Order entered December 29, 2014
In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-14-00716-CV
IN RE VICTOR ENTERPRISES, INC., Relator
Original Proceeding from the County Court at Law No. 1 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC-09-07625-A
ORDER Before Justices Bridges, Lang-Miers, and Myers
Real party in interest Clifford Holland requests that the Court reconsider its jurisdiction
to render the writ of mandamus and order signed on October 27, 2014 in this case. We conclude
the Court properly exercised its jurisdiction in both instances.
Holland’s contention the Court lacked authority to order Judge Benson to refrain from
interfering with the unappealed justice court’s judgments is incorrect. Texas courts have long
recognized the power of an appellate court to prohibit litigation that interferes with an inferior
court’s judgment. Cleveland v. Ward, 285 S.W. 1063, 1068 (Tex. 1926) (orig. proceeding),
disapproved of on other grounds by Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding). The power to prohibit litigation that interferes with the jurisdiction of another
inferior court flows from the appellate court’s authority to require lower courts to proceed to
judgment. Nat'l Debenture Corp. v. Adams, 115 S.W.2d 757, 761 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1938, orig. proceeding). (“[T]he power to order one judge to proceed to trial and judgment in a
cause does, of itself, necessarily imply the power to prohibit all other judges from interference
with obedience to such order.”); Ward, 285 S.W. at 1068 (pointing out power to issue writ of
mandamus directing one trial judge to proceed to judgment necessarily implied correlative
authority to make all other orders, including those for prohibition and injunction, “to protect and
make efficacious” the exercise of mandamus authority). Judge Benson’s actions do not simply
represent a failure to give proper preclusive effect to the judgment of another court, Holloway v.
Fifth Court of Appeals, 767 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding), but rather constitute
active interference with the jurisdiction of the justice court. See In re Reliant Energy, Inc., 159
S.W.3d 624, 626 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (mandamus relief should be granted where trial
court has “actively interfered” with the jurisdiction of another court); In re SWEPI, L.P., 85
S.W.3d 800, 809 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding) (mandamus relief is appropriate when one court
interferes with another court's jurisdiction). Thus, the Court’s writ prohibiting Judge Benson
from taking action to interfere with the unappealed justice court judgments was proper.
Holland is also incorrect in arguing the Court lacked jurisdiction to order the
administrative judge of the Dallas County Civil Courts at Law to determine whether this case
should be transferred from County Court at Law No. 1 to another court to provide for the
“efficient operation of the court system and effective administration of justice” and to order the
presiding judge of the First Administrative Judicial Region to perform that duty if the
administrative judge of the Dallas County Civil Courts at Law was not able to perform that duty.
Holland does not dispute the local administrative judge is required to “supervise the expeditious
movement of court caseloads, subject to local, regional, and state rules of administration.” TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 74.092(a) (5) (West 2013). Nor does he deny the authority of the local administrative judge extends to implementing and executing “the local rules of administration,
including the assignment, docketing, transfer, and hearing of cases,” TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §
74.092 (a) (1), and that the local administrative judge must “coordinate and cooperate with any
other local administrative judge in the district in the assignment of cases in the courts’ concurrent
jurisdiction for the efficient operation of the court system and the effective administration of
justice.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.092(a)(10). He does not disagree that the regional
presiding judge has a mandatory statutory duty to act for the local administrative judge if the
local administrative judge does not perform her duties. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.046
(presiding judge shall perform the duties of local administrative judge when the local
administrative judge does not perform the duties required by subchapter D of the government
code). He contends, however, these statutes are “aimed at the broad operation of the courts,” but
“do not provide a basis to compel a transfer of the case.” Importantly, the Court did not compel
the transfer of the case. Rather, the Court ordered the local administrative judge to determine
whether the case should be transferred to provide for the efficient operation of the court system.
This is not tantamount to an order requiring the case to be transferred.
More significantly, however, despite the fact that it has been the prior practice of this
Court to refer, by means of court order, matters concerning the administration of the local district
and county courts to the regional presiding judge and local administrative judge, Holland
contends the Court lacks the power to refer such matters to the regional presiding judge and local
administrative judge for determination. We disagree. The order was a proper exercise of the
Court’s inherent power “to aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in the administration of justice,
and in the preservation of its independence and integrity,” Greiner v. Jameson, 865 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied), and to protect the “orderly trial” of cases within its
judicial district. Nat'l Debenture Corp., 115 S.W.2d at 761.
