STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A26-0407
In re Washington County, Petitioner,
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Erik Lawrence Bader, Respondent.
Filed May 11, 2026 Writ denied Frisch, Chief Judge
Washington County District Court File Nos. 82-CR-24-1681, 82-CR-25-626, 82-CR-25-1181, 82-CR-25-1601
Kevin M. Magnuson, Washington County Attorney, Andrew T. Jackola, Nicholas A. Hydukovich, Assistant County Attorneys, Stillwater, Minnesota (for petitioner)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Virginia Murphrey, Tenth District Public Defender, Laurel O’Rourke, Assistant Public Defender, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent Erik Bader)
Considered and decided by Frisch, Chief Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Harris, Judge.
SYLLABUS
An order requiring a county to pay attorney fees arising from the state’s motion
under Minn. Stat. § 611.47, subd. 1 (2024), is independently appealable under Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 103.03(g). SPECIAL TERM OPINION
FRISCH, Chief Judge
Petitioner Washington County seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent the district
court from enforcing its September 19, 2025 order directing the county to pay reasonable
attorney fees for court-appointed counsel in proceedings arising from respondent State of
Minnesota’s motion for authorization to involuntarily administer neuroleptic medication to
respondent Erik Lawrence Bader. Because an order requiring the county to pay attorney
fees for a motion for involuntary administration of neuroleptic medication under
Minn. Stat. § 611.47, subd. 1, is independently appealable, we deny the county’s petition
for a writ of prohibition.
DECISION
The district court found Bader not competent to proceed in four separate criminal
prosecutions and ordered that he participate in a competency-attainment program pursuant
to Minn. Stat. § 611.46, subd. 1 (2024). On August 15, 2025, the state filed a motion
seeking an order authorizing the involuntary administration of neuroleptic medication to
Bader, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 611.47, subd. 1. The district public defender’s office,
which represented Bader in the criminal proceedings, filed correspondence stating that it
would not represent Bader at a hearing on the state’s motion because such representation
falls outside the scope of the public defender’s mandate under Minn. Stat. §§ 611.14-.273
(2024).
In response to the motion and correspondence, the district court filed an order on
September 5, 2025, setting a hearing on the state’s motion, and directing “the Washington
2 County Attorney’s Office, on behalf of Washington County, and the Tenth Judicial District
Public Defender’s Office [to] file letter briefs and/or memoranda of law” prior to the
motion hearing. The district court directed the county to address whether Minnesota
Statutes section 256G.08, subdivision 1 (Supp. 2025), requires the county to bear
responsibility for the costs of hearings held under section 611.47, and directed the public
defender’s office to address whether sections 611.14 and 611.18 obligate it to provide
representation. Following the hearing, the district court filed an order on September 19,
2025, in which it (1) concluded that the public defender’s office is not statutorily obligated
to provide representation to Bader, (2) stated that it would appoint counsel “with
experience in commitment proceedings” to represent Bader with respect to the state’s
motion under Minn. Stat. § 611.47, subd. 1, for authorization to involuntarily administer
the neuroleptic medication; and (3) directed the county to “pay all reasonable fees charged
by that attorney for that representation.” That same day, the district court appointed private
counsel to represent Bader and ordered the county to pay all reasonable fees for that
representation.
The State of Minnesota filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to preclude
enforcement of the September 19 order. On February 3, 2026, we denied the state’s
petition, concluding that the state itself had not established a cognizable injury that would
result from enforcement of the September 19 order. State v. Bader (In re State), No. A25-
1733 (Minn. App. Feb. 3, 2026) (order). Because we discerned no injury to the state, we
did not resolve whether an adequate remedy at law existed in the form of an appeal under
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(g) or otherwise. Id.
3 On March 5, 2026, Washington County filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in
this court, seeking to prevent the district court from enforcing its September 19 order. The
county asks us to grant a writ of prohibition on the basis that (1) the district court exceeded
its authority by ordering the county to bear the costs of Bader’s representation on the state’s
motion for authorization to involuntarily administer neuroleptic medication, and (2) the
district court’s order results in an injury for which there is no adequate remedy because
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(g) “does not provide an avenue for appeal.” Bader opposes
the petition, arguing that the district court did not exceed its lawful authority, and that the
county has an adequate remedy by way of an appeal under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(g).
Prohibition is an extraordinary remedy that is “only used in extraordinary cases.”
