In Re William W., (Jan. 5, 2001)

2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 401
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedJanuary 5, 2001
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 401 (In Re William W., (Jan. 5, 2001)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re William W., (Jan. 5, 2001), 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 401 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

FINDINGS ON PETITION FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
The Department of Children and Families (DCF) has filed petitions to terminate parental rights with respect to two children, William W (a a Corey 3.), born January 1987, and Zachary K., born May 1996. The mother of both children is Melanie B., born August 30, 1963. Charles W. is the father or William W. James K. is the father of Zachary K. Both fathers were previously defaulted by the court. The trial of the petitions was scheduled for January 4, 2001. All three respondents failed to appear. CT Page 402 The court proceeded to hear the testimony of the DCF social worker, take judicial notice of certain documents on one file and receive exhibits submitted by DCF. Thereafter, DCF rested. No other party adduced evidence.

I
General Statutes § 17a-112 provides that unless a parent consents to the termination of parental rights, the court may grant a petition filed for such relief if it finds by clear and convincing evidence (1) that one or more statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exists, (2) that DCF "has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to subsection (b) of section 17a-110 or section 17a-111b that such efforts are not appropriate," and (3) that termination is in the best interest of the child.

"Termination of parental rights means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents. . . . General Statutes § 45a-707 (3). Termination of parental rights is `a most serious and sensitive judicial action. . . . Since termination of parental rights is the ultimate interference by the state with the natural rights of parents in their children, resulting in everlasting severance of the legal relationship, and usually the permanent separation of parent and child as well, courts must require strict adherence to the statutory standards." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In reSteve N., 57 Conn. App. 629, 632, ___ A.2d ___ (2000).

"In contrast to custody proceedings, in which the best interests of the child are always the paramount consideration and, in fact, usually dictate the outcome, in termination proceedings the statutory criteria must be met before termination can be accomplished and adoption proceedings can begin. No all-encompassing best interests standard vitiates the requirement of compliance with the statutory criteria. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Antonio M., 56 Conn. App. 534, 533, 744 A.2d 915 (2000).

"A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition. . . . In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exists by clear and convincing evidence. If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In the dispositional CT Page 403 phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In reJohn G., 56 Conn. App. 12, 17, 740 A.2d 496 (1999). For purposes of fixing the adjudicatory date, the court finds that the petitions were filed on April 8, 1999.

II
DCF's involvement with the respondent mother dates to February, 1991. Over the years, William has been removed from the mother's home four times. Zachary has been removed twice. On May 30, 1995, DCF invoked a 96. hour hold on William. On June 1, 1995, DCF obtained an order of temporary custody (OTC). On June 9, 1995, the OTC was vacated. On July 1, 1995, William was adjudicated neglected, with a disposition of protective supervision.

On November 21, 1995, DCF again invoked a 96 hour hold over William and thereafter obtained an OTC. The OTC was sustained and the court ordered protective supervision. That order expired on February 5, 1997.

On October 7, 1997, DCF invoked a 96 hour hold on behalf of both children. On October 10, 1997, DCF filed neglect petitions and obtained OTCs for both children. The OTCs were sustained on October 17, 1997. On January 23, 1998, both children were adjudicated neglected. The court ordered protective supervision. In May, 1998, however, DCF again invoked a 96 hour hold on the children's behalf and subsequently obtained an OTC, which was sustained in court. On September 2, 1998, the court modified the disposition of both children to a commitment to DCF.

III
A.
Respondent Mother
With respect to the respondent mother, DCF alleges grounds General Statutes § 17a-112 (c)(A) (abandonment), § 17a-112 (c)(B) (failure to rehabilitate) and § 17a-112 (c)(C). At trial, DCF abandoned its claim with respect to § 17a-112 (c)(C).1

1.
"Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare. . . . Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending CT Page 404 of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child. . . . Section 17a-112 (b)(1) does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Terrance C., 58 Conn. App. 389,394, ___ A.2d ___ (2000).

"The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes: (1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing, and medical care; (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re John G., 56 Conn. App. 12,21, 740 A.2d 496 (1999).

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Related

In re John G.
740 A.2d 496 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1999)
In re Amy H.
742 A.2d 372 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1999)
In re Antonio M.
744 A.2d 915 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 2000)
In re Steven N.
749 A.2d 678 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 2000)
In re Terrance C.
755 A.2d 232 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 2000)
In re Tyscheicka H.
762 A.2d 916 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 2000)

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Bluebook (online)
2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 401, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-william-w-jan-5-2001-connsuperct-2001.