In re Willington R. II

2025 IL App (5th) 250600-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: December 15, 2025
• Docket: 5-25-0600
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (5th) 250600-U NOTICE Decision filed 12/15/25. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0600 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

In re WILLINGTON R. II, a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Edgar County. ) Petitioner-Appellee ) ) v. ) No. 24-JA-13 ) Jessy S., ) Honorable ) Matthew L. Sullivan, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Cates and Justice Boie concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: This court affirms the order terminating the respondent’s parental rights to her minor child where the circuit court’s fitness and best-interest determinations were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶2 In April 2025 the State filed a motion to terminate the parental rights of the respondent,

Jessy S., to her minor child, Willington R. II, who was born on April 26, 2024. Following unfitness

and best-interest hearings, the circuit court granted the State’s motion and terminated the

respondent’s parental rights in June 2025. The respondent now appeals, arguing that the

termination of her parental rights was error and should be reversed. This court finds no error and

affirms the circuit court’s order terminating parental rights.

1 ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 A. Neglect Proceedings

¶5 The minor’s father, Jacob R., died in the midst of these proceedings on November 6, 2024.

Accordingly, this court’s discussion of the facts and issues in this case will focus on the minor and

the respondent, who is the minor’s mother. Additionally, there was a discrepancy regarding the

minor’s name, but this matter was resolved by an order of the circuit court.

¶6 On April 29, 2024, three days after the minor’s birth, the State filed a verified petition for

adjudication of wardship as to the minor. The State alleged that the minor was neglected under

section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b)

(West 2022)) in that his environment was injurious to his welfare. The supporting factual

allegations were that (A) the minor “experienced respiratory distress consistent with

methamphetamine withdrawal in newborns;” (B) on March 28, 2024, a drug screen performed on

the respondent showed a positive result for methamphetamine; and (C) the respondent had “a

reported history of substance abuse.”

¶7 On April 30, 3024, the circuit court held a shelter-care hearing. Prior to the start of the

hearing, the court appointed an attorney for the respondent, and a guardian ad litem (GAL), who

was an attorney, was appointed for the minor. After witness testimony and arguments from the

parties, the circuit court awarded temporary custody of the minor to the Department of Children

and Family Services (DCFS). The court informed the respondent that she was required to cooperate

with DCFS, to comply with the terms of the service plan, and to correct the conditions that required

the minor to be in care, or she would risk having her parental rights terminated.

¶8 The record reveals that the minor remained in the hospital for five days after his birth, due

to his showing signs of withdrawal. After his release, he was placed with a traditional foster family,

2 where he remained through the termination proceedings. The record also shows that the minor had

three older brothers: Riley R. (born January 2008), George R. (born December 2017), and Ridley

R. (born January 2019). Those three boys were removed from the respondent and taken into

protective custody by DCFS on June 30, 2021; all three were placed with their maternal great-

grandmother. Their neglect cases were Edgar County case Nos. 21-JA-13, 21-JA-14, and 21-JA-

15. The respondent’s parental rights to those three boys were terminated on July 2, 2024.

¶9 A family service plan, dated May 31, 2024, was filed with the court on July 9, 2024. The

family service plan stated that the respondent “will collaborate and cooperate” with DCFS and

with “other providers that have been recommended to her in order to achieve a successful

completion of services outlined on her service plan.” The respondent participated in an integrated

assessment. She signed her initial service plan and said that she would “do services.” She had

completed domestic violence services and was engaged in parenting services. However, she had

“not yet initiated mental health or substance abuse counseling. She is on the waiting list for mental

health counseling at HRC [i.e., the Human Resources Center].” She needed to complete a

substance-abuse assessment. She had been directed to complete random drug screens, although

her past included two refusals to take drug screens and one drug screen that “showed a non-

negative for meth.” The minor’s service plan goal was to return home within 12 months. The

service plan goal of the minor’s three brothers was substitute care pending the determination of

termination of parental rights. On the signature page of the family service plan, there was a notation

that the respondent had refused to sign the plan but was given a copy thereof.

¶ 10 On June 21, 2024, the State filed a verified amended petition for adjudication of wardship.

The amended petition included one additional factual allegation beyond the three contained in the

original petition. In addition to allegations (A) through (C), the amended petition presented

3 allegation (D), which was an allegation that the respondent had not complied with DCFS services

in Edgar County case Nos. 21-JA-13, 21-JA-14, and 21-JA-15—the three cases involving the

minor’s three older brothers—“showing an injurious environment still exists for [the minor] as

well.”

