faults.

At the same time, defendants sought to advance their defense that the City and the contractors enjoyed immunity arising from federal and New York State laws. Both sides considered that the prospective substantial litigation expense made it important to clarify the reach and efficacy of this defense at an early time. I ordered discovery on limited issues relevant to the defense. The same discovery also would be relevant to defining the relationships between plaintiffs and the scores of defendant contractors, between defendant contractors and the City, and among the City, the State, and federal agencies that were active at the World Trade Center worksite.

The parties pursued discovery to satisfy both objectives with mixed success. The pleadings were conclusory in their allegations and impossible to understand in relation to essential facts and issues. Remonstrations at conferences and rulings on motions did not seem to advance matters. See, e.g., Transcript of Status Conference at 31-32 (May 13, 2005); Order Regulating Limited Discovery (June 15, 2005). As happens with discovery confined to limited issues, it proved difficult to define boundaries. Finally, however, defendants made their motions, and I denied the motions in a lengthy opinion, ruling that the issue of immunity hinged on controverted facts. Opinion Denying and Granting Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and for Summary Judgment, 456 F.Supp.2d 520 (S.D.N.Y.2006). I denied defendants’ motion that my order was eligible for immediate review or, alternatively, for certification for interlocutory review, Opinion and Order Denying Motion for Interlocutory Appeal and Asserting Continuing Jurisdiction (Jan. 8, 2007), but the Court of Appeals ruled that the appeal could nevertheless be pursued because rulings on immunity sufficiently satisfied an exception for final decisions on severable issues. 469 F.Supp.2d 134 (S.D.N.Y.2007), rev’d, McCue v. City of New York, 503 F.3d 167 (2d Cir.2007). The Court of Appeals also granted a stay of all proceedings on March 9, 2007, causing a complete standstill until March 26, 2008, when the stay was dissolved. The Court of Appeals then affirmed my decision. McCue v. City of New York, 521 F.3d 169 (2d Cir.2008).

II. The Litigation’s Complexities

During the lengthy stay, I considered how these cases should progress were they to be remanded. There were few precedents, perhaps none. These are not typical mass tort claims in which a single product or event injures the victims in a relatively similar way. Here, the victims were injured over a protracted period of time — days, weeks, and months, varying with the hours and dates particular plaintiffs worked in the widespread area (sixteen acres) constituting the World Trade Center site. Case Management Order No. 3 (Feb. 7, 2005) (defining World Trade Center site).

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598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54518, 2009 WL 424149, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-world-trade-center-disaster-site-litigation-nysd-2009.