In Re Volk

26 B.R. 457, 7 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1096, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 7054, 9 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1382
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. South Dakota
DecidedJanuary 11, 1983
Docket19-10001
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 26 B.R. 457 (In Re Volk) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. South Dakota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Volk, 26 B.R. 457, 7 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1096, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 7054, 9 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1382 (S.D. 1983).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

PEDER K. ECKER, Bankruptcy Judge.

The trustee filed an objection to Debtors’ claim of exempt homestead property. The basis of the objection was the trustee’s belief that the debtors’ homestead property located in Gillette, Wyoming, could not be claimed under the South Dakota exemption statutes. Pursuant to the application of the debtors, the objection came on for hearing on March 24, 1982, before the undersigned Bankruptcy Judge. The facts are uncontro-verted.

Thomas Jack Volk and Margie Carole Volk, the debtors, filed a joint petition for voluntary relief on December 4, 1981. For the longer portion of the 180-day period immediately prior to filing, the debtors were domiciled within this District of South Dakota, and, therefore, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1472, were required to file their petition in this district. However, prior to the date of filing, Debtors had ceased doing business in South Dakota and were residing in the State of Wyoming.

In Schedule B-4 of the petition, the debtors claimed personal and real property exempt under the laws of the State of South Dakota because the federal exemption is not available to South Dakota residents. 1 The debtors claimed a homestead exemption under Sections 43-31-1 and 43-31-2 of the South Dakota Code. South Dakota Codified Laws §§ 43-31-1 and 43-31-2 (Supp.1980).

The trustee argues, in effect, that although the debtors are required by the Bankruptcy Code to file their petition in the District of South Dakota, and in spite of the fact that the debtors claimed the exemp *459 tions under the South Dakota Code because the federal exemptions are not available, the debtors are foreclosed from claiming any homestead exemption because the property is located outside of South Dakota. The trustee suggests that allowing a debtor to claim a homestead exemption in property located outside the state of filing would encourage forum shopping.

The debtors claim that Congress has allowed the states “to violate or attempt to violate” the Equal Protection Clause of the 14 Amendment to the United States Constitution by allowing the states to opt out of the federal exemptions and determine the exemptions available to their citizens. Debtors further allege this is “manifestly unfair” and also violates Article IV, Section 2, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution. However, neither of these issues have been argued by the debtors in their brief. The Court cannot rule that any statute is unconstitutional in the absence of proper pleadings, citations of authority, and arguments by the debtors. Absent a clear showing that a statute is unconstitutional, the Court must defer to the legislature and accept the constitutionality of the statute in question. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971); Home Telephone Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265, 29 S.Ct. 50, 53 L.Ed. 176 (1908).

Despite that neither cogent argument nor citation of authority is offered by either party in their briefs, the Court accedes to Trustee’s urging to “review the law” and render a decision. Counsel would do well in the future to remember that researching and reviewing the law is to be accomplished by counsel prior to filing briefs and is not to be the sole responsibility of the Court in the absence of any effort on counsel’s part.

The issue before the Court is which exemption law is available when a case is filed in South Dakota but the debtors do not qualify for the exemptions provided under the South Dakota Code and are further prohibited by the South Dakota Code from claiming the federal exemptions.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1472(1), venue of this matter is properly in this Court because the debtors resided in this district for a longer portion of the 180 days immediately preceding the commencement of this case on December 4,1981, when the petition was filed. Debtors also operated a business located in this district from May, 1974, until November 13, 1981.

Having .determined that venue is properly in this Court, it is now necessary to determine whether this Court has jurisdiction over the exempt property. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e) conveys jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court over “all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor, as of the commencement of such case.” The fact that Debtors’ real property is located outside this district has no bearing on the determination of jurisdiction since the Court’s jurisdiction extends to all of the debtors’ property regardless of location. See also 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.01 (15th ed. 1982).

Any disputes over exempt property are governed by 11 U.S.C. § 522. The availability of exemptions is governed by Section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. The liability of exempt property for certain debts and liens is provided at subsection (c); limitations on the enforceability of waivers of injunctions are specified at subsection (e). A fortiori, the bankruptcy court must have jurisdiction over exempt property to enforce the mandates of these provisions.

Having determined that this Court has jurisdiction over the property and the dispute, the question must be addressed as to which exemption statute is applicable. The Code allows the debtor to exempt property from the estate either as provided under Section 522(d) or, in the alternative, as provided under state law of the debtor’s domicile. The location of the debtors’ domicile during the longer portion of the 180-day period immediately preceding filing of the petition governs the determination of applicable state law. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A).

The evidence is clear that the debtors were domiciliaries of the State of South *460 Dakota from 1974 until the time of purchasing a home in Wyoming on September 25, 1981, or until closing the business in South Dakota on November 13, 1981. There is neither evidence nor argument addressing the exact date Debtors moved out of South Dakota with no intent to return. Whether the change of domicile occurred in September or November, the debtors’ domicile for a greater portion of the 180 days prior to filing their petition was South Dakota, and the Bankruptcy Code makes South Dakota law applicable for the determination of exemptions.

The South Dakota Code restricts the availability of the personal property exemption statutes under S.D.C.L. 43-45 to residents and, further, to residents who are not in the act of removing with their families from the state. 2 S.D.C.L. 43-45-7.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
26 B.R. 457, 7 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1096, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 7054, 9 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1382, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-volk-sdb-1983.