¶ 11 On July 2, 2024, the circuit court conducted an adjudicatory hearing in this case. The court

found that the State had proven two of the four allegations contained in the amended petition for

adjudication of wardship, specifically, allegation (3) and the new allegation (4). The court

adjudicated the minor neglected. The court ended the adjudicatory hearing by admonishing the

respondent that she was “required to cooperate with DCFS, comply with the terms of the service

plan, correct the conditions that require the minor to be in care,” or else risk termination of her

parental rights. See 705 ILCS 405/2-21(1) (West 2024) (court’s admonishments to parents after

finding that their child has been abused, neglected, or dependent).

¶ 12 On October 1, 2024, the court held a dispositional hearing and determined that it was in

the best interests of the minor and the public that the minor be made a ward of the court. The court

found that the conditions that had led to the minor’s removal had not been corrected. Custody and

guardianship of the minor were granted to DCFS. The respondent was ordered to complete a

psychological evaluation and to cooperate with treatment recommendations. The court found the

goal of having the minor return home within 12 months appropriate.

¶ 13 On March 4, 2025, the circuit court held a permanency hearing. The court found that the

respondent had made no reasonable efforts and no substantial progress toward returning the minor

home. The permanency goal remained return home within 12 months.

4 ¶ 14 B. Termination Proceedings

¶ 15 On April 24, 2025, the State filed a motion to terminate the respondent’s parental rights.

The motion alleged that the respondent was unfit to have a child because, during the nine-month

period from July 17, 2024, to April 17, 2025, a period after the adjudication of neglect, she (A)

had failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal

of the minor from the respondent, and (B) had failed to make reasonable progress toward the return

of the minor to the respondent, pursuant to sections 1(D)(m)(i) and 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption

Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i), (ii) (West 2024)).

¶ 16 On April 25, 2025, DCFS filed a report stating that the respondent “had not engaged in

substance abuse treatment,” had made only “minor progress towards her mental health treatment

goals,” and had not taken a drug screen since the opening of this case, despite being referred for

drug screening and even being offered options of drug-screening methods. The respondent had not

made reasonable efforts, or substantial progress, toward the minor’s return home, the report

concluded. DCFS recommended changing the permanency goal to substitute care pending court

determination of termination of parental rights.

¶ 17 1. Fitness

¶ 18 On June 24, 2025, the court held a hearing on the issue of the respondent’s fitness or

unfitness to have a child. As its sole witness at the fitness hearing, the State called Kara Chamoun,

a child welfare specialist with DCFS, who was the assigned caseworker.

¶ 19 Chamoun testified that the respondent had participated in an integrated assessment, and in

that integrated assessment, she was required, inter alia, to complete an assessment and treatment

for substance abuse and mental health. In regard to substance abuse, Chamoun testified that the

respondent never even completed an assessment during the nine-month period at issue here, July

5 17, 2024, to April 17, 2025, the respondent did not have any substance-abuse treatment. On June

6, 2025 (i.e., 50 days after the relevant nine-month period had ended), the respondent informed

Chamoun that she was starting an online course on substance abuse, however, DCFS had not

approved an online course for the respondent “since she could not have random drug screens.”

During the relevant nine-month period, the respondent did not have any drug screens. Completion

of random drug screens “is on [the respondent’s] service plan,” which Chamoun reviewed with

the respondent “every time that [she] had a chance.” Chamoun “attempted to have her screened

four times, and four times she refused an oral toxicology screen. Four times she did not show to

the arranged urine drop.”

¶ 20 Chamoun testified that in regard to mental health, the respondent had completed an

assessment in July 2024 though she could not recall the exact date. The recommendation was for

26 hours of treatment. However, after the assessment, the respondent did not follow through on

treatment. In February 2025 she began treatment with a different treatment provider than the one

who had done the assessment. As of June 11, 2025, she had completed 11 of the 26 hours of

treatment.

¶ 21 Chamoun also stated that the minor’s father, Jacob R., had died on November 6, 2024, of

“a meth and fentanyl overdose” at the respondent’s apartment. She identified a copy of Jacob R.’s

death certificate. She was unaware of whether the respondent was in her apartment at the time of

his death.

