In re Williams

381 B.R. 742, 64 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1034, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 206, 2008 WL 287974
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Arkansas
DecidedFebruary 1, 2008
DocketNo. 1:07-bk-71980M
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 381 B.R. 742 (In re Williams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Williams, 381 B.R. 742, 64 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1034, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 206, 2008 WL 287974 (Ark. 2008).

Opinion

ORDER

JAMES G. MIXON, Bankruptcy Judge.

On June 29, 2007, Charles Edward Williams (Debtor) filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The Debtor filed an objection to Wells Fargo’s claim of $2,865.00, stating that the claim is unsecured. Wells Fargo filed a response asserting a perfected secured claim. A hearing was held on October 26, 2007. A stipulated statement of uncontested facts was filed and both parties submitted briefs.

The Court considers whether Wells Fargo has a perfected security interest in a K Guard Guttering System (guttering system) installed by Hanke Brothers. This Court finds that the guttering system is a consumer good as provided by Arkansas Code Annotated Section 4-9-102(23) and, therefore, the claim is allowed as secured.

This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B), and the Court has jurisdiction to enter a final judgment in the case.

I. Facts

According to the stipulated facts, the Debtor entered into a charge slip contract with Wells Fargo for the purchase and installation of a guttering system. The Debtor agreed to pay Wells Fargo principal plus interest in an original amount not shown by the record in return for payment [744]*744by Wells Fargo to Hanke Brothers. Wells Fargo made payment to Hanke Brothers for the purchase price of the guttering system. Hanke Brothers then installed the guttering system on the Debtor’s residence. The charge slip contract between the Debtor and Wells Fargo provides that:

Where applicable, you give us a purchase money security interest in any goods, described in this charge slip. We will not claim a security interest or other lien (except judgment lien) in your principal dwelling. You agree that any property described in this charge slip will remain personal property and will not become a fixture even if attached to real property.

(Stipulated Statement of Uneontested Facts.)

The Debtor paid for the guttering system with a Home Projects Visa credit card from Wells Fargo. The credit card contains the following terms:

Use of Account: The use of your account by you or anyone permitted by you indicates acceptance of the terms of this agreement. You promise that all purchases made using your account will be for personal, family or household purposes.
Security Interest: To the extent permitted by applicable law, you hereby grant to us and we are retaining a [purchase] money security interest under the Uniform Commercial Code in the merchandise purchased on your account using your special HOME PROJECTS subaccounts until such merchandise is paid in full. You agree to assist us in executing documents necessary to perfect our security interest. If you do not make a minimum payment due on your account by the date on which it is due, we may repossess any merchandise that has not been paid in full.

(Stipulated Statement of Uncontested Facts.)

Attached to the stipulated facts was a sheet entitled, “K-GUARD Proper Installation Techniques for All Installation Personnel.” (Ex. A.) The instructions indicate that “Valley Baffles” are affixed to the roof with silicone and that screws are used in relation to a “Hood” and “Down-Spouts.” (Ex. A.) The record does not contain any explanation of these instructions. The record also lacks any explanation of how the guttering system is to be removed.

II. Argument

Wells Fargo asserts that the guttering system is personal property and is a consumer good that did not become a fixture because of the language contained in the charge slip contract. Wells Fargo further asserts that because it holds a purchase money security interest in consumer goods, the security interest is automatically perfected upon attachment and no filing is required pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated Section 4-9-309(1). The Debt- or asserts that the guttering system became a fixture when it was affixed to the house regardless of the contract language; therefore, Wells Fargo does not have a perfected security interest and is an unsecured creditor.

III. Discussion

11 U.S.C. § 502(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 3001(f) grant prima facie effect to the validity and amount of a properly filed claim. The debtor then has the initial burden of proof to overcome the presumed validity and amount of the creditor’s secured claim. In re Robertson, 135 B.R. 350, 352 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.1992). The burden then shifts to the creditor to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence both the extent of its lien and the value of the collateral securing the loan. In re Robertson, 135 B.R. 350, 352 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.1992). Therefore, the burden of [745]*745proving the validity of the claim ultimately rests with the creditor. In re Fanners’ Co-op of Arkansas and Oklahoma, Inc., 43 B.R. 619, 620 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.1984)(citing 3 Collier on Bankruptcy § 502.01[3] (15th Ed.); In re Trending Cycles for Commodities, Inc., 26 B.R. 350 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 1982); In re Kontaratos, 35 B.R. 135 (Bankr.Me.1983); In re Central Rubber Products, Inc., 31 B.R. 865 (Bankr.Conn.1983)).

A fixture is defined as “goods that have become so related to particular real property that an interest in them arises under real property law.” Ark.Code Ann. § 4-9-102(a)(41)(Michie 2003). To perfect an interest in a fixture, a financing statement must be recorded in the office of the recorder of deeds. See Ark.Code Ann. §§ 4-9-102(a)(40), 4-9-502, 4-9-501, 14-15-401-404 (Michie 2003). The question of whether a type of property constitutes a fixture is usually a mixed question of law and fact. Brown v. Blake, 86 Ark.App. 107, 115, 161 S.W.3d 298, 304 (2004)(citing Coming Bank v. Bank of Rector, 265 Ark. 68, 576 S.W.2d 949 (1979)).

To determine whether the property is a fixture or remains personal property, Arkansas courts have adopted a three part test: (1) whether the items are annexed to the realty; (2) whether the items are appropriate and adapted to the use or purpose of that part of the realty to which the items are connected; and (3) whether the party making the annexation intended to make it permanent. Brown v. Blake, 86 Ark.App. 107, 115-116, 161 S.W.3d 298, 304 (2004) (citations omitted). The intention of the party making the annexation is considered of primary importance. Pledger v. Halvorson, 324 Ark. 302, 306 921 S.W.2d 576, 578 (1996). Intention can be inferred from the nature of the chattel, the relation and situation of the party making the annexation, the structure and mode of annexation and the purpose for which the annexation has been made. Hot Shots Burgers & Fries, Inc. v. Fas Fax Corporation, 169 B.R. 920 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.1994)(citing Corning Bank v. Bank of Rector, 265 Ark. 68, 576 S.W.2d 949, 952-53(1979)).

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381 B.R. 742, 64 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1034, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 206, 2008 WL 287974, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-williams-arwb-2008.