In re V.S.

2020 IL App (4th) 200020-U

Opinion

NOTICE FILED This order was filed under Supreme 2020 IL App (4th) 200020-U May 26, 2020 Court Rule 23 and may not be cited Carla Bender as precedent by any party except in th NO. 4-20-0020 4 District Appellate the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re V.S., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) McLean County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 18JA80 v. ) Amanda S., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) J. Brian Goldrick, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Harris concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, holding the trial court did not err in terminating respondent’s parental rights.

¶2 In August 2018, the State filed a petition for adjudication of neglect or abuse with

respect to V.S., the minor child of respondent, Amanda S. In October 2018, the trial court

adjudicated the minor neglected, made her a ward of the court, and placed custody and

guardianship with the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). The State filed a

motion to terminate respondent’s parental rights in August 2019. Following a hearing on the

State’s motion in December 2019, respondent admitted she was an “unfit person” based on one

of the counts alleged in the State’s petition. The court subsequently held a best-interests hearing,

where the court found it was in the minor’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental

rights.

¶3 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights; contending the trial court’s best-interest determination was against the manifest weight of

the evidence. We affirm.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 In August 2018, the State filed a petition for adjudication of neglect with respect

to V.S.—a minor child born in July 2016—alleging V.S. was living in an environment injurious

to her welfare while in the care of respondent due to respondent’s unresolved issues of alcohol

and/or substance abuse and unresolved issues of domestic violence and/or anger management

which created a risk of harm to the minor. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018). The State’s

petition also alleged the minor was neglected by the putative father, who was never involved in

these proceedings and is not relevant for the purposes of this appeal. The following day, during

the emergency shelter-care hearing, respondent stipulated to probable cause and immediate and

urgent necessity and the court placed temporary custody and guardianship with DCFS. The

court’s written order found there was probable cause based on the stipulation as well as the

reports showing respondent’s history of substance abuse and domestic violence, and

respondent’s recent positive tests for cocaine.

¶6 A. Adjudicatory Proceedings.

¶7 In October 2018, the court held an adjudicatory hearing wherein respondent

admitted paragraph 3A of the petition which alleged she had unresolved alcohol and/or substance

abuse issues and “several positive screens for cocaine.” The trial court found, “The minor is

neglected or abused as defined in [the Juvenile Court Act] [(705 ILCS 405/2-3 (West 2018))] in

that the minor is in an environment injurious to the welfare of the minor as defined by 705 ILCS

405/2-3(1)(b).” The trial court admonished respondent to cooperate with DCFS, comply with the

terms of the agency’s service plan, and correct any conditions which required the minor to be in

-2- the agency’s care. If not, respondent would risk termination of her parental rights.

¶8 At the dispositional hearing in December 2018, the trial court found respondent

unfit and unable to care for, protect, train, educate, supervise, or discipline V.S., and placement

with respondent was contrary to V.S.’s health, safety and best interest because “[respondent] will

need to complete substance abuse and [domestic violence] treatment *** and need to

demonstrate the ability to live a sober lifestyle.” The court found it was in the best interests of

the minor that she be made a ward of the court, maintained custody and guardianship with

DCFS, and found a return home within 12 months would be appropriate.

¶9 In March 2019, the trial court entered a permanency order, which included the

goal of return home within 12 months. The court found respondent had not made reasonable and

substantial progress or reasonable efforts toward a return of the minor and remained unfit due to

her “continued use of marijuana and minimizing her continuing usage.” Furthermore, the court

found respondent’s counselor “does not feel [respondent] is fully engaged in her individual

counseling.”

¶ 10 B. Termination of Respondent’s Parental Rights

¶ 11 In August 2019, the State filed a motion seeking a finding of unfitness and

termination of parental rights of respondent. The State alleged respondent was unfit pursuant to

Illinois’s Adoption Act (see 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(k), (m)(i), (ii) (West 2018)). Specifically, the

State alleged respondent (1) suffered from habitual drunkenness or addiction to unprescribed

drugs for at least one year prior to commencement of the unfitness proceedings, (2) failed to

make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were the basis for removal of the minor

during the nine-month period from November 1, 2018, through August 1, 2019, and (3) failed to

make reasonable progress toward the return of the child during the same nine-month period. The

-3- State’s petition also alleged terminating respondent’s parental rights served the best interests of

the minor, V.S., and requested DCFS retain custody and guardianship over V.S. with the

authority to consent to V.S.’s adoption.