¶ 22 Chamoun further testified that the respondent, in her integrated assessment, was ordered to

complete parenting classes and to maintain stable housing. The respondent had completed

parenting classes required in her earlier three cases (involving her three children other than the

minor here), and she was taking parenting classes, through a different provider, throughout the

6 instant case. She needed “11 parenting hours for completion. She had made it to 7 and was

unsuccessfully discharged on May 6th [2025].” The respondent reinitiated services, and as of June

11, 2025, she has completed three hours. In short, she had not completed parenting classes within

the nine-month period from July 17, 2024, to April 17, 2025. According to Chamoun, the

respondent had weekly supervised visits with the minor. From the visits that Chamoun had

observed, the visits went well. The respondent is “attentive” to the minor. According to Chamoun,

the respondent, through May 2025, had been offered 49 visits with the minor and had missed 15,

usually because she “didn’t call to confirm the day before,” as DCFS required her to do. However,

Chamoun could not say how many visits or how many misses occurred during the nine-month

period from July 17, 2024, to April 17, 2025.

¶ 23 Chamoun also testified that during the entire nine-month period, the respondent maintained

the same apartment. However, the apartment had been “cluttered” during visits, to the point where

Chamoun would be concerned about having a child of the minor’s age visit. On cross-examination

by the respondent’s attorney, Chamoun stated that in the respondent’s three earlier cases involving

the minor’s three older brothers, the respondent had completed her parenting classes but had not

complied with her substance-abuse or mental-health services.

¶ 24 In closing argument, the State asked the court for a finding of parental unfitness. According

to the State, the minor had become “the fourth child where [the respondent] has just not

participated with [DCFS]. She has not done the things that Ms. Chamoun has asked her to do.”

The respondent’s counsel, in his argument, stated that the respondent “recently appears to be

making good progress,” arguing that she should not be found unfit, or in the alternative that the

court should “take this [matter] under advisement, set the matter out for a couple of months to see

if [the respondent] can finish up all of the services she is currently in.” The minor’s GAL stated

7 that, “[i]n regard to the fitness, I’d probably agree with the State.” The GAL argued that he would

be “hard pressed” to conclude that the respondent, during the nine-month period, “made any

reasonable progress or even reasonable efforts.”

¶ 25 The circuit court found that the State had met its burden of establishing that during the

nine-month period from July 17, 2024, to April 17, 2025, the respondent (1) had failed to make

reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the minor from

the respondent and (2) had failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minor to

the respondent. “[S]he’s refused to do any drug tests,” the court stated. “[S]he has had several

visits, but she’s also missed a third of them with the child.” The court found the respondent “not a

fit person at this point.” With that finding of unfitness, the court immediately proceeded to the

best-interest hearing.

¶ 26 2. Best Interest

¶ 27 For the best-interest hearing, the State recalled Chamoun, who testified that the minor was

one year old at the time of the termination proceedings. He was in a traditional foster home, where

he had been since his release from the hospital days after his birth. The relationship between the

minor and his foster parents was “very positive.” The minor would often cling to his foster mother

during Chamoun’s monthly visits to the foster home. In the foster home, there was also another

child who was in DCFS care, an infant, who had been with the family for two months. The minor

had adjusted “pretty good” to the infant, and Chamoun did not have any concerns about his

adjustment. The minor received “early intervention services,” which had been going well. The

foster family had expressed an ability to continue to support the minor. On cross-examination by

the minor’s GAL, Chamoun testified that during visits between the minor and the respondent, the

minor was “usually happy to see [the respondent].”

8 ¶ 28 The State also called Loretta Schrock, the minor’s foster mother, as a witness. Schrock

testified that she was married to the minor’s foster father, and the relationship between her husband

and the minor was “great.” She and her husband took the minor to the doctor without any problem.

They were willing to care for the minor and were interested in adopting him if the occasion arose.

Also, Schrock testified that the minor and the other infant in their household got along well, and

she did not have any concerns about them. There were no other children in the home.

¶ 29 On cross-examination by the minor’s GAL, Schrock testified that she was a full-time

homemaker and her husband worked in a warehouse. They had sufficient funds to care for the

minor, and they owned their four-bedroom home. Under questioning by the court, Schrock stated

that the four of them—Schrock herself, Schrock’s husband, the minor, and the other infant in

DCFS care—were the only ones who lived in the house. She and her husband had no biological

children of their own. They both loved the minor, had discussed adoption, and wanted to adopt

him.

