In Re Waxman

128 B.R. 49, 24 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 2103, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1305, 21 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1331, 1991 WL 109818
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. New York
DecidedJune 19, 1991
Docket8-19-71120
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 128 B.R. 49 (In Re Waxman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Waxman, 128 B.R. 49, 24 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 2103, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1305, 21 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1331, 1991 WL 109818 (N.Y. 1991).

Opinion

DOROTHY EISENBERG, Bankruptcy Judge.

The Chapter 7 Trustee, seeks the authority to sell the estate’s right, title and interest in the Debtor’s marital residence which he owns as a tenant by the entirety with his wife for the sum of $8,000.00 to Debt- or’s spouse. The only creditor of this Debtor’s Estate, who has a judgment of over $500,000.00, has objected to the proposed sale of the estate’s property based on the fact that a complaint seeking a determination of dischargeability under § 727(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code and the dischargeability of the debt under § 525(a) had not yet been determined. The creditor claims that the sale of the Debtor’s interest in the real property is premature. He claims that if he is successful in this dis-chargeability litigation, he would be deprived of his ability to satisfy the non-discharged claim from the Debtor’s only significant asset, his interest in his home, either by reason of the wife predeceasing the Debtor, or if the property was sold in its entirety.

This Court finds no basis in law to support the creditor’s argument. It further finds, after a duly conducted hearing, that the sale of the property, free of the interest of the co-owner spouse, in this case, would not outweigh the detriment to such co-owner as is required pursuant to section 363(h) of the Bankruptcy Code, and therefore approves the offer made to the Trustee herein for the Trustee’s right, title and interest in the Debtor’s real property.

BACKGROUND

The Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief pursuant to Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on May 2, 1989. The Debtor listed his interest, as a co-owner, with his wife as a tenant by the entirety of their residence in West Hempstead, New York. The schedules list the market value of the home at $5,000.00. It does not list any *51 mortgages encumbering the property. This market value was based upon the Debtor’s understanding of applicable New York Law prohibiting partition of a marital residence owned as tenants by the entirety.

The Trustee seeks authority to accept the wife’s offer to purchase the estate’s right, title and interest in the marital residence for $8,000.00. The offer is based upon a market value placed on the real property of $180,000.00. See Debtor’s Hearing Memorandum of Law at p. 2. This market value was arrived at by the showing of comparable sales of two recently transferred similar properties. Based on this total market value, the spouse divided by one-half (lk) and deducted the Debtor’s homestead exemption of $10,000.00 which resulted in a net offer of ten (10%) percent of Debtor’s share ($80,000.00) of the value of the residence. The spouse claims this offer represents the value of the Estate’s interest in the tenancy by the entirety.

The objecting creditor had obtained a judgment of over $500,000.00 rendered by an Arbitration Panel approximately two (2) months prior to the Debtor’s filing his petition. The creditor had commenced an adversary proceeding against Debtor seeking a determination as to the dischargeability of the arbitration award pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a), as well as to determine whether the Debtor should be denied a discharge pursuant to section 727(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code. These proceedings have subsequently been dropped.

While the creditor’s discharge and dis-chargeability proceedings were still pending, the creditor objected to the proposed sale of the estate’s interest in the property to the Debtor’s wife. The basis of his objection was that to sell the estate’s interest in the property now for only $8,000.00 will deprive him of the opportunity to possibly collect more of his judgment if he were to succeed in the non-dischargeability adversary proceeding and the property thereafter sold, or if the Debtor should outlive his wife, that would result in his obtaining fee title to the property by the right of survivorship under New York law, which would then result in a maximum payment to this creditor.

DISCUSSION

The Debtor’s estate as of the date of the filing of the petition consists of all property or interests in property of the Debtor as of the date of the filing of the Petition pursuant to section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. As of that date, the estate had the rights to the Debtor’s interest in the marital residence as a tenancy by the entirety.

Pursuant to section 704 of the Bankruptcy Code, it is the duty of the Trustee to: “(1) collect and reduce to money the property of the estate ... and close such estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties in interest.”

Pursuant to New York Real Property Law as it exists today, a party’s interest in a tenancy by the entirety has a dubious and uncertain value. While the interest of a tenancy by the entirety is subject to a judgment lien and may be sold upon levy of execution under New York Law, practicalities of such action are dubious, as a creditor cannot force partition and any purchaser of the Debtor’s interest becomes a tenant in common with the other tenant by the entirety, subject to the latter’s right of survivorship; additionally, the purchaser steps into the shoes of the tenant whose interest was purchased and is limited to a right to share rents and profits as well as use and occupancy until the tenancy by the entirety is terminated by death, divorce, or in some other way. New York McKinney’s CPLR 5240, In re Morris, 115 B.R. 752 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1990).

In cases where the estate consists of a tenancy by the entirety interest in real property, the Trustee has only three (3) possibilities available: (a) to sell the Trustee’s right, title and interest in and to the Debtor’s interest in the real property; or (b) conduct a sale of the entire property, if appropriate, pursuant to section 363(h) of the Bankruptcy Code; or (c) abandon the Trustee’s interest in the real property.

*52 The Trustee does not have any other authority in regard to the Debtor’s interest in the property.

The creditor erroneously believes that if he were successful in barring the discharge of his debt, he would be able to satisfy that judgment out of the Debtor’s interest in the real property. This is totally erroneous since as of the date of the filing of the petition, the Debtor’s interest has already passed to the Trustee of this Debtor’s estate. It is no longer available to any one creditor, not even a judgment creditor with a non-voidable judgment, without further order of this Court.

In this instance this creditor, who obtained a judgment within ninety (90) days prior to the filing of the petition, has a voidable judgment and is in essence an unsecured creditor.

The only benefit from obtaining a judgment barring the discharge of this debt from this Debtor’s estate is to enable the creditor, if successful, to have a claim which survives the discharge by the Debtor of all other scheduled debts. Such a claim remains payable from the Debtor’s future earnings or assets. Any assets the Debtor may have had as of the date of the filing of the petition are property of the Debtor’s estate and are subject to pre-petition claims properly filed in the case.

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Bluebook (online)
128 B.R. 49, 24 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 2103, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1305, 21 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1331, 1991 WL 109818, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-waxman-nyeb-1991.