In Re Underhill

425 B.R. 614, 63 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1239, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 514, 2010 WL 749987
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Utah
DecidedMarch 1, 2010
Docket19-21196
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 425 B.R. 614 (In Re Underhill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Underhill, 425 B.R. 614, 63 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1239, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 514, 2010 WL 749987 (Utah 2010).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION

R. Kimball MOSIER, Bankruptcy Judge.

The matter before the Court is the confirmation of the amended chapter 13 plan proposed by Fredrick A. Undershill (Debt- or) and MidFirst Bank’s (MidFirst) objection to confirmation. For the reasons set forth herein, confirmation of the Debtor’s amended chapter 13 plan will be denied.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Debtor has had two bankruptcy cases pending and dismissed within the year prior to the filing of this case. Debt- or’s first bankruptcy was filed December 15, 2008. The Court dismissed that case on February 26, 2009. Debtor’s second bankruptcy was filed March 31, 2009 and was dismissed on August 10, 2009. This case was filed October 1, 2009. The Debt- or did not file a motion under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(B) 1 requesting the Court order the stay under § 362(a) take effect.

MidFirst is a creditor in this case with a claim secured only by a security interest in the Debtor’s personal residence. The Debtor has failed to make all payments due to MidFirst and is in default on his agreement with MidFirst.

The Debtor filed an chapter 13 plan on October 16, 2009. An amended chapter 13 plan (Plan) was filed on January 13, 2010. The Plan proposes to cure the Debtor’s prepetition default with MidFirst through the Plan and provides that regular postpe-tition payments will be paid directly by the Debtor. On November 10, 2009, MidFirst objected to confirmation of the original chapter 13 plan and did not withdraw its objection to confirmation of the Plan.

On November 17, 2009, MidFirst filed an ex parte application for an order pursuant to § 362(c)(4)(A)(ii) confirming that no § 362(a) stay is in effect. Pursuant to MidFirst’s application, the Court entered an order on November 20, 2009 confirming that no stay is in effect.

ANALYSIS

MidFirst argues that § 362(c)(4)(A) applies in this case, the § 362(c)(4)(D) presumption establishes that the Debtor’s petition was not filed in good faith, and the proposed Plan cannot be confirmed because it does not comply with § 1325(a)(7). MidFirst also argues that confirming a chapter 13 plan that proposes to cure the Debtor’s prepetition default with MidFirst “is a de facto reinstatement of the automatic stay and impermissibly circumvents the statutory scheme established by Congress to reinstate a stay.” Although not expressly stated by MidFirst, apparently its argument is that the Plan does not comply with the other provisions of the Code as required by § 1325(a)(1).

*617 MidFirst’s objection requires this Court to examine the relationship between §§ 362(c)(4), 1325, and 1327. The issue in this case is whether the Court may confirm a chapter 13 plan in a case where § 362(c)(4)(A) is applicable if a secured creditor objects to confirmation of a plan that proposes to cure a prepetition default on the secured creditor’s claim. 2

A. Section 362(c)(4).

Congress enacted § 362(c)(4) with Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 as a means to discourage bad faith repeat filings. Section 362(e)(4) provides in pertinent part:

(4) (A)(i) if a single or joint case is filed by or against a debtor who is an individual under this title, and if 2 or more single or joint cases of the debtor were pending within the previous year but were dismissed, other than a case refiled under section 707(b) the stay under subsection (a) shall not go into effect upon the filing of the later case; and
(ii) on request of a party in interest, the court shall promptly enter an order confirming that no stay is in effect;
(B) if, within 30 days after the filing of the later case, a party in interest requests the court may order the stay to take effect in the case as to any or all creditors (subject to such conditions or limitations as the court may impose), after notice and a hearing, only if the party in interest demonstrates that the filing of the later case is in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed;
(D) for purposes of subparagraph (B), a case is presumptively filed not in good faith (but such presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary)- — ...

Pursuant to § 362(c)(4)(A), if a case is filed by a debtor and two or more cases of the debtor were pending within the previous year but were dismissed the § 362(a) stay does not go into effect. A creditor is not stayed from numerous actions including enforcing a lien that arose before the commencement of the case against property of the estate. Section 362(c)(4)(B) allows the court to order the stay to take effect if, within 30 days after the filing of the case, a party in interest makes a request that the court order the stay to take effect and rebuts the presumption that the case is not filed in good faith.

B. Relation of § 362(c)(4)(D) to § 1325(a)(7) and (3).

MidFirst contends that the Court may not confirm the Plan because the action of the Debtor in filing the petition was not in good faith as required by § 1325(a)(7) and the Plan was not filed in good faith as required by § 1325(a)(3). MidFirst did not introduce any evidence to support its argument that the Plan and petition were not filed in good faith but relies on § 362(c)(4)(D). MidFirst argues that because the Debtor did not request that the Court order the stay to take effect pursuant to § 362(c)(4)(B), the Debtor’s case is presumptively filed not in good faith and therefore the Plan is not filed in good faith and cannot be confirmed. MidFirst is essentially arguing that the § 362(c)(4)(D) *618 presumption is applicable to all sections of the Bankruptcy Code where the Debtor’s good faith in filing a bankruptcy petition is a relevant inquiry.

The express language of § 362(c)(4)(D) limits its application to § 362(c)(4)(B). Section 362(c)(4)(D) states “for purposes of subparagraph (B), a case is presumptively filed not in good faith (but such presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary) — ...” (emphasis added). If the Court were to ignore the words “for purposes of subparagraph (B),” the terms would be reduced to surplusage. Courts should be reluctant to treat statutory terms as surplusage in any setting. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31, 122 S.Ct. 441, 151 L.Ed.2d 339 (2001). It is elementary that “[i]n construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). If a statute is susceptible to two meanings, a court will choose a meaning that gives full effect to all the provisions of the statute. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana,

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Bluebook (online)
425 B.R. 614, 63 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1239, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 514, 2010 WL 749987, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-underhill-utb-2010.