In re Wapnick

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

In re Wapnick

167 A.D.2d 622, 563 N.Y.S.2d 684, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13316

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 8, 1990

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 167 A.D.2d 622 (In re Wapnick) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In re Wapnick, 167 A.D.2d 622, 563 N.Y.S.2d 684, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13316 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1990).

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Opinion

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed February 13, 1986, which, inter alia, assessed Harold Wapnick for unemployment insurance contributions.

Since Harold Wapnick offered essentially nothing more than a self-serving statement that he had no employees, it was not unreasonable for the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board to determine that, based on the evidence it had, Wapnick exercised sufficient direction and control over three other people performing services at his office as to establish their status as employees (see, Matter of Cohen [Blinder, Robinson & Co.—Roberts], 67 NY2d 683). Likewise, in the absence of the production of any records or reports by Wapnick, the Board properly concluded that the Commissioner of Labor was justified in issuing an estimated assessment based on the evidence he had (see, Labor Law § 571). Finally, under these circumstances, the Board’s determination that Wapnick’s actions were willful was proper (see, Labor Law § 570 [4]).

Decision affirmed, without costs. Kane, J. P., Weiss, Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., and Mercure, JJ., concur.

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Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed February 13, 1986, which, inter alia, assessed Harold Wapnick for unemployment insurance contributions.

Since Harold Wapnick offered essentially nothing more than a self-serving statement that he had no employees, it was not unreasonable for the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board to determine that, based on the evidence it had, Wapnick exercised sufficient direction and control over three other people performing services at his office as to establish their status as employees (see, Matter of Cohen [Blinder, Robinson & Co.—Roberts], 67 NY2d 683). Likewise, in the absence of the production of any records or reports by Wapnick, the Board properly concluded that the Commissioner of Labor was justified in issuing an estimated assessment based on the evidence he had (see, Labor Law § 571). Finally, under these circumstances, the Board’s determination that Wapnick’s actions were willful was proper (see, Labor Law § 570 [4]).

Decision affirmed, without costs. Kane, J. P., Weiss, Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., and Mercure, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

167 A.D.2d 622, 563 N.Y.S.2d 684, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13316, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-wapnick-nyappdiv-1990.

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