¶ 30 Neither the respondent’s attorney nor the minor’s GAL presented witnesses or other

evidence at the best-interest hearing. The State argued that it was in the best interest of the minor

to terminate the respondent’s parental rights. The respondent’s counsel argued for taking the matter

“under advisement, set a date approximately two to three months down the road to see what

progress [the respondent] can continue to make.” The GAL commented that after seeing the

minor’s foster mother, he thought “it’s a good placement,” and he recommended termination of

parental rights.

¶ 31 The court expressed some sympathy for the respondent but stated that he was “more

sympathetic to [the minor],” who needed permanency. The court did not choose to take the matter

9 under advisement, as suggested by the respondent’s counsel, and instead found that it was in the

best interest of the minor that the respondent’s parental rights be terminated.

¶ 32 From the order terminating her parental rights, the respondent filed a timely pro se notice

of appeal. The circuit court appointed the respondent’s counsel as her counsel on appeal.

¶ 33 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 34 On appeal, the respondent argues that the circuit court erred in terminating her parental

rights. One component of this argument is her contention that the State acted impermissibly when

it chose the nine-month period from July 17, 2024, to April 17, 2025, as the period in which to

assess whether the respondent had made reasonable efforts or reasonable progress toward having

the minor returned to her. She asserts that it was not until October 1, 2024—the date of the

dispositional hearing and order—that the circuit court “officially imposed” the various

requirements that she needed to meet. Therefore, the nine-month period should have commenced

after October 1, 2024. By selecting a nine-month period that commenced prior to October 1, 2024,

the State was calling for an assessment of the respondent’s performance before the court had even

ordered her to do anything. The respondent specifically argues, “To prematurely terminate parental

rights, is a violation of [the respondent’s] Due Process rights, especially when [the respondent]

was making some progress and would have continued to make progress given the opportunity to

have her progress viewed in an appropriate timeline.”

¶ 35 This argument was not presented in the circuit court. An argument not made in the circuit

court is generally forfeited on appeal. See, e.g., Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Cisco, 178 Ill.

2d 386, 395 (1997). This argument is forfeited. Forfeiture, however, is a limitation on the parties,

not this court. In re T.B., 2020 IL App (1st) 191041, ¶ 68. Given the fundamental liberty interest

of parents to raise and care for their children, courts may overlook a party’s forfeiture. In re B.S.,

10 2022 IL App (2d) 220271, ¶ 36. As such, we will review the nine-month period included in the

State’s petition.

¶ 36 This court notes that under subsections 1(D)(m)(i) and 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act—

the grounds for unfitness at issue here—a person’s efforts or progress are to be assessed “during

any 9-month period following the adjudication of neglected or abused minor.” 750 ILCS

50/1(D)(m)(i), (ii) (West 2024). Thus, “the date on which to begin assessing a parent’s efforts or

progress” is the date the circuit court entered its order adjudging the minor neglected, abused, or

dependent, and not the date the circuit court entered its dispositional order. In re D.F., 208 Ill. 2d

223, 243 (2003). Here, the court adjudicated the minor neglected on July 2, 2024, and the relevant

nine-month period commenced on July 17, 2024, a date after the adjudication of neglect. Thus,

there was nothing improper about the nine-month period chosen by the State for assessing the

respondent’s efforts or progress.

¶ 37 Turning to the termination itself, it is undeniable that parents have a fundamental liberty

interest in the care, custody, and management of their children. See, e.g., In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d

347, 363 (2004). Nevertheless, the circuit court has the authority to terminate parental rights

involuntarily. The involuntary termination of parental rights under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987

(705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2024)) is a two-step process. In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 20.

The State must first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit under any of

the discrete and independent grounds listed in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)

(West 2024)). In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 20; In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 217 (2002) (“the

grounds set forth in section 1(D) each provide a discrete basis for a finding of unfitness.”).

Although the State may rely on several grounds in its motion to terminate parental rights, a finding

11 adverse to the parent on any single ground is sufficient to support a subsequent termination of

parental rights. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at 217.

¶ 38 If the court finds that a parent is unfit, the matter proceeds to a second hearing, at which

the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is in the best interests of the minor

to terminate parental rights. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 352, 366. At this stage of the proceedings, the

circuit court’s focus shifts to the best interests of the child and away from the rights of the parent.