Underdahl v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety (In re Comm’r of Pub. Safety), 735 N.W.2d 706, 710
(Minn. 2007). For such a writ to issue from an appellate court, a petitioner must meet three
requirements: “(1) an inferior court or tribunal must be about to exercise judicial or quasi-
judicial power; (2) the exercise of such power must be unauthorized by law; and (3) the
exercise of such power must result in injury for which there is no adequate remedy.” State
v. Turner, 550 N.W.2d 622, 625 (Minn. 1996) (quotation omitted). The failure to establish
any of the requirements for a writ of prohibition will result in denial of the petition. Smith
v. Tuman, 114 N.W.2d 73, 77 (Minn. 1962).
The county focuses its argument on the second and third requirements for issuance
of a writ of prohibition. Because it resolves our inquiry, we focus on the third requirement:
whether the county has an adequate remedy for the injury it asserts.
4 The county argues that Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04 does not permit an appeal from the
September 19 order. We agree. Rule 28.04 allows the state to appeal certain decisions in
criminal prosecutions, but an order directing the payment of attorney fees is not among the
decisions identified as appealable. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04.
The county also argues that the September 19 order was procedurally improper
because the county did not receive notice that the district court would be deciding whether
the county would be responsible for the payment of Bader’s attorney fees. But the district
court’s September 5 order directed the county attorney, on behalf of the county, to file a
brief addressing whether the county is statutorily obligated to bear the cost, and the county
attorney filed a brief addressing that question.
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STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A26-0407
In re Washington County, Petitioner,
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Erik Lawrence Bader, Respondent.
Filed May 11, 2026 Writ denied Frisch, Chief Judge
Washington County District Court File Nos. 82-CR-24-1681, 82-CR-25-626, 82-CR-25-1181, 82-CR-25-1601
Kevin M. Magnuson, Washington County Attorney, Andrew T. Jackola, Nicholas A. Hydukovich, Assistant County Attorneys, Stillwater, Minnesota (for petitioner)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Virginia Murphrey, Tenth District Public Defender, Laurel O’Rourke, Assistant Public Defender, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent Erik Bader)
Considered and decided by Frisch, Chief Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Harris, Judge.
SYLLABUS
An order requiring a county to pay attorney fees arising from the state’s motion
under Minn. Stat. § 611.47, subd. 1 (2024), is independently appealable under Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 103.03(g). SPECIAL TERM OPINION
FRISCH, Chief Judge
Petitioner Washington County seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent the district
court from enforcing its September 19, 2025 order directing the county to pay reasonable
attorney fees for court-appointed counsel in proceedings arising from respondent State of
Minnesota’s motion for authorization to involuntarily administer neuroleptic medication to
respondent Erik Lawrence Bader. Because an order requiring the county to pay attorney
fees for a motion for involuntary administration of neuroleptic medication under
Minn. Stat. § 611.47, subd. 1, is independently appealable, we deny the county’s petition
for a writ of prohibition.
DECISION
The district court found Bader not competent to proceed in four separate criminal
prosecutions and ordered that he participate in a competency-attainment program pursuant
to Minn. Stat. § 611.46, subd. 1 (2024). On August 15, 2025, the state filed a motion
seeking an order authorizing the involuntary administration of neuroleptic medication to
Bader, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 611.47, subd. 1. The district public defender’s office,
which represented Bader in the criminal proceedings, filed correspondence stating that it
would not represent Bader at a hearing on the state’s motion because such representation
falls outside the scope of the public defender’s mandate under Minn. Stat. §§ 611.14-.273
(2024).
In response to the motion and correspondence, the district court filed an order on
September 5, 2025, setting a hearing on the state’s motion, and directing “the Washington
2 County Attorney’s Office, on behalf of Washington County, and the Tenth Judicial District
Public Defender’s Office [to] file letter briefs and/or memoranda of law” prior to the
motion hearing. The district court directed the county to address whether Minnesota
Statutes section 256G.08, subdivision 1 (Supp. 2025), requires the county to bear
responsibility for the costs of hearings held under section 611.47, and directed the public
defender’s office to address whether sections 611.14 and 611.18 obligate it to provide
representation. Following the hearing, the district court filed an order on September 19,
2025, in which it (1) concluded that the public defender’s office is not statutorily obligated
to provide representation to Bader, (2) stated that it would appoint counsel “with
experience in commitment proceedings” to represent Bader with respect to the state’s
motion under Minn. Stat. § 611.47, subd. 1, for authorization to involuntarily administer
the neuroleptic medication; and (3) directed the county to “pay all reasonable fees charged
by that attorney for that representation.” That same day, the district court appointed private
counsel to represent Bader and ordered the county to pay all reasonable fees for that
representation.