The Court’s inherent powers are “separate and distinct” from its jurisdictional power.
Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. 1979). They flow “from the very fact
that the state constitution has created and charged the court with certain duties and
responsibilities.” Greiner, 865 S.W.2d at 498. Of course, the most widely recognized inherent
power of any court is the power to enforce its judgments. “Every court having jurisdiction to
render a judgment has the inherent power to enforce its judgments.” Arndt v. Farris, 633 S.W.2d
497, 499 (Tex. 1982) (orig. proceeding); Greiner, 865 S.W.2d at 498. When the jurisdiction of a
court is invoked, as it was here by the filing of the multiple petitions for writ of mandamus that
have arisen in the course of this litigation, the court whose jurisdiction is invoked has the “power
to issue all writs necessary to enforce and protect its jurisdiction and to preserve the subject-
matter of the litigation in order to make its decrees effective.” Spiller v. Sherrill, 518 S.W.2d
268, 271 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1974, orig. proceeding).
The inherent powers of Texas appellate courts also include the power “to protect the
orderly trial of causes in courts lying within their respective districts, even against interference
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Order entered December 29, 2014
In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-14-00716-CV
IN RE VICTOR ENTERPRISES, INC., Relator
Original Proceeding from the County Court at Law No. 1 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC-09-07625-A
ORDER Before Justices Bridges, Lang-Miers, and Myers
Real party in interest Clifford Holland requests that the Court reconsider its jurisdiction
to render the writ of mandamus and order signed on October 27, 2014 in this case. We conclude
the Court properly exercised its jurisdiction in both instances.
Holland’s contention the Court lacked authority to order Judge Benson to refrain from
interfering with the unappealed justice court’s judgments is incorrect. Texas courts have long
recognized the power of an appellate court to prohibit litigation that interferes with an inferior
court’s judgment. Cleveland v. Ward, 285 S.W. 1063, 1068 (Tex. 1926) (orig. proceeding),
disapproved of on other grounds by Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding). The power to prohibit litigation that interferes with the jurisdiction of another
inferior court flows from the appellate court’s authority to require lower courts to proceed to
judgment. Nat'l Debenture Corp. v. Adams, 115 S.W.2d 757, 761 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1938, orig. proceeding). (“[T]he power to order one judge to proceed to trial and judgment in a
cause does, of itself, necessarily imply the power to prohibit all other judges from interference
with obedience to such order.”); Ward, 285 S.W. at 1068 (pointing out power to issue writ of
mandamus directing one trial judge to proceed to judgment necessarily implied correlative
authority to make all other orders, including those for prohibition and injunction, “to protect and
make efficacious” the exercise of mandamus authority). Judge Benson’s actions do not simply
represent a failure to give proper preclusive effect to the judgment of another court, Holloway v.
Fifth Court of Appeals, 767 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding), but rather constitute
active interference with the jurisdiction of the justice court. See In re Reliant Energy, Inc., 159
S.W.3d 624, 626 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (mandamus relief should be granted where trial
court has “actively interfered” with the jurisdiction of another court); In re SWEPI, L.P., 85
S.W.3d 800, 809 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding) (mandamus relief is appropriate when one court
interferes with another court's jurisdiction). Thus, the Court’s writ prohibiting Judge Benson
from taking action to interfere with the unappealed justice court judgments was proper.
Holland is also incorrect in arguing the Court lacked jurisdiction to order the
administrative judge of the Dallas County Civil Courts at Law to determine whether this case
should be transferred from County Court at Law No. 1 to another court to provide for the
“efficient operation of the court system and effective administration of justice” and to order the
presiding judge of the First Administrative Judicial Region to perform that duty if the
administrative judge of the Dallas County Civil Courts at Law was not able to perform that duty.
Holland does not dispute the local administrative judge is required to “supervise the expeditious
movement of court caseloads, subject to local, regional, and state rules of administration.” TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 74.092(a) (5) (West 2013). Nor does he deny the authority of the local administrative judge extends to implementing and executing “the local rules of administration,
including the assignment, docketing, transfer, and hearing of cases,” TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §
74.092 (a) (1), and that the local administrative judge must “coordinate and cooperate with any
other local administrative judge in the district in the assignment of cases in the courts’ concurrent
jurisdiction for the efficient operation of the court system and the effective administration of
justice.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.092(a)(10). He does not disagree that the regional
presiding judge has a mandatory statutory duty to act for the local administrative judge if the
local administrative judge does not perform her duties. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.046
(presiding judge shall perform the duties of local administrative judge when the local
administrative judge does not perform the duties required by subchapter D of the government
code). He contends, however, these statutes are “aimed at the broad operation of the courts,” but
“do not provide a basis to compel a transfer of the case.” Importantly, the Court did not compel
the transfer of the case. Rather, the Court ordered the local administrative judge to determine
whether the case should be transferred to provide for the efficient operation of the court system.
