In Re Van Dyke

296 B.R. 591, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 938
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedAugust 11, 2003
Docket19-10853
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 296 B.R. 591 (In Re Van Dyke) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Van Dyke, 296 B.R. 591, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 938 (Mass. 2003).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON FIRST AND FINAL APPLICATION OF PHILIP M. STONE FOR FEES AND EXPENSES

JOEL B. ROSENTHAL, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter came before the Court for a hearing on the First and Final Application of Philip M. Stone for Fees and Expenses [# 69] and the Addendum thereto [# 74]. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court entered an order allowing the Application in full with the exception of $150.00 which the Applicant sought as reimbursement for a fee paid to a paralegal not employed by him. Instead the Applicant contracts with the paralegal, who has over 25 years of bankruptcy experience, on an as-needed basis to prepare bankruptcy schedules and Chapter 13 plans, for a negotiated flat fee. In this case, the Applicant sought reimbursement of $150 paid to the independent paralegal for the preparation of an amend *593 ed Chapter 13 plan. The Court took the issue of whether the Applicant should be reimbursed for the fee paid to the paralegal under advisement in order to address the responsibilities of attorneys and non-attorneys and to caution those practitioners who typically engage independent paralegals and such paralegals of the often imprecise boundaries that encircle the area known as the practice of law. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that the Applicant and the independent practitioner correctly observed their respective duties and responsibilities and thus the Application is now allowed in full.

Section 504 of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits the sharing of fees awarded pursuant to section 503(b)(2) 1 or 503(b)(4) except among members or employees of the same firm. 2 “By enacting § 504, ‘Congress sought to generally prohibit the sharing of compensation or fee splitting among attorneys in a bankruptcy case.’ In re Matis, 73 B.R. 228, 231 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1987). As explained more fully in In re Matis, the purpose of the statute is to ensure that lawyers preserve the integrity of the bankruptcy process and not treat ‘bankruptcy matters as matters of traffic.’ Id.” In re Warner, 141 B.R. 762, 765-66 (M.D.Fla.1992). Although many courts refer to the prohibition in section 504 as a prohibition of fee-sharing among attorneys, 3 the statute is more broadly drafted. It prohibits the sharing of compensation “with another person” who is not a member, partner, or employee of the retained professional’s firm. 11 U.S.C. § 504. See In re Soulisak, 227 B.R. 77, 81 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1998).

Because section 504’s express language includes lawyers and non-lawyers alike, this Court has denied reimbursement for an independent paralegal’s time in previous cases. See, e.g., In re Tarasiak, 280 B.R. 791 (Bankr.D.Mass.2002). In Tarasiak the Court concluded that the independent paralegal who prepared the debtor’s bankruptcy schedules and statement of financial affairs functioned as a professional for whom separate employment was required. Tarasiak, however, was originally commenced as a case under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and therefore raised other issues. 4

*594 In Tarasiak the Court did not address the issue of when services rendered by an independent paralegal in connection with the preparation of a debtor’s bankruptcy schedules and statements constituted the unauthorized practice of law. 5 “Attorneys who practice before a bankruptcy court must not only concern themselves with the obligations set forth in the Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, but also with the application of state ethical rules.” In re Soulisak, 227 B.R. at 80 (footnote omitted). Rule 5.5 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a lawyer from assisting a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law. “Whether a particular activity constitutes the practice of law is fact specific.” Massachusetts Conveyancers Ass’n., Inc. v. Colonial Title & Escrow, Inc., 13 Mass. L. Rptr. 633, 2001 WL 669280, *4 (Mass.Super.), citing In re Shoe Manufacturers Protective Ass’n, 295 Mass. 369, 372, 3 N.E.2d 746, 748 (1936). As the Shoe Manufacturers court stated

We believe it is impossible to frame any comprehensive and satisfactory definition of what constitutes the practice of law. To a large extent each case must be decided upon its own particular facts. But at least it may be said that in general the practice of directing and managing the enforcement of legal claims and the establishment of the legal rights of others, where it is necessary to form and act upon opinions as to what those rights are and as to the legal methods which must be adopted to enforce them, the practice of giving and furnishing legal advise as to such rights and methods and the practice, as an occupation, of drafting documents by which such rights are created, modified, surrendered or secured....

Shoe Manufacturers, 295 Mass. at 372, 3 N.E.2d at 748.

As recognized by the court in In re Ellingson, 230 B.R. 426, 433 (Bankr.D.Mont.1999), there is a split among the states as to whether just the completion of printed forms constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.

There is a split of authority whether preparation of preprinted legal forms constitutes unauthorized practice of law. Montana follows the majority view that preparation or filling in of blanks on preprinted forms constitutes the practice of law.... One district court, citing Pulse v. North Am. Land Title Co. [218 Mont. 275, 707 P.2d 1105, 1109 (1985) ], wrote on the unauthorized practice of law:
Preparation of legal documents is commonly understood to be the practice of law.... What constitutes “preparation” of “legal documents” is construed broadly. Preparation of instruments, even with preprinted forms, involves more than a mere scrivener’s duties and, therefore, constitutes the practice of law....

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In Massachusetts the issue has not be squarely addressed. Although in the Massachusetts Conveyancers Ass’n case, the court concluded that the title company engaged in the practice of law, the title company’s activities went well beyond the mere completion of a simple form.

*595 In preparation for the closing, Colonial reviews the lender’s closing documents for accuracy and consistency. On behalf of the lender and the title company, Colonial evaluates the title for defects and clears up those defects.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
296 B.R. 591, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 938, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-van-dyke-mab-2003.