In re United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc.

138 B.R. 426, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3895
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedMarch 26, 1992
DocketCiv. A. Nos. 91-489-JJF, 91-601-JJF and 91-602-JJF
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 138 B.R. 426 (In re United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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In re United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc., 138 B.R. 426, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3895 (D. Del. 1992).

Opinion

OPINION

FARNAN, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is the motion of United Merchants and Manufacturing, Inc. (“UM & M”) to dismiss the bankruptcy appeal filed by the ILGWU National Retirement Fund (“the Fund”), and UM & M’s motion for an appeal bond. UM & M contends that the Court should dismiss the Fund’s appeal because substantial consummation of the reorganization plan of UM & M has rendered the appeal moot.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court will not dismiss the appeal and will not require the Fund to post an appeal bond.

FACTS

On November 2, 1990, United Merchants and Manufacturing, Inc., Jonathan Logan, Inc., and United Merchants Trucking, Inc., filed petitions under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq.). The Fund filed a proof of claim for each Chapter 11 proceeding stating that it would have a claim against the debtors, if they ceased operations. The Fund asserted that a cessation of operations by the debtors would trigger withdrawal liability, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), equal to $28 million.

On June 19, 1991, the debtors filed a Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization (“Second Plan”), creating nine classes of claims for distribution. Class VIII of the Second Plan consisted of general unsecured creditors with claims exceeding $500. The debtors also established a Disputed Claims Reserve, a set-aside of sufficient securities, to provide for distribution to claimants after resolution of the contested claims. The debtors intended to fund the [428]*428Disputed Claims Reserve with stock allocated to Class VIII. If the amount in the reserve fell short of the amount of claims, the debtors intended to provide a pro rata distribution of the securities.

UM & M filed motions seeking approval of the sale of the debtor UM & M’s Rose Marie Reid and Imerman divisions (the “Divisions”) which were operations covered under ERISA, on August 1, 1991. The Fund allegedly did not receive notice of the motions until August 5, 1991, the last day to object to the Second Plan. Fund’s Answering Brief to Motion to Dismiss Appeals (“Fund’s Answering Brief”), p. 6. In addition, the Fund allegedly did not object earlier to the Second Plan because it relied on certain representations regarding the potential sale made to the Fund by UM & M. Fund’s Answering Brief, pp. 5-6, 8. On August 12, the Fund filed its objection to the Second Plan based on the size of the Disputed Claims Reserve, along with a motion seeking leave to file its objection after August 5, 1991. On August 15, 1991, the Bankruptcy Court denied the Fund’s motion for leave to file its objection, and confirmed the Second Plan of UM & M.

On August 23, 1991, the Bankruptcy Court approved the sale of the Divisions.2

On August 23, 1991, the Fund filed notices of appeal from the Confirmation Order and the Bankruptcy Court’s order denying the Fund’s motion for leave to file an objection. On August 28, the Fund sought an injunction against further stock distributions to Class VIII claimants. Two days later, on August 30, 1991, the Fund filed a motion in the Bankruptcy Court seeking a more limited remedy of a partial stay of further Class VIII distributions. The Bankruptcy Court heard and denied the Fund’s motion for a partial stay on September 5, 1991. On September 5, the Fund requested a stay in this Court, which the Court granted on September 9, 1991, and subsequently extended by Order dated October 4, 1991.

DISCUSSION

The controversy between the parties centers on the distribution of securities to holders of Class VIII claims. The Fund claims that the Disputed Claims Reserve contains insufficient funds to satisfy its purported $28 million claim of withdrawal liability, which the Fund contends is triggered by a sale of the Divisions.

A. The Mootness Question

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated that a court must dismiss an appeal as moot upon the occurrence of an event preventing the appellate court from granting any effective relief. In re Abbotts Dairies of Pennsylvania, Inc., 788 F.2d 143, 150 n. 6 (3d Cir.1986); see also Miami Center Limited Partnership v. Bank of New York, 820 F.2d 376, 379 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823, 109 S.Ct. 69, 102 L.Ed.2d 46 (1988) (concluding that “an appeal is not moot if the court can still order some effective relief”).

In deciding mootness questions regarding appeals from bankruptcy decisions, the Court must consider several factors: (1) whether “substantial consummation” of the bankruptcy plan or a comprehensive change of circumstances has occurred; (2) whether the appellant has obtained a stay pending appeal; and (3) the nature of the relief sought by the appellant. Ultimately, the Court should not dismiss a case as moot if it can effectively grant relief. In re Combined Metals Reduction Company, 557 F.2d 179 (9th Cir.1977).

Section 1101(2) of Chapter 11 defines “substantial consummation” as the distribution of substantially all property under the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(2). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in In re Roberts Farms, Inc., 652 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir.1981), declined to question a confirmation order after substantial consummation, expressing concern about affording finality to judgments of the bank[429]*429ruptcy court. The Ninth Circuit found that implementation of the plan had proceeded so far that effective relief could no longer be granted. Id. Nonetheless, substantial consummation does not sufficiently justify dismissal for mootness in all circumstances. In re Combined Metals Reduction Company, 557 F.2d 179 (9th Cir.1977); see also In re AOV Industries, Inc., 792 F.2d 1140 (D.C.Cir.1986).

Although the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that much of an appeal was moot in In re AOV Industries, Inc., 792 F.2d 1140 (D.C.Cir.1986), the D.C. Circuit did consider whether effective relief was still available considering broader principles of mootness. Id. at 1147-1148 (and considering the “line of Ninth Circuit decisions”). In AOV Industries, the D.C. Circuit stated that “Roberts Farms does not stand for a bright-line rule that ‘substantial consummation’ forecloses any possibility of relief from court- and creditor-approved reorganization plans.” Id. at 1148. In addition, the D.C.

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138 B.R. 426, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3895, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-united-merchants-manufacturers-inc-ded-1992.