In re P.S., 2021 IL App (5th) 210027, ¶ 30. “The parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child

relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d

at 364. A prompt, just, and final resolution of a child’s status, as opposed to having that status

remain in limbo, is in the child’s interests. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (2000).

¶ 39 A reviewing court accords great deference to the circuit court’s decisions in termination

proceedings because the circuit court is in a better position to observe witnesses and to judge their

credibility. In re Dal. D., 2017 IL App (4th) 160893, ¶ 53. This court does not reweigh the evidence

or reassess the credibility of witnesses. In re M.A., 325 Ill. App. 3d 387, 391 (2001). Unless the

circuit court’s finding of parental unfitness or the child’s best interest is against the manifest weight

of the evidence, this court will not disturb that finding. In re A.W., 231 Ill. 2d 92, 104 (2008). A

finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly

apparent or the determination is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.

In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498 (2002).

¶ 40 A. Fitness

¶ 41 Here, the State’s motion to terminate the respondent’s parental rights alleged that the

respondent was unfit to have a child because, during the nine-month period from July 17, 2024, to

April 17, 2025, she (1) had failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were

12 the basis for the removal of the minor from the respondent and (2) had failed to make reasonable

progress toward the return of the minor to the respondent. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i), (ii) (West

2024). The circuit court found that the State had proved both of these grounds of unfitness.

¶ 42 If the State proves more than one statutory ground of parental unfitness, a reviewing court

need not consider each and every one of those grounds. If there is sufficient evidence to satisfy

any single statutory ground, a reviewing court need not consider the other grounds of unfitness.

In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340, 349 (2005) (reviewing court may affirm if there is sufficient

evidence to satisfy any one ground of unfitness alleged in the State’s termination petition). This

court finds it necessary to consider only the “reasonable progress” ground under section

1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act. The “reasonable efforts” ground under section 1(D)(m)(i) need

not be considered.

¶ 43 A person may be found unfit to have a child if he or she fails “to make reasonable progress

toward the return of the child to the parent during any 9-month period following the adjudication

of neglected or abused minor *** .” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024). In In re C.N., 196 Ill.

2d 181 (2001), our supreme court examined the “reasonable progress” ground for parental

unfitness, beginning with the observation that “progress” is usually defined as movement or

advancement toward a goal, and in this particular context, progress toward the goal of having the

child returned to the parent. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 211. Measuring a parent’s progress toward

the goal of having the child returned

“encompasses the parent’s compliance with the service plans and the court’s

directives, in light of the condition which gave rise to the removal of the child, and in light

of other conditions which later become known and which would prevent the court from

returning custody of the child to the parent. *** [C]ompliance with DCFS service plans is

13 intimately tied to a parent’s progress toward the return of the child, so much so, that where

a service plan has been established to correct the conditions that were the basis for the

removal of the child from the parent, the failure to make reasonable progress now includes

the failure to ‘substantially’ fulfill the terms of that service plan.” Id. at 216-17.

Of course, the service plan must reasonably relate to “remedying a condition or conditions that

gave rise or which could give rise to any finding of child abuse or neglect.” 325 ILCS 5/8.2 (West

2024) (nature and purpose of service plans).

¶ 44 “[R]easonable progress is judged by an objective standard based upon the amount of

progress measured from the conditions existing at the time custody was taken from the parent.”

In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1067 (2006). It is not judged by a subjective standard

based upon the progress that is reasonable for a particular person. Id. at 1066-67. When

determining whether a parent has made reasonable progress, the circuit court only considers the

evidence occurring during the relevant nine-month period. In re Z.M., 2019 IL App (3d) 180424,

¶ 68. A parent has made reasonable progress when “the progress being made by a parent to comply

with directives given for the return of the child is sufficiently demonstrable and of such a quality

that the court, in the near future, will be able to order the child returned to parental custody.”

(Emphases in original.) In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 461 (1991). “[T]he overall focus in

evaluating a parent’s progress toward the return of the child remains, at all times, on the fitness of

the parent in relation to the needs of the child.” In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 216.

