In re VAXART, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedMarch 19, 2026
Docket3:20-cv-05949
StatusUnknown

This text of In re VAXART, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION (In re VAXART, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re VAXART, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION, (N.D. Cal. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re VAXART, INC. SECURITIES Case No. 20-cv-05949-VC

LITIGATION. ORDER RE MOTIONS IN LIMINE Re: Dkt. Nos. 539, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 571

This summarizes the Court’s rulings on the parties’ motions in limine and motions to exclude expert testimony. As a reminder, a ruling on a motion in limine may be revisited at trial depending upon how the evidence comes in. See City of Pomona v. SQM North America Corporation, 866 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2017). The defendants’ motion to exclude expert Matthew Cain’s opinions regarding Section 20A damages is granted in part. Section 20A(b)(1) states that in private actions for insider trading, the total amount of damages imposed “shall not exceed the profit gained or loss avoided in the transaction or transactions that are the subject of the violation.” 15 U.S.C. § 78t- 1(b)(1). The plaintiffs seek to have their damages expert Cain testify about two alternative methods for calculating the cap on damages for the Section 20A claims. The first, which Cain calls “profit gained based on market prices,” is calculated by comparing the stock price when the defendants sold their stock to the price when they bought it. The second, which Cain calls “profit gained based on artificial inflation,” is calculated by estimating the amount of artificial inflation in the stock price due to the press release misrepresentations at the time the defendants sold their stock. For their part, the defendants argue that the Section 20A damages cap should instead be calculated based on the difference in the stock price when the defendants sold their stock and the price after the truth was fully revealed to the market. Cain will be permitted to testify only about the artificial inflation method for calculating the Section 20A damages cap. Cain’s market prices method and the defendants’ proposed method will be off limits. Although Section 20A does not specify how the profit gained or loss avoided should be calculated, the artificial inflation method reflects the best and most common-sense understanding of the statutory phrase, “profit gained or loss avoided in the transaction or transactions that are the subject of the violation.” Under the artificial inflation method, a defendant’s liability is capped at the total amount the defendant profited (or avoided losses) by trading on information that was unavailable to the rest of the investing public. In other words, a defendant is liable up to the total amount he gained by ripping off investors who didn’t have access to the inside information. By contrast, under Cain’s market prices method, a defendant would be liable for all profits gained from increases in the stock price over the period he owned it, which could include price increases wholly unrelated to the undisclosed information. Thus, depending on what price the defendant bought the shares at, the defendant might be liable for profits that have nothing to do with his harmful conduct. The same is true for the defendants’ proposed methodology based on the stock price after the truth was fully revealed: because the price may have changed after the defendant’s transactions for reasons other than the revelation of the inside information, the damages cap would be affected by price fluctuations unrelated to the harmful conduct. The artificial inflation method does the best job of measuring how much the defendant gained from trading while possessing inside information. This is also the only sensible way that Section 20A’s damages cap provision can interact with the contemporaneous trading period requirement that appears alongside it. As explained in a prior ruling, Section 20A’s contemporaneous trading requirement serves as a rough substitute for requiring privity between private plaintiffs and insider trader defendants while purposefully being overinclusive to allow anyone who might have traded with the defendant to recover. In re Vaxart, Inc. Securities Litigation, 2025 WL 3676949, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). Thus, the number of shares purchased by people in a Section 20A class will, by definition, be greater than the number of shares sold by the defendants, which means that the class members’ total damages have the potential to far exceed the amount the defendant gained from the insider trading. Applying the artificial inflation method ensures that total damages correspond to the defendant’s gain and thus strikes a balance between the relaxed proof requirement for plaintiffs to bring a Section 20A claim and the risk of imposing liability disproportionate to the defendant’s wrongful conduct (and wrongful gains from that conduct).1 The other proposed methods would not reliably achieve that balancing, because the damages cap would be dependent on other unrelated factors that may have increased or decreased the stock price during the relevant period. The cases cited by the plaintiffs and defendants in support of their other proposed methods do not undermine this analysis. For reasons already discussed, the Court is unpersuaded by the reasoning in favor of the market prices method in In re Allergan, Inc. Proxy Violation Securities Litigation, 2018 WL 3912934, at *41 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2018), and in favor of the defendants’ method in Kaplan v. S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P., 40 F. Supp. 3d 332, 339-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). To the extent caselaw from before the creation of the Section 20A statutory right of action assists in interpretation of the damages cap, it seems to confirm that liability should be limited to what the inside trader gained from the possession and use of the information. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1980).2 The defendants also argue that Cain should not be permitted to testify about the Section

1 The legislative history is sparse, but it seems to provide mild support for this interpretation of Section 20A. In a committee hearing on an earlier version of the bill, which did not include a damages cap for Section 20A claims, the SEC Chair proposed adding a damages cap that would limit liability “to the amount of profit gained or loss avoided by the defendant as a result of the violation.” Insider Trading, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. 41 (1988) (Serial No. 100- 225). The SEC Chair argued that a damages cap would avoid imposing “Draconian” liability on defendants given that Section 20A allows all contemporaneous traders to recover. Id. at 98-99. The next version of the bill after this hearing included a damages cap provision. This seems to suggest that when Congress added the damages cap provision, it was trying to accomplish what the SEC Chair was proposing. But even absent this piece of legislative history evidence, the Court would rule the same way, based on the text of the relevant statutory phrase and the context in which it appears in Section 20A. 2 The SEC Chair cited Elkind in support of his proposal for a damages cap. Id. at 41. 20A damages cap without also testifying about how to calculate Section 20A damages. But the number of shares purchased by the class during the contemporaneous trading period—the two days on which the defendants sold their shares while possessing inside information—is far greater than the number of shares actually sold by the defendants.

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Related

United States v. Reyes
660 F.3d 454 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
City of Pomona v. Sqm North America Corp.
866 F.3d 1060 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Kaplan v. S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P.
40 F. Supp. 3d 332 (S.D. New York, 2014)

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Bluebook (online)
In re VAXART, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-vaxart-inc-securities-litigation-cand-2026.