Holcomb, J.
The petitioner, John Walker, brings an original action in this court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging in his petition that he is unlawfully restrained of his liberty by the sheriff of Cass county, in Avhose custody he is held by virtue of a capias Avrit issued out of the district court of said county. It appears from the record that the writ Avas issued on a judgment of filiation, rendered in an action pending in said court against the petitioner, in Avhicli said judgment it was ordered by the court that the defendant, the petitioner, pay to the plaintiff in the action the sum of $138.75, for the care and expense connected with the birth, care and death of a bastard child, he being adjudged to be the reputed father, and the costs of the action; in default of which payment or the securing of the payment thereof, the defendant should be committed to the jail of the county until the judgment be complied with. The facts in the case are stipulated by the parties. There are but two questions of controlling importance, necessary to be considered' in a proper determination of the controversy, Avhich Avill appear in the further discussion of the subject. In September, 1900, a complaint Avas entered by Lillie Parker, an unmarried woman, before a justice of the peace of Cass county, under the provisions of chapter 37 of the Compiled Statutes of 1899, charging the defendant with being the father of her illegitimate child, of which she had been delivered a short time previous. A warrant was issued and the defendant arrested and. brought before the justice, and upon defendant’s application a continuance of the hearing contemplated by statute was had, and he entered into a recognizance to appear at the time to which the hearing Avas continued. Upon a hearing had before the justice of the peace as to the truth of the charge made against the defendant, at which he was present, evidence Avas submitted and reduced to writing as required by statute, upon consideration of which it was found that the com[806] plaint was established; and the defendant was required to enter into a recognizance in the sum of $500 for his appearance at the next term of the district court, to answer the accusation made against him and abide the order of the court. The defendant was placed in the custody of a constable for the purpose of securing the recognizance required, and, neglecting to give the same, a mittimus was issued authorizing his commitment to the jail of the county. Before execution of the mittimus the defendant escaped from the custody of the constable and fled to the state of Iowa. A transcript of the complaint and all proceedings had before the justice of the peace was duly made, certified and filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of Cass county on the first day of the next term thereof held after the preliminary hearing had before the justice of the peace. The defendant failing to appear at said term of the district court, his default was duly taken and entered, and the case coming on for hearing, evidence was submitted to the court without the intervention of a jury, upon consideration whereof it was by the court adjudged that the defendant- was the reputed father of the bastard child of the plaintiff, liable for its support and maintenance, and awarding judgment accordingly as.herein first mentioned. The defendant was afterwards arrested on a capias issued upon the judgment and held in custody because of his failure and default in complying with the judgment so rendered.
It is contended by counsel for the petitioner, and argued in his brief, that the judgment, which is the foundation for the prpcess directing the arrest and imprisonment of the defendant, is void for want of jurisdiction over his person of the court rendering the judgment, the precise question being that because the defendant was not personally present in court and had entered into no recognizance for his presence thereat, and having fled from the custody of the officer detaining him under the mittimus-, jurisdiction by the district court was never [807] acquired over his person. We are, therefore, to inquire in what manner does the district court obtain jurisdiction in a proceeding of the character under consideration? Is it by filing a transcript of the complaint and proceedings had before a justice of the peace,—who, it must be conceded, in this case was empowered to act and had the jurisdiction which was exercised at the preliminary inquiry,—or must the personal presence of the defendant, voluntarily or involuntarily, be had in the district court before it is authorized to render judgment in the case?