¶ 12 At the previous permanency hearing in March 2019, the court heard respondent

tested positive for drugs four times during a four-month period. At the August 2019 permanency

review held before respondent was admonished on the termination petition, the court heard

respondent failed to provide 22 out of 24 drug screens, cancelled eight sessions with her

counselor, and failed to show up for three more. Although she attended six anger management

counseling appointments, she was very inconsistent and missed several appointments. The status

hearing report filed by the Center for Youth and Family Services (CYFS) in October 2019

indicated respondent completed only 7 out of 23 drug screens since the last reporting period. Out

of the seven times she appeared, she tested positive for marijuana three times, and one of those

screens tested positive for marijuana and cocaine. She also missed a total of four counseling

sessions.

¶ 13 In December 2019, the trial court held a fitness hearing. By this time, respondent

was incarcerated but was present for the hearing with counsel. Respondent admitted to the first

allegation set forth in the State’s termination petition, admitting she was an unfit person by

habitual drunkenness or addiction to unprescribed drugs. In exchange for respondent’s admission

of unfitness to Count 1, the State dismissed the remaining counts. The State then presented a

factual basis consisting of the proffer of two witnesses. The first, Brittany Barth, was a former

CYFS caseworker. If called, she would testify that during the integrated assessment interview,

respondent acknowledged she used cannabis daily since the age of 15 and shortly thereafter

began using “spice,” cocaine, and unauthorized prescription drugs. At the time DCFS became

-4- involved with V.S., respondent was “binging every few days on alcohol and/or drugs.” Carrie

Marsh, a counselor with Chestnut, would testify respondent began substance abuse treatment at

Chestnut on July 3, 2018; engaged in level two intensive outpatient treatment. After screening

positive for cannabis, cocaine, and benzodiazepines during her treatment, she was recommended

for level three residential treatment which she attended between August 31 and September 20,

2018. Respondent successfully completed residential treatment but continued to use drugs and

failed to appear for required drug screenings upon her release. She was referred to residential

treatment a second time, where again, upon completion of residential treatment and the

commencement of outpatient treatment, she continued to use illegal substances and failed to

attend mandatory treatment sessions until she was unsuccessfully discharged from treatment in

October 2019. According to Marsh, respondent’s prognosis was poor at the time of discharge and

her diagnosis included cannabis, cocaine, and alcohol use disorders. Respondent stipulated to

this testimony and the court found the State provided a sufficient factual basis by clear and

convincing evidence. Based on the evidence and respondent’s knowing and voluntary admission,

the court found respondent unfit. The court then proceeded to a best-interests hearing.

¶ 14 C. Best-Interests Hearing

¶ 15 The State called caseworker Kaitlynn Stigall. She testified she is V.S.’s current

caseworker. V.S.’s current placement with her aunt, Sarah Kiper, had been going very well.

Stigall stated V.S.’s expected long-term placement was with V.S.’s aunt and uncle who live in

Arizona. She said this placement had been approved and the agency was working towards the

transition to the new home. Because the respondent was currently in custody, the agency wanted

to wait until respondent was released from custody before the transition. This would take place in

approximately 90 days and allow respondent an opportunity to spend time with V.S. before the

-5- transition takes place. Stigall confirmed the prospective foster parents have a relationship with

V.S., and upon learning they were going to be the prospective long-term foster home, they have

been in contact with V.S. daily. She acknowledged respondent has a bond with V.S. and their

visits together go well, but they have not had an in-person visit since respondent has been in

custody. Citing respondent’s substance abuse and mental health issues and her inability to help

keep V.S. safe, Stigall recommended respondent’s parental rights be terminated. When asked to

elaborate, she said “I think her drug use is my biggest thing. She tends to pick using over [V.S.],

and if you’re under the influence *** you can’t keep yourself safe, let alone someone that is as

young as [V.S.]”

¶ 16 Next, the State called Sarah Kiper, the respondent’s sister. Kiper testified V.S.

currently lives with her but she was only willing to provide long-term placement if necessary.

When questioned further, she stated, “I believe [V.S.] mentally and emotionally will be healthier

if she’s not locally near [respondent] and is not witness to some of the chaos that might follow

her.” When asked to elaborate, she stated, “Um [sic], [respondent] is not very stable. She does

have substance abuse problems. She’s not entirely independent and sometimes her mental health

combined with her substance abuse problems can cause violent outbursts or lapses in judgment.

And sometimes she takes that out on family.” She agreed respondent’s parental rights should be

terminated and believed it would take “several years” before she thought it would be safe for

respondent to be unsupervised around V.S. She also confirmed the potential foster parents in

Arizona have a strong bond with V.S. and there are several other family members in Arizona

who also have a relationship with V.S.

¶ 17 The State next called Tabitha Staley, who is V.S.’s aunt and prospective adoptive

parent who lives in Arizona. Staley testified she and her husband have a place for V.S. to stay,

-6- V.S. is familiar with their children, and the family lives close to the school V.S. will attend.

