In re Williams

2025 Ohio 5434

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 5, 2025
• Docket: 2025-CA-17
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re Williams, 2025-Ohio-5434.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY

IN THE MATTER OF: : : C.A. No. 2025-CA-17 SHANE WILLIAMS : : Trial Court Case No. 21-DS-0199 AND : : (Appeal from Common Pleas Court- JAMI WILLIAMS : Domestic Relations) : : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION

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Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on December 5, 2025, the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

MICHAEL L. TUCKER, JUDGE

EPLEY, P.J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur. OPINION CLARK C.A. No. 2025-CA-17

EDWARD A. FRIZZELL, Attorney for Appellant GREGORY K. LIND, Attorney for Appellee

TUCKER, J.

{¶ 1} Jami Williams appeals from the trial court’s judgment entry overruling her motion

to terminate a custody condition prohibiting her boyfriend, a convicted sex offender, from

having any contact with her minor child.

{¶ 2} Jami contends the trial court abused its discretion in not removing the restriction

because allowing contact with her boyfriend would not adversely affect the child.

{¶ 3} We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision. Accordingly, its

judgment is affirmed.

I. Background

{¶ 4} Jami and Shane Williams married and had a child together in 2010 before

obtaining a dissolution in 2021. Jami was named the child’s residential parent and legal

custodian, and Shane received parenting time. Following the dissolution, Jami began dating

Alan Funderburg, a registered sex offender with a 2008 conviction for gross sexual

imposition involving his then 13-year-old stepdaughter. After discovering Jami’s new

relationship, Shane moved for reallocation of parental rights and sought legal custody.

Following a hearing, the trial court overruled Shane’s motion. In a March 6, 2024 entry, it

found that allowing Funderburg to be in the presence of the parties’ child would be contrary

to the child’s best interest. However, it accepted Jami’s representation that she had

terminated her relationship with Funderburg and did not intend to renew it. As a precaution,

the trial court’s entry overruling Shane’s motion for legal custody imposed an affirmative

2 obligation on her “to ensure that the minor child . . . is not ever in the presence of Alan

Funderburg and that she have no contact with him whatsoever.” Neither party appealed the

trial court’s ruling.

{¶ 5} Just months after the trial court’s decision, Jami filed a July 26, 2024 motion to

terminate the prohibition of contact between Funderburg and the child. She expressed a

desire to renew her relationship with him and noted that his obligation to register as a sex

offender recently had expired. Shane responded by filing a renewed custody motion, and

Jami filed her own motion to retain legal custody.

{¶ 6} The trial court held an evidentiary hearing limited to Jami’s motion seeking to

permit contact between Funderburg and the child. Witnesses included Jami, Shane,

Funderburg, and a guardian ad litem. The trial court also spoke to the child in camera. It

then filed a March 3, 2025 entry overruling Jami’s motion to allow contact between

Funderburg and the child. It construed her motion as arising under R.C. 3109.04, which

governs the modification of parental rights and responsibilities after an initial decree has

been issued. The trial court reasoned that she was seeking to modify her parental

responsibility to ensure that the child had no contact with Funderburg. Among other things,

the trial court determined that Jami was not entitled to relief because she had not shown a

requisite “change in circumstances” since the prior decree and because allowing contact

would not be in the child’s best interest.

II. Analysis

{¶ 7} Jami’s assignment of error states:

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN, AGAINST THE

MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, IT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE NO

ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE CHILD.

3 {¶ 8} Jami contends that the trial court should have terminated the no-contact

restriction because allowing contact between Funderburg and the child would not adversely

affect the child. She cites her testimony that the child enjoyed being around Funderburg

when she dated him prior to imposition of the restriction. She also cites her testimony that

she will not allow him to be alone with the child. Jami additionally notes that Funderburg’s

obligation to register as a sex offender has expired and that he has not been accused of

engaging in any inappropriate behavior since his nearly 20-year-old conviction.

{¶ 9} Upon review, we find Jami’s assignment of error to be unpersuasive.

Modification of an existing order allocating parental rights is governed by

R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a), which provides in part:

The court shall not modify a prior decree allocating parental rights and

responsibilities for the care of children unless it finds, based on facts that have

arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of

the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child,

the child’s residential parent, or either of the parents subject to a shared

parenting decree, and that the modification is necessary to serve the best

interest of the child.