Preliminary to what follows we, perhaps, should here note that habeas corpus proceedings can not be resorted to for the purpose of correcting errors of the trial court rendering the judgment which is challenged in such proceedings. If the prisoner is held under a process in due form issued upon a judgment, he can not obtain his discharge by habeas corpus, unless the judgment is void and not merely voidable. Freeman, Judgments, sec. 619, citing Ex parte Marx, 86 Va., 40; In re Coy, 127 U. S., 731, 757, and Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. [U. S.], 191, 202. The bastardy proceedings must also be regarded as essentially a civil action, accompanied by the extraordinary remedy of arrest and imprisonment for the purpose of enforcing, a judgment rendered in the case. Ex parte Cottrell, 13 Nebr., 193; Altschuler v. Algaza, 16 Nebr., 631; Strickler v. Grass, 32 Nebr., 811. While in its character the proceeding is a civil action under the statute, the act is, properly speaking, the exercise of the police power of the state, the object of which is to require the putative father, in compliance with his moral obligation, to furnish support for his child and indemnify the public against liability for its care and keeping, “to compel him to assist in the maintenance of the fruit of his immoral act” and to prevent the child from becoming a county charge. Stoppert v. Nierle, 15 Nebr., 105, 117, and cases therein cited. It is practically conceded that the justice of the peace, before whom the preliminary proceedings [808] were had in the case, had jurisdiction and authority to act regarding the case, in so far as his powers were exercised. This jurisdiction was obtained by the filing of the statutory complaint, duly verified, and the issuance of a warrant thereon, and the arrest of the defendant. The process by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant was the warrant issued for his arrest, and its execution serves, the same office as the service of a summons in an ordinary civil action; and the court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Altschuler v. Algaza, supra; Beckett v. State, 30 N. E. Rep. [Ind.], 536. The justice can not try the case. He may make only an examination, and, if the evidence warrants it, require the defendant to enter into a recognizance to appear at the next term of the district court, there to answer the complaint and abide by the order of the court. This proceeding, however, is required only in the event of the defendant’s failure to comply with the provisions of section 1, for the payment of money or transfer of property to the plaintiff, and to give an obligation to save the county free from charge toward the maintenance of the child; if the defendant comply with these provisions, he is entitled to be discharged. On the district court, the statute has conferred original jurisdiction to try the case on its merits, render judgment of filiation, and for the maintenance of the illegitimate child in such sum as may be ordered. Munro v. Callahan, 41 Nebr., 849.
Has the district court jurisdiction for this purpose when a defendant has not personally appeared therein, under the facts and circumstances as in the case at bar? In Altschuler v. Algaza, supra, it is held in the syllabus : “In a proceeding under the bastardy act the district court acquires jurisdiction by the filing of the transcript of the proceedings before the justice, based on a proper complaint, arrest of the accused, and order requiring him to appear before the district court for trial.” The record in this case discloses that a transcript of all the proceedings [809] liad before tbe justice of tbe peace were duly filed in the office of the clerk of the district court, and jurisdiction, it would seem, was by the court thus acquired as fully as if the defendant had voluntarily submitted his person to the jurisdiction of that court and afterward departed without leave. The court having secured jurisdiction by the filing of the transcript, the vital question next presented is whether the court has jurisdiction to render a judgment in the absence of the defendant? Jurisdiction having been acquired at the commencement of the action and the case, after the examination contemplated by the statute before the justice, having been transferred to the district court for a continuation of the proceeding, we observe no good reason for holding that the case may not be proceeded with and a proper judgment rendered, of the same validity and force, and to the same extent, as though such proceeding were in the first place had in the district court. The action being civil in character, there would seem to be no pressing necessity for the defendant’s presence if lie voluntarily absents himself from the court at the time of the hearing had in that tribunal. The court has jurisdiction over the person of the defeudant and the subject-matter by the filing of the transcript, and, as we view the entire scope and object of the statute, is empowered to try the case and render judgment, even though the defendant be not personally present. The object of the statute providing for the detention of the defendant- in confinement, or his recognizance for his appearance in the district court, is manifestly for the purpose of enforcing summarily the judgment rendered in the action, and not to confer jurisdiction on the court —this had already been accomplished in the manner stated. It is observed by Bellows, J., in a well considered case, Stokes v. Sanborn, 45 N. H., 274, 276: “Indeed, it is quite obvious, that the object of the law is to redress a civil injury by compelling the putative father to aid the mother in the support of the child, and to indemnify the town, chargeable with its support, against the ex[810] penses which may be incurred thereby; giving to the court the power to require of the father or the mother, or both, security against this liability. * * * Some of the forms of this