In re William A.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

In re William A.

72 A.D.3d 587, 898 N.Y.S.2d 845

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 27, 2010

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 72 A.D.3d 587 (In re William A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In re William A., 72 A.D.3d 587, 898 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010).

Pincite

Opinion

Order, Family Court, Bronx County (Robert R. Reed, J.), entered on or about February 13, 2009, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent after a fact-finding determination that he committed acts [588]*588which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of assault in the third degree, and imposed a conditional discharge for a period of six months, unanimously reversed, as an exercise of discretion in the interest of justice,' and the petition dismissed, without costs.

Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion in adjudicating appellant a juvenile delinquent under the facts of this case. The fact that the term of the conditional discharge has now expired does not moot this appeal (see Matter of Bickwid v Deutsch, 87 NY2d 862 [1995]), as the stigma attached to the juvenile delinquency adjudication remains (see Matter of Daniel W., 56 AD3d 483 [2008]). Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Andrias, Saxe, Catterson and Acosta, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Order, Family Court, Bronx County (Robert R. Reed, J.), entered on or about February 13, 2009, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent after a fact-finding determination that he committed acts [588]*588which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of assault in the third degree, and imposed a conditional discharge for a period of six months, unanimously reversed, as an exercise of discretion in the interest of justice,' and the petition dismissed, without costs.

Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion in adjudicating appellant a juvenile delinquent under the facts of this case. The fact that the term of the conditional discharge has now expired does not moot this appeal (see Matter of Bickwid v Deutsch, 87 NY2d 862 [1995]), as the stigma attached to the juvenile delinquency adjudication remains (see Matter of Daniel W., 56 AD3d 483 [2008]). Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Andrias, Saxe, Catterson and Acosta, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

72 A.D.3d 587, 898 N.Y.S.2d 845, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-william-a-nyappdiv-2010.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack