In Re UnitedHealth Group Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation

591 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 2008 WL 5422616
CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedDecember 24, 2008
Docket06-CV-1216, 27 CV 06-8085
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 591 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (In Re UnitedHealth Group Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re UnitedHealth Group Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 2008 WL 5422616 (mnd 2008).

Opinion

ORDER FOR PRELIMINARY SETTLEMENT APPROVAL

JAMES M. ROSENBAUM, District Judge.

This matter has been jointly considered by the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota and the District Court for the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Minnesota, Hennepin County (the “Courts”), on the parties’ motion for preliminary approval of a settlement. The motion is granted.

I. Background

More than two years ago, a Wall Street Journal article reported that certain exec *1027 utives, some of whom were employed at UnitedHealth Group, Inc. (“United-Health”), had received advantageously-timed stock options, dated to correspond to low points in the company’s share price. These allegations led to a number of state and federal lawsuits, including shareholder derivative actions against UnitedHealth, charging its current and former leadership with breach of fiduciary duty, gross mismanagement, waste of corporate assets, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract.

The UnitedHealth board of directors’ initial public response to these disclosures was to appoint a committee of independent directors, who then retained the firm of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP (“WilmerHale”) to investigate the allegations. The law firm’s investigators interviewed officers and directors of United-Health, with the exception of Dr. William McGuire, the company’s president and chief executive officer, and Mr. David Lub-ben, its secretary and general counsel. After investigating, WilmerHale issued an October, 2006, report which concluded that many option grants to UnitedHealth officers and employees were “likely backdated.” (Report of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP to the Special Committee of the Board of Directors of United Health Group, Inc., at 13 (October 15, 2006)). Following the issuance of the Wil-merHale report, defendants McGuire, Lubben, and William Spears, a board member, resigned.

In further response to the shareholder derivative actions, UnitedHealth’s board established a special litigation committee (“SLC”) in June, 2006. The SLC was charged with investigating and deciding whether to pursue the action on the company’s behalf. Nearly two and a half years later, the SLC recommended that the action be settled. The proposed settlement was tendered to the Courts in December, 2007. See Report of the Special Litigation Committee (December 6, 2007) (“SLC Report”).

The settlement consisted largely of transfers of UnitedHealth stock and options. When first proposed to the Courts, UnitedHealth shares traded at $54.33, rendering a settlement value between $499.3 million (Black Scholes) and $495.1 million (intrinsic). The corporation’s shares are now trading in the low-$20 range, reducing the settlement value to a range approximating $250 million, as of the date of this Order, and subject to market vagaries.

Having received the proposed settlement, the U.S. District Court certified a question to the Minnesota Supreme Court, seeking guidance regarding the degree of deference afforded an SLC’s settlement decisions under Minnesota’s business judgment doctrine. That question has been answered. In re UnitedHealth Group Incorporated Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 754 N.W.2d 544, 559 (Minn.2008).

With the Supreme Court’s answer in hand, the SLC, and each named party, now moves for preliminary approval of the proposed settlement. As the proposed settlement encompasses both the state and federal claims, the undersigned judges have jointly considered these matters and have independently found the proposed settlements fall within the range of possible settlements of these claims, and a full hearing ought to be set to consider their fairness and adequacy in accord with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 and Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 23.09.

II. Analysis

A special litigation committee has the power to terminate a derivative action to the extent allowed by the state of incorporation. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 486, 99 S.Ct. 1831, 60 L.Ed.2d 404 (1979); see also Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 95, 77 S.Ct. 1112, 1 L.Ed.2d 1205 *1028 (1957). As UnitedHealth is incorporated in Minnesota, the Courts looks to Minnesota law, as elucidated by the Minnesota Supreme Court.

Under Minnesota law, a board of directors may create a special litigation committee “consisting of one or more independent directors or other independent persons to consider legal rights or remedies of the corporation and whether those rights and remedies should be pursued.” Minn.Stat. § 302A.241, subd. 1 (2006). Once formed, the special litigation committee is “not subject to the board’s direction and control.” In re UnitedHealth Group Incorporated Shareholder Derivative Litigation (“UnitedHealth”), 754 N.W.2d 544, at 550 (Minn.2008). Thus, the special litigation committee allows the corporation to retain control of the litigation when one or more board members may have a conflict of interest.

A derivative action “belongs to the corporation, but the shareholders ... bring the action where the corporation has failed to take action for itself.” UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 559, citing Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn.2003). The SLC’s substantive decision to pursue the claims implicates a “careful balancing” of “legal, ethical, commercial, promotional, public relations, fiscal, and other factors familiar to the resolution of many if not most corporate problems.” Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 883. This balance “is best [struck] by the board of directors, which is familiar with the appropriate weight to attribute to each factor given the company’s product and history.” Id.

Minnesota law requires a court to “defer to an SLC’s decision to settle a shareholder derivative action if (1) the members of the SLC possessed a disinterested independence and (2) the SLC’s investigative procedures and methodologies were adequate, appropriate, and pursued in good faith.” UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 559. In making this choice, Minnesota explicitly adopted the New York Court of Appeals’ business judgment rule set forth in Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y.1979). While Auerbach involved a corporate motion to dismiss, rather than a proposal to settle a shareholder derivative litigation, the Minnesota Supreme Court made clear its rule applies with equal force in the context of settlement. UnitedHealth, id. at 559.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Charlotte Kokocinski v. Arthur D. Collins, Jr.
850 F.3d 354 (Eighth Circuit, 2017)
In Re Unitedhealth Group Incorporated Pslra Litig.
643 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Minnesota, 2009)
In re UnitedHealth Group Inc. PSLRA Litigation
643 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Minnesota, 2009)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
591 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 2008 WL 5422616, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-unitedhealth-group-inc-shareholder-derivative-litigation-mnd-2008.