¶ 45 Here, the respondent completed an integrated assessment, as mentioned in the family

service plan dated May 31, 2024. The integrated assessment required the respondent to complete

an assessment and treatment for both substance abuse and mental health. At the June 25, 2025,

fitness hearing, Chamoun testified that the respondent never completed an assessment regarding

14 substance abuse. The failure to complete this assessment is of importance, since substance abuse

was the principal reason for the respondent’s involvement with DCFS. Chamoun also testified that

during the relevant nine-month period, July 17, 2024, to April 17, 2025, the respondent did not

have any substance-abuse treatment, or any drug screens. Such a performance, or non-

performance, by the respondent represents a complete failure in the area of greatest concern—the

respondent’s relationship with drugs. She remained mired in that problem.

¶ 46 The respondent did complete a mental-health assessment in July 2024 according to

Chamoun, and the recommendation was that she complete 26 hours of mental-health treatment.

However, Chamoun testified, after the assessment, the respondent did not follow through on

treatment. Eventually, in February 2025 she began mental-health treatment with a provider other

than the one who had assessed her. However, as of June 11, 2025—nearly two months after the

relevant nine-month period had ended—the respondent still had completed only 11 of the 26 hours

of treatment. Given the number of hours available in a period of nine months, 11 completed hours

of treatment does not show that the respondent actively pursued the necessary treatment.

¶ 47 Chamoun also testified that the respondent had not completed parenting classes during the

nine-month period from July 17, 2024, to April 17, 2025. According to Chamoun, the respondent

needed to complete 11 parenting hours, but she had completed only seven hours and therefore was

unsuccessfully discharged on May 6, 2025, which was after the end of the relevant nine-month

period. She then reinitiated services, but as of June 11, 2025 (55 days after the end of the nine-

month period), she had only completed three hours.

¶ 48 In light of this testimony by caseworker Chamoun—the sole witness to testify at the fitness

hearing—this court concludes that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the

respondent, during the relevant nine-month period, had failed to make reasonable progress toward

15 the return of the minor to her. Accordingly, the circuit court’s finding that the respondent was unfit

to have a child, under subsection (D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act, was not against the manifest

weight of the evidence. In other words, a finding that she did make reasonable progress is not

clearly apparent. See In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 498.

¶ 49 B. Best Interest

¶ 50 Once the circuit court found that the respondent was unfit to have a child, it then considered

the minor’s best interest. See In re Julian K., 2012 IL App (1st) 112841, ¶ 80 (once the parent is

found unfit, “all considerations, including the parent’s rights, yield to the best interests of the

child.”).

¶ 51 Section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act lists the factors that a circuit court must

consider “in the context of the child’s age and developmental needs.” 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)

(West 2024). These must-consider factors include “the physical safety and welfare of the child,

including food, shelter, health, and clothing”; the child’s sense of attachments, including where he

“actually feels love, attachment, and a sense of being valued”; the child’s sense of security and of

familiarity; the continuity of affection for the child, and the least disruptive placement alternative

for the child; the child’s need for permanence, which includes the child’s “need for stability and

continuity of relationships with parent figures, siblings, and other relatives”; “the uniqueness of

every family and child”; and the preferences of the persons available to care for the child, including

“willingness to provide permanency to the child *** through adoption.” Id. §§ 1-3(4.05)(a), (d)(i)-

(v), (g), (h), (j).

¶ 52 At the best-interest hearing, Chamoun, the DCFS caseworker, testified that the minor had

been with the same foster family for just about all of his very young life, and that the relationship

between the minor and his foster parents was “very positive.” According to Chamoun, the minor

16 would often cling to his foster mother during Chamoun’s monthly visits to the foster home. This

testimony indicated that the minor felt loved and had a sense of security and familiarity with his

foster family. Early intervention services were going well, Chamoun testified. That bit of

testimony was an indication that the uniqueness of the minor, including his needs, was being

respected. The testimony of the minor’s foster mother, Loretta Schrock, portrayed a thoroughly

capable and loving family for the minor. She and her husband’s desire to adopt the minor promise

to bring him the stability, continuity, and permanency that the minor deserves.

¶ 53 With the testimony of Chamoun and Schrock, the State proved by a preponderance of the

evidence that the best interest of the minor would be served by terminating the respondent’s

parental rights. The court was free to credit their testimonies and to rule as it did on the issue of

best interest. The court’s determination was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 54 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 55 The circuit court’s findings on the respondent’s unfitness and the minor’s best interest, as

well as the order terminating the respondent’s parental rights, are hereby affirmed.

¶ 56 Affirmed.