In Re Wilbur

344 B.R. 650, 56 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 413, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1100, 2006 WL 1687586
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Utah
DecidedJune 21, 2006
Docket06-20104
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 344 B.R. 650 (In Re Wilbur) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Wilbur, 344 B.R. 650, 56 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 413, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1100, 2006 WL 1687586 (Utah 2006).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAM T. THURMAN, Bankruptcy Judge.

The matter before the Court is the hearing on confirmation of Clyde and Deborah Wilburs’ (“the Wilburs”) proposed chapter 13 plan. Specifically, the Court is called upon to determine whether the term “unsecured creditors” in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) 1 refers to non-priority unsecured creditors only. The Wilburs’ position is that the term “unsecured creditors,” as found in § 1325(b)(1)(B), includes unsecured creditors holding both priority and non-priority claims. The chapter 13 Trustee, however, contends that “unsecured creditors” refers only to payments made to unsecured creditors with non-priority claims. As this matter presents an issue of first impression in light of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”), the Court elects to issue this Memorandum Opinion. The Court determines that the term “unsecured creditors,” as used in § 1325(b)(1)(B), refers to non-priority unsecured creditors only.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Wilburs filed their chapter 13 petition on January 16, 2006. Their Statement of Financial Affairs and Schedules list priority unsecured debts amounting to $88,478.64, and non-priority unsecured debts amounting to $12,496.47. Their Statement of Current Monthly Income, as set forth in Form B22C, shows an annual *652 ized current monthly income of $84,417.60, 2 resulting in monthly disposable income of $330.90. This amount includes a deduction for payments to priority unsecured creditors. Thus, by the terms of § 1325(b)(1)(B) and Form B22C, the Wil-burs are presumptively required to return $330.90 per month, or a total of $19,854, to “unsecured creditors.” 3 The Wilburs’ chapter 13 plan proposes to pay priority unsecured creditors approximately $40,802, and would pay non-priority unsecured creditors at least $4,000.

At the confirmation hearing in this case, the chapter 13 Trustee objected to confirmation of the Wilburs’ chapter 13 plan because they propose to pay non-priority unsecured creditors a total of only $4,000, whereas Form B22C requires a total return to “unsecured creditors” of $19,854. The Trustee argued that the proposed plan does not comply with the terms of § 1325(b)(1)(B). The Wilburs argued that they satisfy the terms of § 1325(b)(1)(B) because the proposed return to non-priority unsecured creditors ($4,000) plus the proposed return to priority unsecured creditors ($40,802) is greater than the amount resulting from Form B22C ($19,-854). This dispute is the subject of this Memorandum Opinion.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The Court has jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(L). Venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Statutory Dilemma

Section 1325(b)(1)(B) provides that if the Trustee or an unsecured creditor objects to confirmation of a debtor’s proposed chapter 13 plan, the Court may only confirm the plan if it proposes to pay creditors in full or “provides that all of the debtor’s projected disposable income ... will be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan.” 4 “Disposable income” means current monthly income received by the debtor less “amounts reasonably necessary to be expended,” which is defined by §§ 707(b)(2)(A) and (B). 5 Sections 707(b)(2)(A) and (B) provide a lengthy and detailed method for calculating a debtor’s “disposable income,” pointing to specific deductions a debtor may take from his gross monthly income. This calculation has been memorialized in Form B22C. Among the deductions taken under this calculation, the debtor is directed to account for payments on account of secured debts 6 and for payments on priority claims. 7 After subtracting these amounts from the debtor’s gross monthly income, the number resulting (the “monthly disposable income”) is the presumptive *653 amount the debtor must return to “unsecured creditors” under § 1325(b)(1)(B). 8

IN RE WILBUR Cite as 344 B.R. 650 (Bkrtcy.D.Utah 2006)

B. Statutory Construction

Statutory construction begins with the language of the statute itself and an analysis of whether the language is plain. 9 If the Court determines that the language of the statute is plain, the “sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.” 10 Where the language is plain, the Court should generally enforce that language by giving each word its plain meaning. 11 The Court’s inquiry will continue beyond the language of the statute where (1) a literal application of the statutory language would be at odds with the manifest intent of the legislature; (2) a literal application of the statutory language would produce an absurd result; or (3) the statutory language is ambiguous. 12

1. Plain Language:

As the Wilburs argue, the term “unsecured creditors” in § 1325(b)(1)(B) appears to be clear and plain on its face. An unsecured creditor is, quite simply, a creditor who is not secured. 13 Whereas an unsecured creditor may be entitled to priority treatment, it remains an unsecured creditor despite this treatment. 14 Thus, the reference to “unsecured creditors” in § 1325(b)(1)(B) would seem to refer both to priority and non-priority unsecured creditors.

As stated above, the Court’s determination of the plain meaning of a statute should be the end of the Court’s inquiry unless the plain language is at odds with the legislature’s manifest intent or unless a literal application of the statute would produce an absurd result. The Trustee argues, and the Court agrees, that both of these exceptions require the Court to interpret the term “unsecured creditors” in § 1325(b)(1)(B) contrary to its plain meaning.

2. Congress’s Manifest Intent:
As the Court stated in Jass:
Generally, a court considering Congressional intent should look first to the Congressional record.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
344 B.R. 650, 56 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 413, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1100, 2006 WL 1687586, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-wilbur-utb-2006.