In re Woodworth

16 N.Y.S. 147, 1891 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 361
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 24, 1891
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 16 N.Y.S. 147 (In re Woodworth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Woodworth, 16 N.Y.S. 147, 1891 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 361 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1891).

Opinion

Adams, J.

This is a proceeding under section IS, c. 262, Laws 1890, to compel the clerk of Seneca county to print upon the official ballot to be used at the approaching election the names of certain parties claiming to be regularly nominated candidates of the Republican party of that county, and its determination involves an adjudication between rival factions of the party, each claiming to be the regular organization. This simple statement of the nature of the duty imposed is sufficient to indicate that it is one from which any judicial officer would gladly escape were it possible to do so without disregarding the plain mandate of the law-making power of the state. This, however, cannot be done, and it becomes necessary, therefore, to meet the questions presented precisely like any other questions of fact and law, and without the slightest regard for the consequences which may result from the conclusion to be reached.

As has already been suggested, the parties in interest represent two opposing factions in the Republican organization of Seneca county, each of which has held a county convention at which candidates were placed in nomination for local offices; each of which claims to be the only regular representative of the party; and each of which has duly filed with the clerk of the county of Seneca a certificate in apparent conformity with the provisions of the act in question. To the certificates thus filed objections have been made within the time specified, and it thereupon became the duty of the clerk of the county, in the first instance, to pass upon the validity of the questions thus raised. This duty has been fulfilled by him, and the office of this proceeding is to review his determination.

As has just been stated, the certificates of nomination filed by the respective parties, upon their face, appear to conform, in all respects, to the requirements of law, and consequently there is nothing there furnished which can aid materially in reaching a satisfactory conclusion in the premises. It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine the record carefully for extraneous facts which may throw some additional light upon the subject; but before attempting this it will be desirable to understand precisely what is contemplated by the act under which this proceeding is instituted. The design of this act is declared by the legislature to be “to promote the independence of voters at [149]*149public elections, enforce the secrecy of the ballot, and provide for the printing and distribution of ballots at public expense,” and the means by which this most laudable object is to be attained is expressed in plain and direct terms. It is quite obvious to any intelligent person that, in seeking to purify and elevate our electoral system, not only must the existence of political parties be recognized, but party machinery must, to some extent, and within proper limitations, be utilized. We find, therefore, that the second section of the act in question provides that nominations to public office may be made through the medium of conventions or primary meetings, and it defines a convention or primary meeting to be “an organized assemblage of voters, or delegates, representing a political party which, at the last election before the holding of such convention or primary meeting, polled at least one per centum of the entire vote cast in the state, county, or other division or district for which the nomination is made.” The language above quoted would seem to indicate pretty clearly that, while recognizing the necessity of political divisions, it was within the contemplation of the legislature that such divisions should manifest themselves through the medium of organizations which should fairly represent the members of such divisions or parties; and, if this be true, then it becomes important that the facts of this case should be inquired into solely with a desire to ascertain, if possible, which, if either, of the two opposing factions is the actual representative of the political party which each claims to represent.

Now, what are the real facts established by the papers read upon the hearing of this motion? It is conceded that the Republican party represents a sufficient proportion of the voters of Seneca county to entitle the names of its candidates to be printed upon the official ballot. It is conceded that the party is divided into two opposing factions, each claiming to be regular, which, for the purposes of this proceeding, may be termed the Mongin and Patterson factions. It further appears that the county of Seneca is composed of ten towns, each of which, according to party usage, is entitled to five delegates in the county convention; that such convention was duly called to meet-at Seneca Palls on Monday, the 12th of October, 1891, at 2 o’clock p. m.; that prior to the last-mentioned date primary meetings were held in the several towns in the county for the purpose of electing delegates to represent such towns in said convention; that in six of such towns delegates were elected concerning whose title there was no dispute, and that these six towns were evenly divided between the two factions. In each of the remaining towns, viz., Waterloo, Varick, Payette, and Tyre, there were, or claimed to be, contesting delegations, and the contests which were thus presented were disposed of by the county convention in a manner to be more specifically noticed later on. It will be seen at a glance, then, that the important and controlling question in the ease relates to the regularity of the delegates from these four towns, and to the elucidation of that question let us bend our energies.

In the town of Waterloo two caucuses were held, one in pursuance of a call emanating from a town committee representing the Mongin faction, and the other in pursuance of a call issued by a committee which is supposed to. speak for the rival, or Patterson, faction. These separate committees owe their existence to two caucuses which were held prior to the town-meeting in. February last, and the regularity of these rival caucuses was the subject of judicial inquiry at that time, which inquiry resulted in an adjudication in favor of the one termed the “Patterson Caucus.” This adjudication was apparently accepted by both sides as a finality, as no appeal therefrom was-, taken; but, notwithstanding this, the committee appointed at the Mongin caucus, of which Mr. Mongin is a member, still assumes to discharge functions which it does not possess; and, in utter disregard of the order made last winter, called a caucus for the town, which caucus was held at the time and place named in the call, and those who attended the same went through [150]*150the form of electing Mr. Mongin and four other persons to represent the town in the county convention. It is true that this call received the sanction of the member of the county committee representing the town of Waterloo, and that in joining therein he claimed to act under the authority and direction of such committee; but it will hardly be claimed that the legislature intended to confer appellate jurisdiction upon so irresponsible a body as a county committee of any political party, and, until some better authority is cited, this tribunal will insist that its former adjudication shall be respected. It is sufficient to say that the Patterson caucus was called by the legally constituted town committee, in accordance with party usage, and that concerning the regularity of the delegates elected there can be no doubt whatever.

In the town of Varick but one caucus was held, and as to the regularity of the call there was no question made.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
16 N.Y.S. 147, 1891 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 361, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-woodworth-nysupct-1891.