proceeding, it is true, are borrowed from the criminal law, but these are simply with the view of'giving a more summary and stringent character to the. process, by which the respondent is brought into court and held to answer to the charge; leaving it, in most other respects, to stand upon the footing of ordinary civil causes. It is, therefore, held, in Marston v. Jenness [11 N. H., 156] and Little v. Dickinson [29 N. H., 56], * * that the respondent is not arraigned, but appears and pleads by attorney. Under a similar law in Massachusetts, this is held to be a civil proceeding. Wilbur v. Crane, 13 Pick. [Mass.], 284; Williams v. Campbell, 3 Met. [Mass.], 209. So in Mariner v. Dyer, 2 Greenl. [Me.], 165; Hinman v. Taylor, 2 Conn., 357; Robie v. McNiece, 7 Vt., 419; Gray v. Fulsome, 7 Vt., 452; Smith v. Lint, 37 Me., 546. It being settled, then, that , proceedings under this law are to be.regarded as civil actions,.the question is, whether there is anything in their nature, or anything to be implied from the provisions of the statute, that requires the personal presence of the respondent at the trial, or the rendition of judgment, or that takes such cases out of the general rule, that judgment in civil actions may be rendered upon default. The service in these cases is by the arrest of the body, and security taken for the appearance of the-respondent at the proper court, by bond; and, although the form of the proceeding is more summary, yet in substance it is like the cases of arrest and bail in ordinary civil process; and, upon a careful consideration of the question, we are of the opinion that a trial and judgment may be had without the personal attendance of the respondent, or that judgment may be rendered on default. Indeed, it may be regarded as settled here, that the respondent need not be arraigned, but may plead by attorney, from which a strong inference arises that his presence in person is not [811] necessary.” In England, under statutes the scope and object of which are similar to ours, it is held that jurisdiction may be acquired by leaving summons at the place of residence of the accused and, upon hearing, judgment may be rendered by default and enforced summarily by arrest and imprisonment when defendant is within the jurisdiction of the court. Regina v. Webb, 65 Law J. M. Cas., 98; Regina v. Lee, 58 Law T. [n. s.], 384; Regina v. De Winton, 53 Just. P., 292, 59 Law T. [n. s.], 382. See, also, Blood v. Morrill, 17 Vt., 598; Chandler v. Commonwealth, 4 Met. [Ky.], 66, 68; Lucas v. Hawkins, 102 Ind., 64, 1 N. E. Rep., 358.
It is also contended that the default and trial to the court without a jury renders the judgment void, for the reason that section 5 of the act provides for a trial to a jury upon the issue of á plea of not guilty. In this case there was no issue raised by a plea of not guilty. There was no demand for a jury to try an issue not raised by a plea entered by the defendant. By his default he practically confessed the charge. The plaintiff was at liberty to submit her evidence to the court. While the defendant,being present, could demand a jury to try the issues raised, yet he is not, because of his absence, in a position to complain. The court could properly determine the matter without the aid of a jury. Wolf v. State, 11 Ind., 231; Mariner v. Dyer, 2 Me., 165. Even though the statute should be construed as requiring the trial of the issue of defendant’s guilt to be submitted to a jury, the failure to observe the requirement would not go to the jurisdiction of the court, but, at most, render the judgment erroneous, the correction of which could not be had by proceedings in habeas corpus. In re Fife, 110 Cal., 8; Lowery v. Howard, 103 Ind., 440; Ex parte Miller, 82 Cal., 454; State v. Sheriff, 24 Minn., 87.
The second question of importance is whether the defendant, at the time the capias was served upon him, was privileged from arrest by reason of the fact that he had been brought into the jurisdiction of the court under an [812] extradition warrant, to answer for a crime or charge of which he was discharged, and immediately rearrested on a process issued on the judgment rendered in the case at bar. His counsel contends that the asylum state from which he was extradited was, by the choice of the defendant, made his home, and constituted his domicile, to which he should have been allowed a reasonable time to return, and during such time he was entitled to immunity from arrest; and that the service of the writ was an unlawful act and the subsequent restraint likewise unlawful. Two subordinate propositions are involved in the consideration of this phase of the case: First, are there any express provisions in the laws and rules governing extradition which are violated, directly or indirectly, by the service of process, civil or criminal, on one who has been extradited to answer a charge of violating the criminal laws, without allowing him the immunity contended for? And, second, is there a sound rule or policy of the law in the administration of justice which forbids the service of such a writ without extending the privilege of departing within a reasonable time from- the jurisdiction to which a person has been brought, against his will, by virtue of the laws providing for rendition and extradition of fugitives from justice, after discharge from custody on the charge by reason of which the requisition was granted? In a late case, Lascelles v. Georgia, Avhere the question of the rights, of such a person was directly in issue, it is stated in the syllabus: “As betAveen the states of the union, fugitives from justice have no right of asylum, in the international sense; and a fugitive Avko has been returned by interstate rendition may be tried for other offenses than that for which his return was demanded, Avithout violating any right secured by the constitution or laws of the United States.” 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 687, 148 U. S., 537.