In Re Warneck

336 B.R. 181, 55 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 929, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 27, 2006 WL 62667
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 4, 2006
Docket19-22583
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 336 B.R. 181 (In Re Warneck) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Warneck, 336 B.R. 181, 55 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 929, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 27, 2006 WL 62667 (N.Y. 2006).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO EXTEND THE AUTOMATIC STAY PURSUANT TO 11 U.S.C. § 362(C)(3)(B)

CECELIA G. MORRIS, Bankruptcy Judge.

The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 *182 (“BAPCPA”) added several provisions to the Bankruptcy Code wherein the automatic stay, which normally arises whenever a bankruptcy case is commenced, is either limited in duration or not triggered. Because the above-captioned Debtors were also Debtors in a prior bankruptcy case that was pending and dismissed within one year prior to filing of the instant petition, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) the automatic stay would have terminated on the 30th day after the filing of this case but for the motion by Debtors seeking a continuation of the stay. Following a hearing December 13, 2005, the Court granted the Debtors’ motion extending the automatic stay in the above-captioned case as to all creditors, with no limitations. As explained below, the Court extended the stay in this case because no presumption of bad faith arose as to this filing. Where no presumption of bad faith arises, and where no party objects, a request to extend the automatic stay should be liberally granted.

Jurisdiction

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Standing Order of Reference signed by Acting Chief Judge Robert J. Ward dated July 10, 1984. This motion to extend the automatic stay is analogous to a motion to terminate, annul or modify the automatic stay, and the determination is a “core proceeding” under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G).

Background

Debtors, John M. Warneck and Jewel B. Warneck, filed this joint Chapter 13 case on November 9, 2005 (the “Pending Case”). Thus the BAPCPA, which became effective as to cases filed after October 17, 2005, applies to the Pending Case.

This is the third bankruptcy filing by these Debtors, all under Chapter 13. Debtors’ first case, 03-37404 (the “First Filing”), was filed October 9, 2003 and dismissed June 10, 2004. The second case, 04-36851 (the “Second Filing”), was filed August 5, 2004 and dismissed on January 19, 2005. The First Filing and the Second Filing were both dismissed by Court order after application of the Chapter 13 trustee, with consent of the Debtors and their counsel, and both were dismissed prior to confirmation. The First Filing was dismissed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(1), for “unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors”. The Second Filing was dismissed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(4) for failure to make the plan payments required by 11 U.S.C. § 1326.

Two days after filing the Pending Case, Debtors made this motion. The motion was supported by nearly identical affidavits from each Debtor, stating that the First Filing was dismissed because the Debtors were behind in plan payments and other expenses and could not catch up given their limited income, which is derived solely from Social Security. Debtors also state that during the Second Filing they received contributions from their daughter and son-in-law, who were both gainfully employed at the commencement of the Second Filing; however, after their daughter’s work hours were reduced and their son-in-law was “laid off of work due to injury/illness” the Debtors were again unable to make plan payments. The Debtors state that their daughter and son-in-law are again willing to make contributions to the Chapter 13 plan, that their daughter has now started her own licensed business with a steady income, and that their son-in-law has recovered and returned to work. In addition, the Debtors’ daughter and son-in-law now live with them and share some of the Debtors’ living expenses. The Debtors assert that the Pending Case is filed “in good faith with the intention and *183 desire to maintain the plan payments for 60 months,” and state that they “desire to remain in our home and bring ourselves back to financial health once again.”

Discussion

Bankruptcy Code Section 362(a) provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition “operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of’ various acts, including: “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate,” and “any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose [pre-petition].” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), (5).

Section 362(c) sets forth the duration of the automatic stay. Generally the automatic stay continues to stay “an act against property of the estate” until such property is no longer property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1). All other acts are stayed until the time the case is closed or dismissed, whichever is earlier. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2).

Section 362(c)(3), a section added by the BAPCPA, limits the duration of the automatic stay under certain circumstances, unless a party timely moves to extend the stay.

Section 363(c)(3) provides:

(c) Except as provided in subsections

(d), (e), (f), and (h) of this section—

* * * * * *

(3) if a single or joint case is filed by or against debtor who is an individual in a case under chapter 7, 11, or 13, and if a single or joint case of the debtor was pending within the preceding 1-year period but was dismissed, other than a case refiled under a chapter other than chapter 7 after dismissal under section 707(b)—

(A) the stay under subsection (a) with respect to any action taken with respect to a debt or property securing such debt or with respect to any lease shall terminate with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later case;

(B) on the motion of a party in interest for continuation of the automatic stay and upon notice and a hearing, the court may extend the stay in particular cases as to any or all creditors (subject to such conditions or limitations as the court may then impose) after notice and a hearing completed before the expiration of the 30-day period only if the party in interest demonstrates that the filing of the later case is in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed; and

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Related

In Re Williams
390 B.R. 780 (S.D. New York, 2008)
In Re Elliott-Cook
357 B.R. 811 (N.D. California, 2006)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
336 B.R. 181, 55 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 929, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 27, 2006 WL 62667, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-warneck-nysb-2006.