In re: Vidal Rosario Leon

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedJune 7, 2018
Docket17-06542
StatusUnknown

This text of In re: Vidal Rosario Leon (In re: Vidal Rosario Leon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re: Vidal Rosario Leon, (prb 2018).

Opinion

1 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 2

3 IN RE: CASE NO. 17-06542 4

5 VIDAL ROSARIO LEON CHAPTER 11

6 Debtor(s) FILED & ENTERED ON 06/07/2018

8 OPINION & ORDER 9 10 Before the court is claimants’ Elizabeth Flores Bermudez, Ledaliz Collazo Flores and 11 Carlos E. Collazo (hereinafter “Claimants”) Motion for Reconsideration and Response to 12 Debtor’s Objection to Claim of Carlos E. Collazo [Dkt. No. 103]; Debtor’s Objection to Motion 13 for Reconsideration [Dkt. No. 109] and Claimants’ Response to Debtor’s Objection to Motion 14 for Reconsideration and Further Request for Relief Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(B)(1) [Dkt. 15 No. 111]. This controversy stems from the court’s Order [Dkt. No. 96] granting Debtor’s 16 objection to claim number 6-2, as a result of Mr. Carlos E. Collazo’s (hereinafter “Collazo”) 17 18 failure to timely respond. Claimants’ motion for reconsideration requests that the court review 19 that particular Order. However, in Claimants’ response, two additional Orders [Dkt. No’s 94 & 20 95] are included for reconsideration.1 Notwithstanding, for the sake of judicial economy, the 21 court will analyze the reconsideration of all three Orders. Debtor’s three objections to claims 4-1, 22 5-1 and 6-2, and the subsequent orders, are identical in their reasoning. Claimants’ motion for 23 24 25 26

27 1 The Orders at Dkt’s No. 94 and 95 pertain to the granting of Debtor’s objection to claims 4-1 and 5-1 filed by claimants Elizabeth Flores Bermudez and Ledaliz Collazo Flores, respectively. 1 reconsideration cites Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) as the basis for relief. Therefore, the court will 2 proceed to analyze the merits of the reconsideration under this rule.2 3 Under a Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration, a court may relieve a party from a final 4 judgment, order or proceeding only if the moving party can establish within a reasonable time 5 under extraordinary circumstances: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 6 newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged 7 8 judgment; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment. Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 9 F.2d 1386, 1387 (9thCir.1985); Twentieth Century–Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338, 10 1341 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal citations omitted) (“Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must be requested 11 within a reasonable time, and is available only under extraordinary circumstances.”). The First 12 Circuit has recognized that “[a] motion for reconsideration does not provide a vehicle for a party 13 to undo its own procedural failures, and it certainly does not allow a party to introduce new 14 evidence or advance new arguments that could or should have been presented to the district court 15 16 prior to judgment.” Marks 2–Zet–Ernst Marks GMBH & Co. KG v. Presstek, Inc., 455 F.3d 7, 17 15–16 (1st Cir.2006). In sum, counsel in a motion for reconsideration must set forth the 18 following: (1) genuine reasons why the court should revisit its prior order; and (2) compelling 19 facts or law in support of reversing the prior decision. See Frasure v. United States, 256 20 F.Supp.2d 1180, 1183 (D.Nev.2003). 21 In their motion to reconsider and subsequent response, Claimants premise their request 22 on three assertions: (1) the attorney representing Claimants is not a bankruptcy practitioner, has 23 24 limited familiarity with bankruptcy proceedings and inadvertently neglected to file a timely 25 response to the Debtor’s objection at Dkt. No. 85; (2) the attorney for Claimants is a solo 26 practitioner with a heavy caseload; (3) As a result of Hurricanes Irma and Maria, the attorney’s 27 2 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024 states that Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 applies in cases under the Bankruptcy Code. 1 law office was flooded and suffered damage. Claimants go on to state that “[e]ven after cleanup 2 and the restoration of electric power, internet and phone service were non-existent. The 3 hurricanes adversely affected the status of all of our pending cases…resulting in considerable 4 emotional and financial strain upon the…solo practice.”3 Looking at the factors for Rule 60(b) 5 relief discussed above, Claimants’ arguments allege that their failure to timely respond to the 6 duly noticed objections was due to excusable neglect. Moreover, Claimants argue that the 7 8 Debtor’s objection to the reconsideration merely raises a procedural misstep and does not delve 9 into the substantive merits of the Claimants’ response to the objection to claim. 10 “Demonstrating excusable neglect is a demanding standard” and the trial judge has 11 “wide discretion” in dealing with litigants who make such claims. Santos–Santos v. Torres– 12 Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 169 (1st Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 13 Although many courts have indicated that Rule 60(b) motions should be granted liberally,4 this 14 Circuit has taken a harsher tack. “Because Rule 60(b) is a vehicle for ‘extraordinary relief,’ 15 16 motions invoking the rule should be granted ‘only under exceptional circumstances.’ ” Torre v. 17 Continental Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 12, 14–15 (1st Cir. 1994). (quoting Lepore v. Vidockler, 792 F.2d 18 272, 274 (1st Cir. 1986)). 19 The Supreme Court has provided guidance, advising that trial courts utilize their 20 equitable powers by weighing the following four factors: (1) the danger of prejudice to the non- 21 22 3 Claimants’ Response to Debtor’s Objection to Motion for Reconsideration and Further Request for 23 Relief Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(B)(1) [Dkt. No. 111 ¶ 9].

24 4 See, e.g., Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp. v. Bio–Energy Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 1130, 1132 (11th 25 Cir.1986); Blois v. Friday, 612 F.2d 938, 940 (5th Cir.1980); Radack v. Norwegian Am. Line Agency, Inc., 318 F.2d 538, 542 (2d Cir.1963); 11 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2852, 26 at 231 (1995). Davila-Alvarez v. Escuela de Medicina Universidad Central del Caribe, 257 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2001). 27 1 moving party; (2) the length of delay and potential impact on judicial proceedings; (3) the 2 reason for the delay; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith. Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. 3 Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993) (interpreting “excusable neglect” in Rule 4 9006(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Rules); see Pratt v.

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