{¶ 10} The trial court addressed Jami’s motion in the context of R.C. 3109.04. It

reasoned that she sought modification of a requirement in the existing decree that allocated

to her an obligation to prevent contact between Funderburg and the child. On appeal, the

parties also have addressed the issue under R.C. 3109.04, and we likewise consider the

issue under this statute.

{¶ 11} We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to modify parental rights and

responsibilities for an abuse of discretion. In the Matter of Z.L.A., 2025-Ohio-2355, ¶ 11

4 (2d Dist.). “Abuse of discretion” means a trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). An abuse of

discretion usually will result in a decision that is unreasonable rather than unconscionable

or arbitrary. Chaney v. Chaney, 2012-Ohio-626, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.). “‘A decision is unreasonable

if there is no sound reasoning process that would support that decision. It is not enough that

the reviewing court, were it deciding the issue de novo, would not have found that reasoning

process to be persuasive, perhaps in view of countervailing reasoning processes that would

support a contrary result.’” Musgrove v. Musgrove, 2011-Ohio-4460, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.), quoting

AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Redevelopment, 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990).

{¶ 12} With the foregoing standards in mind, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s overruling of Jami’s motion to remove the no-contact restriction. As an initial matter,

her appellate brief largely ignores the trial court’s finding that she had failed to establish the

change in circumstances required by R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a). The statute does not permit

modification of an existing order absent a change in the circumstances of the child or the

residential parent. The trial court found that Jami’s desire to reunite with Funderburg was

not a change in circumstances because it disbelieved her testimony that she in fact had

broken up with him at the time of the prior order. The trial court found that the only real

change in circumstances in the four-month interval between its prior order and her motion

was the expiration of Funderburg’s obligation to register as a sex offender. The trial court

reasoned that this was a change in his circumstances, not Jami’s or the child’s

circumstances. Therefore, it held that Jami was not entitled to modification of her parental

responsibility to keep Funderburg away from the child. Jami’s substantive argument on

appeal does not address this aspect of the trial court’s ruling, so she has failed to

demonstrate any abuse of discretion.

5 {¶ 13} Even if the required change in circumstances did exist, we see no abuse of

discretion in the trial court’s additional finding that allowing contact between Funderburg and

the child would not be in the child’s best interest. The trial court noted that his 2008 conviction

involved him lifting his 13-year-old stepdaughter’s shirt while she slept and touching her

breasts before leaving the room and masturbating. Although Funderburg only served two

years in prison for gross sexual imposition, the trial court observed that he had engaged in

this conduct up to 150 times over a 16-month period. The trial court also pointed out that he

remained a convicted sex offender despite the recent expiration of his registration obligation.

{¶ 14} The trial court additionally found the testimony of Jami and Funderburg to lack

credibility in significant ways. As for Jami, it discredited her testimony that she previously

had terminated her relationship with Funderburg and had no intention of reconciling with him

at the time of the prior decree. The trial court found it “much more likely that [the] relationship

continued during the course of those proceedings and after.” The trial court similarly found

not credible Funderburg’s testimony that he and Jami had broken up at the time of the prior

order.

{¶ 15} The trial court found that the motion to lift the no-contact restriction was

motivated by Jami’s self-interest rather than a desire to benefit the child. Based on its in-

camera interview, the trial court also found that Jami had minimized Funderburg’s

misconduct and had not given the child an accurate explanation of his past behavior, leading

the child to have a falsely positive view of Funderburg and to be frustrated with her father

for supporting the no-contact restriction. The trial court additionally found that neither

Funderburg nor Jami could be trusted to abide by a requirement for someone else to be

present if Funderburg and the child were allowed to be together.

6 {¶ 16} Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court’s decision is not

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. On the contrary, the decision is supported by a

sound reasoning process. Although Jami contends Funderburg previously was a positive

influence on the child, the record reflects that the child continues to flourish without seeing

him. As for Jami’s assertion that she will not allow him to be alone with the child, the trial

court acted within its discretion in finding her testimony not credible. Although Funderburg’s

sex-offender registration had recently expired, the trial court reasonably considered the long-

term nature of his offenses, the fact that the parties’ child was of a similar age as his prior

victim, the fact that Jami had minimized his wrongdoing when discussing the issue with the

child, and the fact that Jami’s motion was motivated by self-interest rather than a desire to

benefit the child. For the foregoing reasons, Jami’s assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 17} The judgment of the Clark County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

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EPLEY, P.J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.