The State of Minnesota filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to preclude
enforcement of the September 19 order. On February 3, 2026, we denied the state’s
petition, concluding that the state itself had not established a cognizable injury that would
result from enforcement of the September 19 order. State v. Bader (In re State), No. A25-
1733 (Minn. App. Feb. 3, 2026) (order). Because we discerned no injury to the state, we
did not resolve whether an adequate remedy at law existed in the form of an appeal under
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(g) or otherwise. Id.
3 On March 5, 2026, Washington County filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in
this court, seeking to prevent the district court from enforcing its September 19 order. The
county asks us to grant a writ of prohibition on the basis that (1) the district court exceeded
its authority by ordering the county to bear the costs of Bader’s representation on the state’s
motion for authorization to involuntarily administer neuroleptic medication, and (2) the
district court’s order results in an injury for which there is no adequate remedy because
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(g) “does not provide an avenue for appeal.” Bader opposes
the petition, arguing that the district court did not exceed its lawful authority, and that the
county has an adequate remedy by way of an appeal under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(g).
Prohibition is an extraordinary remedy that is “only used in extraordinary cases.”
Underdahl v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety (In re Comm’r of Pub. Safety), 735 N.W.2d 706, 710
(Minn. 2007). For such a writ to issue from an appellate court, a petitioner must meet three
requirements: “(1) an inferior court or tribunal must be about to exercise judicial or quasi-
judicial power; (2) the exercise of such power must be unauthorized by law; and (3) the
exercise of such power must result in injury for which there is no adequate remedy.” State
v. Turner, 550 N.W.2d 622, 625 (Minn. 1996) (quotation omitted). The failure to establish
any of the requirements for a writ of prohibition will result in denial of the petition. Smith
v. Tuman, 114 N.W.2d 73, 77 (Minn. 1962).
The county focuses its argument on the second and third requirements for issuance
of a writ of prohibition. Because it resolves our inquiry, we focus on the third requirement:
whether the county has an adequate remedy for the injury it asserts.
4 The county argues that Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04 does not permit an appeal from the
September 19 order. We agree. Rule 28.04 allows the state to appeal certain decisions in
criminal prosecutions, but an order directing the payment of attorney fees is not among the
decisions identified as appealable. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04.
The county also argues that the September 19 order was procedurally improper
because the county did not receive notice that the district court would be deciding whether
the county would be responsible for the payment of Bader’s attorney fees. But the district
court’s September 5 order directed the county attorney, on behalf of the county, to file a
brief addressing whether the county is statutorily obligated to bear the cost, and the county
attorney filed a brief addressing that question. Thus, the county has not established that it
lacked notice.
The county next argues that it does not have an adequate remedy under Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 103.03(g). We disagree. Rule 103.03(g) provides that an appeal may be taken
from a final order, decision, or judgment affecting a substantial right in a special
proceeding. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(g). “An order is ‘final’ under Rule 103.03(g)
when the matter is conclusively terminated so far as the court issuing the order is
concerned, and the court anticipates no further action on the matter.” In re Est. of Figliuzzi,
979 N.W.2d 225, 231 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). Generally, a special proceeding
is “such a proceeding as may be commenced independently of a pending action by petition
or motion, upon notice, in order to obtain special relief.” County of Stearns v. Schaaf, 472
N.W.2d 191, 192 (Minn. App. 1991) (quoting Chapman v. Dorsey, 41 N.W.2d 438, 440
(Minn. 1950)). The existence of a special proceeding “is not dependent upon the existence
5 of any other action and it therefore is not an integral part of the original action but is
separate and apart.” In re GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 699 N.W.2d 749, 756 (Minn. 2005)
(quotation omitted).
We conclude that the district court’s September 5 order—which required the public
defender’s office and the county to submit briefing on the issue of financial responsibility
for Bader’s representation for the state’s motion under Minn. Stat. § 611.47, subd 1—
initiated a special proceeding independent of the underlying criminal action. Further, the
district court’s September 19 order affects the county’s substantial rights because it
requires the county to “pay all reasonable fees” for counsel appointed by the district court
to represent Bader in proceedings related to the state’s motion under Minn. Stat. § 611.47,
subd. 1. Cf. In re Application of Jobe, 477 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Minn. App. 1991)
(concluding “order pertaining to payment of expert witness fees arose from a special
proceeding and is appealable under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(g)”). And the September
19 order is final because it conclusively determined that the county is responsible for
paying Bader’s reasonable attorney fees.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the order requiring the county to pay
attorney fees for Bader’s representation relating to the state’s motion under Minn. Stat.
§ 611.47, subd. 1, for authorization to involuntarily administer neuroleptic medication is a
final order in a special proceeding and is therefore appealable under Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 103.03(g). Because the order is independently appealable, the county has an adequate
remedy. Accordingly, we deny the county’s petition for a writ of prohibition.
Writ denied.