In re Waugh

135 F.2d 627, 30 C.C.P.A. 1000, 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 371, 1943 CCPA LEXIS 46
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedApril 5, 1943
DocketNo. 4697
StatusPublished

This text of 135 F.2d 627 (In re Waugh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Waugh, 135 F.2d 627, 30 C.C.P.A. 1000, 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 371, 1943 CCPA LEXIS 46 (ccpa 1943).

Opinion

Bland, Judge,

delivered tire opinion of tire court:

The Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office affirmed the decision of the Primary Examiner in finally rejecting all of appellant’s claims, 21 to 34 inclusive, in an application for a patent. Appeal has been taken here from the board’s decision.

• While all the claims involved differ in some respects, which difference will be shown hereinafter, claims 27 and 28, we think, may be taken as fairly representative. They read:

27. A highly refractory and insulating lagging composition adapted for self-adherent coating upon high temperature apparatus, and which is potentially plastic by the addition of water, comprising a dry mixture of (a) a preponderating proportion of finely divided mineral grog which is carbon-free and refractory and the particles of which are minutely porous; (b) with a proportion of hydraulic cement, adapted to rigidify the applied mixture after its expansion but before drying; (c) a proportion of finely divided and dried unburned fireclay adapted to confer on the wetted mixture a degree of plastic cohesion to trap and hoI|d generated gas bubbles and adhesion to stick to a surface to be lagged; (d) a strengthening proportion of an asbestos-like mineral binder in the form of fine fibers of substantial length; and (e) a small proportion of a dry and finely divided inorganic expanding agent which is adapted like aluminum powder to react with other ingredients when wetted, for cellular self-expansion of the mixture; such lagging mixture being adapted for use by wetting to a pasty plasticity and promptly coating as an adhering layer upon the surface to be lagged, whereupon the expanding agent generates gas bubbles to expand the coating into a cellular layer, which is then solidified by setting, and finally dries into an adhering, durable, refractory and heat-insulating lagging layer wherein the cells are separated by finely porous walls strengthened by the mineral fibers.
28. A lagging composition as in claim 27 and wherein the ingredient proportions respectively are of the order of (a) 130 parts, (b) 120 parts, (c) 110 parts, (d) 40 parts, and (e) between % and 2 parts.

Claims 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31 relate to an insulating refractory-lagging composition, while claims 32 and 33 relate to an insulating refractory lagging layer. Claim 34 relates to a method of applying the composition in the lagging art.

The instant application, entitled “Insulating Refractory Plastic [1002]*1002Composition and Method and Product,” is stated by applicant to-be an improvement over that which is disclosed in his co-pending application relating to a composition to be marketed in dry condition.. The disclosure of the instant application is concerned with an insulating refractory plastic composition or lagging material adapted for plastic coating or jacketing of the outer surfaces of furnaces,, boilers, flues, pijjes, and other high temperature equipment. Its purpose is to protect the metalwork to which it is attached and to insulate against excessive conduction and waste of heat.

Appellant’s instant application is particularly directed to the object of improving the expanding action of the mixture so that the Avetted plastic material will have structural cells of appreciable size therein, separated by relatively thin walls that are themselves microscopically porous because of the character of the basic constituent — - “grog.” Appellant attains the stated end by the use of either a natural grog, such as diatomaceous earth, or an artificial or synthetic grog. The mode of production of the synthetic grog is described as. that of thoroughly premixing very finely divided carbonaceous particles (such as paper) with a high quality of fireclay, also finely divided, and with any other desired ingredient, adding water before-the mixing is completed. The material is then molded to the desired shape, and by drying it is “set.” It is first burned in the presence-of air to consume the carbon particles, leaving microscopic voids, and then it is finally burned at a high temperature in the usual manner of burning fireclay products. These products, when completed,, are crushed and pulverized to a fine powder and constitute the preferred grog of the present disclosure. With this grog, appellant uses-hydraulic cement, a quantity of finely divided, dried, unburned fire-clay, and an expanding agent, preferably aluminum powder, in small percentages. There is also included a proportion of asbestos-like-mineral matter in the form of fine fibers.

The examiner required division between the claims directed to the plastic composition and the layer made from such composition and the claims relating to the method of applying the coating. He stated that the applicant chose to prosecute “composition” claims without, argument and is therefore estopped to claim the method (as in claim 34) in the instant application, by reason of the practice in Ex parte Higinbotham, 1922 C. D. 29.

Claim 34, the method claim, remained in the application and, according to appellant’s statement, was substituted for the original' method claims for the purpose of appeal. It was rejected by both tribunals below on said ground of estoppel, as well as upon the prior-art. As to this claim, appellant urges here that since the tribunals-passed upon the patentability of the claim, the Patent Office has there[1003]*1003by waived its requirement for division, and that appellant therefore may properly question here the correctness of the conclusion of the Patent Office tribunals as to the unpatentability of the claim over the prior art.

As we view the situation with respect to claim 34, the mere fact that the Patent Office tribunals rejected the same upon two grounds does not amount to a waiver of the requirement for division. Appellant admits that he elected to claim the composition and product and did not question the correctness of the action of the examiner requiring that the method claims be divided out of the application. After having so elected, he urged the allowance of the method claim 34 in the instant application. Both tribunals held that under such circumstances he was estopped from claiming claim 34 in the instant application. Notwithstanding the fact that the board passed upon the patentability of the claim over the prior art, we think its holding on the question of estoppel under the circumstances stated was proper, and said holding is affirmed.

It is at once apparent from appellant’s contentions, that he may feel that if and when the method claims are considered by the Patent Office tribunals, they might regard their holding as to the unpatent-ability of claim 34 as res judicata, which would bar him from after-wards presenting the same subject-matter. On this phase of the case, it seems to us that the Patent Office passed upon the patentability of this claim merely as a matter of precaution, in view of the probability of appeal, and that it was not necessary for the board to have passed upon the prior art status of the claim. We are of the opinion that it is not necessary for us to pass upon the correctness of the conclusion of the board as to the unpatentability of claim 34 in view of the prior art, and that under such circumstances appellant’s fears relating to the issue of res judicata are groundless.

Appellant, in his brief, makes the following statement concerning his alleged invention:

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Bluebook (online)
135 F.2d 627, 30 C.C.P.A. 1000, 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 371, 1943 CCPA LEXIS 46, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-waugh-ccpa-1943.