In Re Wanda B.

516 A.2d 615, 69 Md. App. 105, 1986 Md. App. LEXIS 409
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland
DecidedNovember 5, 1986
Docket93, September Term, 1986
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 516 A.2d 615 (In Re Wanda B.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Special Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Wanda B., 516 A.2d 615, 69 Md. App. 105, 1986 Md. App. LEXIS 409 (Md. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinion

KARWACKI, Judge.

The parents of Robert B., Wanda B. and Debbie B. seek reversal of orders of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (DeWaters, J.) adjudicating their son and daughters to be children in need of assistance (CINA) 1 and committing them to the custody of the Baltimore County Department of Social Services (DSS) for foster care placement. The appellants make a single contention in this appeal. They posit: The trial judge erred in considering the testimony and report of Dr. Renate Kniffin.

We will place the issue in perspective by reciting the factual background which led up to this litigation and the course the case followed in the trial court.

Since 1972 the B. family unit has received public assistance. Also, the family was provided protective services by the Baltimore City Department of Social Services until 1983 when their care was transferred to the appellee, DSS of Baltimore County. Both appellants suffer from mental *108 illnesses which have required their hospitalization on repeated occasions.

Ample evidence was presented below that the appellants had failed to provide their children with proper care and attention since at least June, 1983, despite the efforts of the staff of the appellee, DSS, to improve the appellants’ parenting skills. What finally convinced DSS to remove the children from the appellants’ home, however, was not the continuing neglect of the children’s physical and emotional needs. Rather, that action was prompted by evidence that the appellant father had been taking baths with his daughters, then aged 10 and 8 years, with the approval of the appellant mother.

On December 6, 1984 the children were placed in emergency shelter care by DSS pursuant to § 3-815(b) and Rule 912a.l. On the following day DSS filed a petition seeking continued shelter care for the children in accordance with § 3-815(c) and Rule 912b. At the same time DSS filed a petition under § 3-812 and Rule 903 asking that the court declare the children CIÑA. As required by § 3-815(b) and Rule 912a.3., a hearing on the petition for continued shelter care was scheduled for the same day before the court’s juvenile master. The appellants appeared at that hearing and requested a postponement so that they might obtain counsel. A postponement was granted until December 10, 1984. The appellants appeared on that day without counsel. Being indigent, they had sought legal services from the Legal Aid Bureau, but they were advised that the Bureau would be providing counsel for their children in the pending proceeding. The appellants were directed to the Office of the Public Defender of Maryland for representation. When the appellants sought representation there, however, they were incorrectly advised that the Public Defender was not able to assist them.

At the hearing on December 10, the juvenile master authorized continued shelter care for the children. She also ordered the appellants to appear for an evaluation by the *109 court’s forensic psychiatrist, Renate M. Kniffin, M.D., on January 11, 1985. Dr. Kniffin filed her report with the court on February 21, 1985.

On January 14, 1985, the juvenile master conducted an adjudicatory hearing on the CINA petition pursuant to § 3-819 and Rule 914. The master recommended that the children be found to be CINA and that, in disposition of that finding pursuant to § 3-820 and Rule 915, the court commit the children to DSS for foster home placement. The appellants appeared at that hearing unrepresented by counsel. Their request for a further postponement in order to obtain counsel was denied.

On January 22, 1985 the Public Defender’s Office discovered its earlier erroneous refusal to represent the appellants in this case and filed exceptions on behalf of the appellants to the master’s recommendations that the children be adjudicated CINA and placed in foster care. These exceptions were sustained by the court on March 12, 1985, and the case was remanded for a new hearing before the juvenile master because the indigent appellants had been denied representation by the Office of the Public Defender at the adjudicatory and disposition hearings before the master as required by Rule 906. 2

*110 After a hearing on April 22, 1985, the juvenile master again recommended that the children be adjudicated CINA and that they be placed in foster care by DSS. Exceptions were filed to these recommendations by the appellants, who elected a de novo hearing before the court on the issues of the adjudication of their children as CINA and the dispositional placement of the children in foster care. Hearings on the adjudicatory phase of the proceedings were conducted before the court on June 25, 1985 and August 20, 1985. It was at the later hearing that DSS offered the testimony of Dr. Kniffin, Over the objections of the appellants that testimony was admitted subject to being stricken should the court decide upon submission of memoranda from counsel for the parties that the testimony should have been excluded. On February 4, 1986, the court, after considering the written and oral arguments of the parties, ruled that Dr. Kniffin’s testimony was admissible. Based on that testimony and the other evidence offered in the two days of hearings before it, the court overruled the exceptions to the master’s recommended CINA adjudication of the children. Immediately thereafter, the court held a de novo hearing on the exceptions to the recommendation of the master as to the disposition of the case. In that phase of the proceeding the written report of Dr. Kniffin, which had been filed on February 21, 1985, was considered by the court when it overruled the exceptions to the master’s recommendation in disposition of the case that the children be placed in foster care by DSS.

The appellants’ argument that Dr. Kniffen’s testimony was inadmissible at the de novo hearing on their exceptions to the master’s recommendation that the children be *111 adjudicated CINA is based on the fact that the appellants were not represented by counsel on December 10, 1984 when the master ordered them to submit to a psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Kniffin. The appellants assert that since § 3-821 mandates that “[a] party is entitled to the assistance of counsel at every stage of any proceeding under this subtitle,” the results of the psychiatric evaluation of them at the time when they were unrepresented should not have been admitted in the adjudicatory hearing of the petition alleging that their children were CINA. We disagree and explain.

To carry out the expressed purposes of the Juvenile Causes Code, 3 the General Assembly has recognized the importance to the judges and masters who are clothed with juvenile jurisdiction of appropriate professional advice concerning children brought before the court. Thus, § 3-818 provides:

(a) After a petition or a citation has been filed, the court may direct the Juvenile Services Administration or another qualified agency to make a study concerning the child, his family, his environment, and other matters relevant to the disposition of the case.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
516 A.2d 615, 69 Md. App. 105, 1986 Md. App. LEXIS 409, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-wanda-b-mdctspecapp-1986.