This is not tantamount to an order requiring the case to be transferred.
More significantly, however, despite the fact that it has been the prior practice of this
Court to refer, by means of court order, matters concerning the administration of the local district
and county courts to the regional presiding judge and local administrative judge, Holland
contends the Court lacks the power to refer such matters to the regional presiding judge and local
administrative judge for determination. We disagree. The order was a proper exercise of the
Court’s inherent power “to aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in the administration of justice,
and in the preservation of its independence and integrity,” Greiner v. Jameson, 865 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied), and to protect the “orderly trial” of cases within its
judicial district. Nat'l Debenture Corp., 115 S.W.2d at 761.
The Court’s inherent powers are “separate and distinct” from its jurisdictional power.
Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. 1979). They flow “from the very fact
that the state constitution has created and charged the court with certain duties and
responsibilities.” Greiner, 865 S.W.2d at 498. Of course, the most widely recognized inherent
power of any court is the power to enforce its judgments. “Every court having jurisdiction to
render a judgment has the inherent power to enforce its judgments.” Arndt v. Farris, 633 S.W.2d
497, 499 (Tex. 1982) (orig. proceeding); Greiner, 865 S.W.2d at 498. When the jurisdiction of a
court is invoked, as it was here by the filing of the multiple petitions for writ of mandamus that
have arisen in the course of this litigation, the court whose jurisdiction is invoked has the “power
to issue all writs necessary to enforce and protect its jurisdiction and to preserve the subject-
matter of the litigation in order to make its decrees effective.” Spiller v. Sherrill, 518 S.W.2d
268, 271 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1974, orig. proceeding).
The inherent powers of Texas appellate courts also include the power “to protect the
orderly trial of causes in courts lying within their respective districts, even against interference
by courts beyond the limits of such appellate jurisdiction.” Nat'l Debenture Corp., 115 S.W.2d
at 761. “[A] court's inherent power to administer justice must necessarily include the ability to
develop reasonable means to assure 1) that a cause is disposed of expeditiously and 2) that a
judgment becomes final and enforceable in an expeditious manner.” Rodriguez v. State, 970
S.W.2d 133, 135 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. ref'd). The Court may employ “suitable
methods” to attain these ends. Arndt, 633 S.W.2d at 499. The order to the local administrative
and regional presiding judges to make a determination whether the case should be transferred directly relates to the court’s jurisdiction over the multiple mandamus proceedings that have
been filed in this case and rests on the court’s inherent power to control the orderly trial of cases
within its district. In view of the unique circumstances of this case, it is a “suitable method” for
attaining these ends. Moreover, when acting in its administrative capacity, the Court may “direct
action irrespective of whether there has been an abuse of discretion or a violation of a legal duty”
by those who are directed to take action. In re Nolo Press/Folk Law, Inc., 991 S.W.2d 768, 776
(Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding).
Although we conclude the Court’s orders were within its authority to render, as we
previously advised the parties more than four and a half years ago, “our familiarity of the
pending case convinces us that a prompt judicial resolution of the parties’ dispute would best
serve the administration of justice.” To aid in the prompt administration of justice, on our own
motion we VACATE IN PART our order signed October 27, 2014, as follows. WE DO NOT
VACATE the portion of the order of October 27, 2014 granting the petition for writ of
mandamus, denying relator’s request for sanctions and attorney’s fees and ordering that relator
recover the costs of this original proceeding from real party in interest. We VACATE the
remainder of the order of October 27, 2014. WE DO NOT VACATE the writ of mandamus or
withdraw the opinion signed on October 27, 2014 and they remain in effect.
We trust that no further intervention by this Court will be necessary to enforce its orders
or to require the case to proceed to judgment, but will not hesitate to take whatever other steps
we conclude are appropriate, including requiring those who disobey the orders of this Court to
show cause why they should not be held in contempt.
/s/ DAVID L. BRIDGES JUSTICE