In Re: Vallejo v. Federal National Mortgage Association

Ninth Circuit

In Re: Vallejo v. Federal National Mortgage Association

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJune 23, 2026

Docket24-7612

StatusUnpublished

This text of In Re: Vallejo v. Federal National Mortgage Association (In Re: Vallejo v. Federal National Mortgage Association) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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In Re: Vallejo v. Federal National Mortgage Association, (9th Cir. 2026).

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Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 23 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: EDUARDO ENRIQUE VALLEJO No. 24-7612

Debtor, BAP No. 23-1107 ---------------------------------------- MEMORANDUM* EDUARDO ENRIQUE VALLEJO,

Appellant,

v.

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION (FANNIE MAE),

Appellee.

Appeal from the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Gan, Corbit, and Spraker, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding

Submitted June 22, 2026**

Before: CANBY, BENNETT, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Eduardo Enrique Vallejo appeals pro se from the Bankruptcy Appellate

Panel’s (“BAP”) judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing his

adversary complaint. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review

de novo the BAP’s decision and apply the same standard of review that the BAP

applied to the bankruptcy court’s ruling. Licup v. Jefferson Ave. Temecula LLC (In

re Licup), 95 F.4th 1234, 1237 (9th Cir. 2024). We affirm.

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Vallejo’s

adversary complaint without leave to amend because amendment would have been

futile. See Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990) (setting

forth the standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend

is proper when amendment would be futile).

We do not consider issues not specifically and distinctly argued in the

opening brief or issues raised for the first time on appeal. See Roley v. Google

LLC, 40 F.4th 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2022).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

2 24-7612

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