In Re US Airways Group, Inc.

287 B.R. 643, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1675, 49 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1627, 2002 WL 31831449
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedOctober 2, 2002
Docket19-31012
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 287 B.R. 643 (In Re US Airways Group, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re US Airways Group, Inc., 287 B.R. 643, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1675, 49 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1627, 2002 WL 31831449 (Va. 2002).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

STEPHEN S. MITCHELL, Bankruptcy Judge.

A hearing was held in open court on September 26, 2002, on the third motion (Doc. # 417) filed by the debtors-in-possession on September 6, 2002, to reject an unspecified number of aircraft and engine leases and to abandon an unspecified number of encumbered aircraft and engines out of a pool of something over a hundred aircraft. Eighteen objections were filed by various financing entities. All but two of these were resolved by consent prior to the hearing. The remaining objections are those of Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (Doc. # 529) 1 and MetLife Capital, L.P. (Doc. # 595 and 607). 2 For the reasons stated, the court will overrule the objections and will grant the requested relief, but in a form slightly different than requested by the debtors in possession.

Background

US Airways Group, Inc., and seven of its subsidiaries and affiliates 3 filed voluntary petitions for reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in this court on August 11, 2002. They continue in operation of their business and possession of their estates as debtors in possession. US Airways represents that it is the seventh largest airline in the United States, and states that during 2001 it carried approximately 56 million passengers and generated operating revenues of $8.3 billion.

At the inception of the case, an order was entered allowing the debtors in possession to abandon (or reject leases with respect to) 57 specified aircraft and assoei *645 ated engines, all of which were stored in the desert and were not being used. A subsequent order gave the debtors authority to abandon (or reject leases with respect to) 10 additional aircraft and their associated engines. The present motion now seeks authority to do the same with respect to a not-yet-determined portion of an “pool” of more than 100 aircraft which the debtors’ financial advisors have identified as potential “dogs.” The debtors concede, however, that they do not intend to abandon or reject all of the aircraft in the pool. Basically, they seek authority, without further hearing or order of this court, to simply designate which aircraft in the pool will be abandoned or rejected. Their strategy is to attempt to renegotiate the terms of those loans and leases which they feel are financially burdensome and, at the end of the day, to retain only those aircraft in the pool that are needed for continued operations and are the least burdensome.

Discussion

A.

A trustee or debtor in possession may, after notice and a hearing, abandon any property of the estate “that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.” § 554(a), Bankruptcy Code. Similarly, a trustee or debtor in possession may, subject to the court’s approval, assume reject any unexpired lease to which the debtor is a party. § 365(a), Bankruptcy Code.

The objections before the court have two themes. The first is that until the debtors actually identify which specific aircraft in the pool they have decided to abandon or reject, the present motion is premature. The second is that the debtors should not be permitted to abandon or reject without complying with requirements in the underlying loan or lease agreements to return the aircraft and engines to a place designated by the lender or lessor, to reinstall any original engines that are not currently on the aircraft, and to provide all manuals, logs, certifications, and documentation.

B.

The standard in this Circuit for approving a request to reject an unexpired lease is whether the trustee or debtor in possession has exercised sound business judgment. Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1046 (4th Cir.1985) (“the bankrupt’s decision [to reject] ... is to be accorded the deference mandated by the sound business judgment rule as generally applied by courts to discretionary actions or decisions of corporate directors”). An unexpired lease is fundamentally an asset coupled with a liability: to obtain the benefit, the trustee or debtor in possession must perform all the obligations. Where the burden outweighs the benefit, the trustee or debtor in possession is allowed to reject the lease so as not to saddle the bankruptcy estate with an unwarranted expense. 4 A similar standard would apply to approval of a request to abandon encumbered property. If the debt exceeds the value of the encumbered property, there would ordinarily be no benefit to the estate, and the court’s review would be limited to ensuring that the trustee or debtor in possession *646 was not short-changing the estate by disposing of property that actually had some value.

As a conceptual matter, there is obviously no way by which the court can make a meaningful determination whether the debtors in possession have exercised sound business judgment in seeking to abandon a particular encumbered aircraft or to reject a particular unexpired aircraft lease when the debtor has not yet selected which aircraft are to be abandoned and which leases are to be rejected. Furthermore, to simply give a trustee or debtor in possession carte blanche to make that determination itself would be to abdicate the court’s essential supervisory role over the reorganization process.

In this case, however, there is another factor at play. What the debtors really seek is a kind of “fast track” authority that will let them effectuate abandonment or rejection prior to what they see as a looming deadline that could arguably make abandonment or rejection more expensive. Specifically, the automatic stay with respect to aircraft mortgages and leases terminates unless, before the date that is 60 days after the filing of the petition, the trustee or debtor in possession “agrees to perform” all obligations of the debtor under the security agreement or lease and cures any defaults. § 1110(a)(2), Bankruptcy Code. Additionally, the statute requires the trustee or debtor in possession “to immediately surrender and return” the aircraft if the lender or secured party “becomes entitled ... to take possession” because .of the termination of the stay. § 1110(c)(1), Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added). The debtors are concerned that the statute could be read in such a way that the estate would be required to shoulder, as an administrative expense, the costs of actually returning the aircraft (which might, for example, include the cost of reinstalling original engines where those engines had been removed for repair or overhaul) to the lenders or lessors, or to pay, as an administrative expense, the lenders’ or lessors’ costs of retrieving their aircraft and making them airworthy.

Whether this potential liability for administrative expenses would actually depend on whether the rejection or abandonment occurs prior to running of the 60-day period is an intriguing question, but one which the court need not decide at this time. 5

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
287 B.R. 643, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1675, 49 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1627, 2002 WL 31831449, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-us-airways-group-inc-vaeb-2002.