In Re Wallace

102 B.R. 54, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 1206, 1989 WL 83810
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. North Carolina
DecidedJuly 26, 1989
Docket14-07266
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 102 B.R. 54 (In Re Wallace) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Wallace, 102 B.R. 54, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 1206, 1989 WL 83810 (N.C. 1989).

Opinion

ORDER

A. THOMAS SMALL, Bankruptcy Judge.

The matter before the court is the reaffirmation agreement between the chapter 7 *55 debtor, Joseph E. Wallace, and General Electric Capital Corporation, as servicing agent for the Government National Mortgage Association. The reaffirmation agreement was filed with the court on July 3, 1989, and involves a debt secured by a “manufactured home” (a 60 x 24 1977 Pinecrest mobile home, North Carolina Motor Vehicle Serial # L-1358P A & B).

The reaffirmation agreement (a copy, without exhibits, is Appendix A to this order) provides for the reaffirmation of a debt in the amount of $6,904.69. The agreement also provides that: the stay of § 362 is lifted (paragraph # 4); the right of redemption under § 722 is waived and “barred” (paragraph # 4); the debtor shall surrender possession of the collateral (his home) upon failure to provide evidence of insurance, failure to make a payment, failure to comply with any contract term, or rescission of the agreement (paragraph # 5); and if, upon default, the debtor does not deliver the collateral to the creditor, then the debtor must “immediately surrender” the home to the U.S. Marshal “who is employed and authorized to take possession of the Manufactured Home upon failure to so surrender” (paragraph # 5).

At the time of the reaffirmation agreement, the debtor was current in his payments under the reaffirmed debt. Nevertheless, the debtor executed the agreement and debtor’s counsel signed a declaration, which states that the debtor was represented by counsel and that the reaffirmation agreement “represents a fully informed and voluntary agreement by the Debtor(s) and does not impose an undue hardship on the Debtor(s) or a dependent of the Debt- or^).” The agreement was filed with the court on July 3, 1989, and the court conducted a telephone hearing on July 14, 1989, to inform the debtor of the matters set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 524(d)(1). 1

In addition to filing the agreement with the court, the parties submitted a proposed order for the court to approve the reaffirmation agreement. The proposed order contains findings that the agreement is in the best interest of the debtor, that it was entered into in good faith, and that the agreement is enforceable.

The court will not sign that order for several reasons. First of all, the Bankruptcy Code does not provide for court approval of a reaffirmation agreement where the debtor is represented by an attorney during the course of negotiating the agreement. In lieu of court approval, the Bankruptcy Code provides that the attorney must file “a declaration or an affidavit” which states that the reaffirmation agreement “represents a fully informed and voluntary agreement by the debtor” and “does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.” Consequently, approval of the reaffirmation agreement by the court is not required and will not be given.

Secondly, even if the Bankruptcy Code required the court to determine whether this reaffirmation agreement should be approved, the court could not make the findings contained in the proposed order. To begin with, the court does not believe the agreement is in the best interest of the debtor. At this time, the debtor is current in his payments, yet he has signed an agreement which reinstates his personal liability for a dischargeable debt, lifts the stay, waives his redemption rights, and requires him to surrender his home upon default to the creditor or to the U.S. Marshal. The agreement requires Mr. Wallace to give up several important rights, yet gives him absolutely nothing in return. If the debtor were behind in his payments, he might derive a benefit from a reaffirmation agreement which allowed him to cure the default, but his payments are current and the court cannot understand how this one-sided agreement can be in the debtor’s “best interest.”

Additionally, the court disagrees with another proposed finding — that the agreement is “enforceable” if not rescind *56 ed. To be enforceable, the agreement must meet all the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 524(c). Arnhold v. Kyrus, 851 F.2d 738 (4th Cir.1988). One of these requirements is that the agreement contain a clear and conspicuous statement advising the debtor of the right to rescind. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(2). There is a statement in the agreement (paragraph # 8) which advises the debtor of his right to rescind the agreement, but that statement is not “conspicuous.” The debtor has specifically been advised by the court of his rescission rights, but that does not satisfy the requirement for a conspicuous statement in the agreement.

Finally, the court has serious doubts that the agreement was entered into in good faith. The agreement gives nothing to the debtor, yet requires him to give up several basic bankruptcy rights. One provision of the agreement which the court finds to be particularly offensive is that which provides that if the debtor should timely rescind the agreement, as is his right under 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4), the debt- or is required to immediately surrender his home to the creditor or to the U.S. Marshal. That provision, of course, would not be enforceable, but its inclusion in the agreement might discourage the debtor from rescinding and is an indication of the creditor’s lack of good faith.

As already stated, the court’s approval of the agreement is not required and, because it is not, and because the court would not approve the agreement even if the issue were before the court, no approval will be given.

SO ORDERED.

APPENDIX A

In the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina

Bk. No. 89-00895-SN7

Filed July 3, 1989.

In re: Joseph E. Wallace, Debtor(s)

REAFFIRMATION AGREEMENT AND DECLARATION OF DEBTOR’S

ATTORNEY: ROBERT U. JOHNSEN

This Reaffirmation Agreement made as of this 19th day of May 1989, between GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL CORPORATION, as servicing agent for the GOVERNMENT NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION (“Creditor”) and Joseph E. Wallace collectively Debtor).

1. On April 6, 1989, a petition for relief under 11 U.S.C. Chapter 7 was filed by Debtor in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, in Cause No. 89-00895-SN7. On the date of the filing of such petition, Debt- or was, and still is, indebted to Creditor for $6,904.69, pursuant to the terms of a contract dated November 30, 1977, held by Creditor for the purchase of a manufactured home 1977 Pinecrest, 60 x 24 Serial # L-1358P A & B (“the Manufactured Home”). A copy of said contract is annexed hereto.

2.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
102 B.R. 54, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 1206, 1989 WL 83810, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-wallace-nceb-1989.