Staley explained that Sarah Kiper, V.S.’s current placement, will also come to their home at the

beginning of the placement to ensure the transition goes smoothly. When asked if she believes

respondent’s parental rights should be terminated, she stated, “ I love [respondent], I always will,

I always have. But with her substance abuse, the violent outbursts, the inability to care for her

daughter, and [V.S.’s father] has never really spent quality time with his child or knows his

child; I feel at this time it’s best that they are removed from parental rights.” She concluded that

she and her husband would still adopt V.S. even without funding from DCFS. Before resting, the

State asked the court to take judicial notice of the court file, which was allowed without

objection.

¶ 18 Respondent testified she is currently incarcerated in the McLean County jail

serving a 90-day jail sentence. She described her visits with V.S. as “amazing” and felt like she

provided for V.S.’s needs during visitation. When asked who V.S. would want to live with, she

responded, “Honestly, I don’t know. I would like to say me, but I think she’s safest right now

with my family.” When asked how long she felt she would need to be stable enough to take care

of V.S. after being released from custody, she believed it would be about six months or less.

When asked to explain, she stated she was “hoping” her prior employer would provide her with

employment upon her release from jail and was “hoping” this employer would also provide her

with lodging while she worked there. On cross-examination, she confirmed the only time she

lived independently was for a brief period of time before V.S. was born, and the longest time she

has ever been sober was for 90 days while she was in a residential treatment program. Finally,

respondent admitted her current incarceration was due to a battery against her mother, and a jail

sentence was imposed only after she failed to complete substance abuse and mental health

-7- counseling pursuant to the agreement.

¶ 19 The trial court observed the respondent started off doing pretty well and was

“participating in services,” but noted 90 days was the longest she ever maintained sobriety and

that was only when she was in a controlled environment. The court further noted this case was

approximately 16 months old, and throughout the life of the case, respondent had not been able

to tackle substance abuse issues or provide any type of permanent stability for V.S. The trial

court expressly considered the various statutory factors contained in section 1-3(4.05) of the

Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018)), as it

made its best-interests determination. When the trial court looked at the safety and security of

V.S., including her health, safety, and welfare, the court found this factor favored terminating

respondent’s parental rights. Respondent had a “difficult time taking care of herself

independently,” and “she’s not able to meet *** [V.S.’s] needs on a full-time basis.”

Additionally, V.S. was familiar and felt secure with her current placement where she has spent

almost half her life, and there was a long-term plan in place to have V.S. live with relatives she

knows. Noting this long-term stable placement would be disrupted if V.S. were placed with

respondent upon her release from incarceration, the court concluded “we need permanence, and

the plan that is in place by CYFS seems to be an appropriate plan that provides for the

permanence of [V.S.].” The court found the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence it

was in V.S.’s best interest that respondent’s parental rights be terminated.

¶ 20 This appeal followed.

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 Respondent argues the trial court erroneously terminated her parental rights

because the court’s best-interest determination goes against the manifest weight of the evidence.

-8- We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 23 The Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1 et seq. (West 2018)) and the Adoption

Act (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 2018)) govern how the State may terminate parental rights.

In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 494, 777 N.E.2d 930, 940 (2002). Together, the statutes outline two

necessary steps the State must take before terminating a person’s parental rights—the State must

first show the parent is an “unfit person” and then the State must show terminating parental

rights serves the best interests of the child. D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 494 (citing the Adoption Act (750

ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1998) and the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 1998)).

Here, respondent does not challenge the trial court’s unfitness finding. Instead she challenges the

trial court’s determination it was in V.S.’s best interests to terminate her parental rights.

¶ 24 Once a trial court finds a parent an “unfit person,” it must next consider whether

terminating that person’s parental rights serves the child’s best interests. “[A]t a best-interests

hearing, the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s

interest in a stable, loving home life.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364, 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1227

(2004); see also In re Julian K., 2012 IL App (1st) 112841, ¶ 80, 966 N.E.2d 1107 (stating once

the trial court finds the parent unfit, “all considerations, including the parent’s rights, yield to the

best interests of the child”). When considering whether termination of parental rights serves a

child’s best interests, the trial court must consider several factors within “the context of the

child’s age and developmental needs.” 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018). These factors

include:

“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of

the child’s identity; (3) the child’s familial, cultural[,] and religious

background and ties; (4) the child’s sense of attachments, including

-9- love, security, familiarity, continuity of affection, and the least

disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes and long-

term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for

permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of

relationships with parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of

every family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and

(10) the preferences of the person available to care for the child.”

In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1072, 859 N.E.2d 123,

141 (2006). See also 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018).

