In Re Villa Diablo Associates

156 B.R. 650, 29 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 136, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 904, 24 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 698, 1993 WL 265881
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. California
DecidedJuly 2, 1993
Docket19-40221
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 156 B.R. 650 (In Re Villa Diablo Associates) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Villa Diablo Associates, 156 B.R. 650, 29 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 136, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 904, 24 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 698, 1993 WL 265881 (Cal. 1993).

Opinion

OPINION

JAMES R. GRUBE, Bankruptcy Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION.

This case involves a dispute between the debtor and its principal secured creditor over how present value should be calculated for purposes of “cramming down” a plan of reorganization under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). 1

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

Villa Diablo filed its Chapter 11 petition on July 13, 1992. Its primary asset is a 48 unit apartment complex located in Concord, California. Citibank holds a note secured by a first deed of trust on the property. At the time of the filing it was owed $2,259,069. The debtor has been unsuccessfully trying to sell the property since well before the case was filed.

Seven months after the filing, in February 1993, Citibank moved for relief from the automatic stay. During these seven months the debtor was making periodic *652 payments to Citibank which amounted to less than half the amount necessary to service the debt. When Citibank’s motion was heard, the debtor contended that it simply needed a little more time to sell the property. The court imposed a deadline, or “drop dead” date, of May 9, 1993, after which the stay would terminate. The debt- or’s efforts to market the property during this additional 90 day period were unsuccessful.

Due to disputes regarding the management of the property, Citibank moved, prior to the deadline, to modify, the court’s order so as to grant it immediate relief to foreclose. The debtor filed a counter-motion for an extension of the stay beyond the May 9th “drop dead” date. The debtor’s motion asserted for the first time that it no longer wanted to sell the property, but instead intended to propose a plan which would “cram-down” the Citibank loan. The debtor asserted throughout the proceedings that the property is worth $2.6 to $2.8 million dollars, which value put Citibank in an oversecured position. However, the debtor now adopts Citibank’s position that the apartment complex has never been worth more than $2,100,000. Since Citibank is owed more than this amount, it is undersecured and not entitled to interest on its secured claim. See United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest, 484 U.S. 365, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988). The debtor further asserts that all payments made during the pendency of the case should be treated as a reduction of principal.

The debtor had not actually filed a plan at the time of the initial hearing on its motion. The court therefore extended the stay through May 26th with the understanding that the stay would terminate unless the debtor had a potentially confirma-ble plan on file. By May 26th, the debtor had filed a plan. It was not obviously unconfirmable on its face, so the court continued the stay to the disclosure statement hearing on June 17th to give both the court and Citibank time to examine the plan.

The plan provides that Citibank will retain its lien on the property and accrue interest on its secured claim at the rate of 4.13%. The plan also provides for a minimum payment of $14,000 per month to Citibank, which calculates to an effective interest rate of 7.99% on the amount of Citibank’s secured claim as calculated by the debtor. The property is to be sold within five years of confirmation. If it is not sold within five years, or if the debtor has failed to promptly cure any default, Citibank will be free to foreclose without further order of the court.

At the June 17th hearing, Citibank raised a variety of objections to the disclosure statement and plan. Among the objections was Citibank’s contention that the debtor’s proposed interest rate of 4.13% does not provide it with present value, and that the plan therefor fails to satisfy the fair and equitable test of § 1129(b). The debtor indicated that it might be willing to increase the interest rate but also admitted that its cash flow could not support an interest rate higher than 9%. However, in examining the cash flow from the property, it appears that if an interest rate higher than 8% is required, the debtor will not be able to confirm a plan. The court therefore severed the present value issue and set it for hearing on June 29th.

The plan and disclosure statement do not describe the manner in which the 4.13% interest rate was chosen. In its response to Citibank’s objections, the debtor stated that it chose the one year Treasury Bill rate, 3.13% at the time the disclosure statement was filed, as an index to which it apparently added 1%. In a subsequent declaration filed in connection with the present value hearing, the debtor indicated that an appropriate interest rate might be in the range of 6.671% to 6.921%. This was calculated by using the Eleventh District Cost of Funds as an index and adding to that index 250 to 275 basis points. 2 Even if the debt- or were to amend its plan to increase the interest rate, Citibank contends • that the proposed rate is still artificially low and *653 fails to satisfy the requirements of § 1129(b).

III. DETERMINING PRESENT VALUE.

A. The Law In The Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit has adopted a case by case market approach for determining present value payments under § 1129(a)(9)(C) or § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II). In re Camino Real Landscape Maintenance Contractors, 818 F.2d 1503 (9th Cir.1987). While a market rate approach is to be utilized, two approaches have developed in the case law as to how the market rate may be found. The first approach is for the court to determine the current market interest rate for similar loans in the geographical area based upon evidence regarding such rates. From that evidence the court should evaluate the nature and quality of the collateral, the loan to value ratio, the debt coverage ratio, and other relevant risk factors to determine an interest rate the market would assign to the subject loan.

The second approach determines the market rate through the use of a formula. The Ninth Circuit has specifically approved the formula approach suggesting that the building of a formula rate is similar to the creation of a presumption which can then be tested by the introduction of evidence regarding market rates in the geographical area. In re Fowler, 903 F.2d 694 (9th Cir.1990). The formula approach is nothing more than an alternative procedure which can be used to determine a market rate.

If, for example, a debtor wanted to rewrite a loan for an apartment building with a loan to value ratio of 70% and a debt coverage ratio of 1.2, the first approach would make the most sense because the market has information readily available regarding the terms and conditions of such a loan including the available interest rate.

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156 B.R. 650, 29 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 136, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 904, 24 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 698, 1993 WL 265881, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-villa-diablo-associates-canb-1993.