¶ 25 A trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best

interests will not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

In re Dal. D., 2017 IL App (4th) 160893, ¶ 53, 74 N.E.3d 1185. The court’s decision will be

found to be “against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is

clearly apparent or the decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.” In re

Keyon R., 2017 IL App (2d) 160657, ¶ 16, 73 N.E.3d 616.

¶ 26 Respondent contends the trial court’s determination terminating her parental

rights goes against the manifest weight of the evidence because it “is clearly against V.S.’s need

for stability, affection, and her sense of attachment[] to [respondent] ***.” The only evidence to

which respondent points in support of this argument is that she had supervised visitation with

V.S. without any issues. The State, on the other hand, presented substantial evidence in support

of termination. V.S., who has been in foster care for almost half of her life, has a bond with her

current placement, Sara Kiper, as well as a familiarity with the proposed alternative placement

out-of-state. Both Kiper and the caseworker recognized V.S.’s interests would best be served by

- 10 - placing her with other family members in a location further away from respondent. V.S. already

has a relationship with her prospective foster parents—her aunt and uncle in Arizona—and there

is extended family living nearby her prospective placement as well. The prospective parents have

no health issues, have a steady income, have acclimated V.S. to their family, live close to a

school V.S. will attend, and were very open to future contact between V.S. and respondent as

long as it was in V.S.’s best interests. V.S.’s prospective placement will be with family members

who are committed to caring for her well-being and safety. They are ready to accept V.S. into

their home as a permanent placement and will do so, regardless of whether a DCFS subsidy

followed. The court noted this serves her best interests because it provides the much-needed

stability she requires.

¶ 27 Conversely, the State’s witnesses unanimously agreed it was in V.S.’s best

interests that respondent’s parental rights be terminated. V.S.’s caseworker said respondent’s

struggle with substance abuse and mental health issues prohibited her from keeping V.S. safe.

Respondent’s sister, Sarah Kiper, echoed similar concerns, saying it would be “[s]everal years”

before it would be safe for V.S. to be in respondent’s care. She pointed out how respondent’s

substance abuse and mental health issues can lead to “violent outbursts or lapses in judgment”

which she sometimes takes out on family members. She even recommended placing V.S. with

family in Arizona in order to remove her from the “chaos that might follow [respondent].”

Finally, V.S.’s prospective foster mother, Tabitha Staley, stated respondent’s substance abuse

issues and her violent outbursts leave her incapable of adequately caring for her daughter.

¶ 28 Respondent confirmed this testimony. She stated the longest time she has ever

been sober was 90 days while she was in a residential treatment facility. She appeared at the

termination proceeding currently serving a jail sentence for misdemeanor battery to her mother

- 11 - only because she failed to complete substance abuse and mental health treatment. Respondent

testified it would take her approximately six months to get stable and establish a safe home for

V.S., although she had no concrete plans for exactly how that would occur. She admitted living

independently only once before and that was before V.S. was born. She also “hoped” her old

boss at a hotel would provide her with her former job but could not confirm any type of

employment since she was in jail. She had no long-term plans for independent housing. She also

hoped her former employer would allow her to stay in a hotel room while she worked there.

Respondent candidly admitted V.S. would not be safe with her. When asked who V.S. wanted to

live with, she stated, “Honestly, I don’t know. I would like to say me, but I think she’s safest

right now with family.”

¶ 29 The court found three statutory factors weighed most heavily in its best-interest

determination. First, with regard to the child’s physical safety and welfare, respondent is not able

to care for herself independently and is unable to meet V.S.’s needs “on a full-time basis.”

Second, the court found V.S.’s security and familiarity support terminating respondent’s parental

rights because V.S. is familiar with her prospective foster parents and “forty percent of her life

has been in the current placement.” Third, V.S.’s need for permanence and stability favor

termination as the proposed placement is the least disruptive and has an “appropriate plan that

provides for the permanence of [V.S.]” with a family who truly cares for her. From our review of

the record, we conclude the trial court had ample evidence before it to find it was in V.S.’s best

interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. This case had been pending for almost 16

months and the child was only two years of age when placed into DCFS care, in part because of

respondent’s substance abuse issues. Respondent continued to test positive for drugs both before

and after residential treatment and throughout the pendency of the case, to the point where she

- 12 - was incarcerated by the time of the termination hearing for failing to successfully complete

treatment. She failed to successfully complete anger management counseling and was sporadic in

her participation. Throughout the life of the case she only occasionally cooperated with required

drug screens, frequently tested positive, and often failed to appear. Respondent had progressed

no further toward correcting the conditions which required V.S. to be placed in care after 16

months, than when she began. The possibility of returning the child to a parent who had so

clearly indicated her lack of concern for her own welfare or that of her child would have been a

greater disservice to the child. We cannot say the trial court’s best-interests determination was

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 30 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 31 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 32 Affirmed.

- 13 -