In Re Turboff

93 B.R. 523, 3 Tex.Bankr.Ct.Rep. 24, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 1982, 1988 WL 128338
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedOctober 24, 1988
Docket19-31065
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 93 B.R. 523 (In Re Turboff) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Turboff, 93 B.R. 523, 3 Tex.Bankr.Ct.Rep. 24, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 1982, 1988 WL 128338 (Tex. 1988).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LETITIA Z. CLARK, Bankruptcy Judge.

Came on for hearing the Emergency Motion for Authority to Disburse Funds to the Internal Revenue Service filed by Debtor, Jerald A. Turboff, and after considering the pleadings, memoranda and arguments of counsel, the court enters the following Order. To the extent any findings of fact herein are construed to be conclusions of law, they are hereby adopted as such. To the extent any conclusions of law herein are construed to be findings of fact, they are hereby adopted as such.

On July 27, 1987 a voluntary Chapter 11 reorganization petition was filed on behalf of Debtor, Jerald A. Turboff. Thereafter, on January 29, 1988 the court granted a Motion for Authority to Sell Property of the Estate whereby the Debtor’s ten percent (10%) interest in certain property known as the Longpoint Shopping Center was sold, generating approximately sixty-five thousand, six hundred sixty-seven dollars, and sixty-nine cents ($65,667.69) which is presently being held by the Debtor subject to further order of this court. In addition, on February 25, 1988 the court authorized the Debtor to sell certain real property in Windermere Subdivision, Piney Point Village which sale resulted in proceeds approximating thirty-six thousand, four hundred thirteen dollars, and eight cents ($36,413.08), said sums held by Debt- or and also subject to further orders of this court. On April 14, 1988 the Debtor filed an Emergency Motion for Authority to Disburse Funds to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to which two creditors, First Texas Savings Association (First Texas) and Gertner, Aron & Ledet Investments (“GALI”), filed objections.

The Debtor, with the advice of his accountant, determined that for the calendar year ending December 31, 1987, additional federal income taxes were due and owing in an approximate amount of ninty thousand dollars ($90,000.00). In order to avoid incurring penalties and interest, all tax liabilities were to be paid as of April 15, 1988. Debtor claims to have insufficient funds to make the required payment and thus proposes that the tax liability be paid by using the proceeds of the previously authorized sales.

First Texas objected to the use of the sale proceeds for payment of the Debtor’s individual income taxes for 1987 on various grounds. These include the following: 1) use of the proceeds would give special treatment to the IRS as a pre-petition creditor by allowing IRS a higher priority than that prescribed by 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7), which outlines the priority of various claims; 2) payment of taxes should be considered and provided for pursuant to an approved Plan of Reorganization; 3) taxes that are due and owing are partially the obligation of the Debtor’s spouse who is not a party to the present bankruptcy; and 4) Debtor’s motivation for requesting payment out of the sale proceeds in order to avoid penalties and interest is unfounded as the Internal Revenue Code provides relief for failure to make timely payment of a tax due to the pendency of a bankruptcy case.

GALI also objected to Debtor’s use of the sale proceeds. GALI contends that if payment from the sale proceeds is allowed, it would give the tax liability a higher priority than it is accorded under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a). In addition, GALI claims that the Debtor had the sum of thirty-three thousand, three hundred nine dollars ($33,- *525 309.00) available as of March 31, 1988 to apply to the taxes owed. Further, GALI contends that the Debtor’s spouse has approximately twenty-one thousand dollar ($21,000.00) in a liquid investment account which should also be used for payment of the taxes since this liability is partially an obligation of Debtor’s spouse.

The initial issue to be resolved by this court is whether the bankruptcy estate is liable for the estimated income taxes. The statute applicable to resolution of this issue is Section 1398 of the Internal Revenue Code which details how federal income tax attributes and liabilities are to be allocated between the bankruptcy estate and the debtor. 26 U.S.C. § 1398. The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 added § 1398 to the Internal Revenue Code and includes specific rules with regard to an individual debtor who enters certain bankruptcy proceedings. Pub.L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389 (1980). The rules set forth in the Act apply to any bankruptcy case of an individual debtor brought under Chapter 7 (relating to liquidations) or Chapter 11 (relating to reorganizations) of Title 11 of the United States Code, which commences on or after March 25, 1981.

Prior to 1980, the Internal Revenue Code did not provide rules concerning the bankruptcy estate of an individual debtor. Nevertheless, the Internal Revenue Service took the position that the estate, which was an entity created under the bankruptcy laws, was a new, separate entity, which necessitated the filing of a return for the estate if the gross income of the estate was at least six hundred dollars ($600.00). Rev. Rul. 72-387, 1972-2 CB 632; Rev.Rul. 78-134, 1978-1 CB 197. Consequently, there was uncertainty and litigation concerning the liability of the bankruptcy estate and the debtor for federal income taxes. The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 was designed to provide the first comprehensive statutory treatment of these issues. Federal Tax Aspects of Bankruptcy § 3.01 et seq.; Committee Report on P.L. 96-589.

Under the 1980 Act, when an individual enters a bankruptcy proceeding under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, a separate taxable entity is created which succeeds to the assets, liabilities, and certain tax attributes of the debtor. The separate entity is called the bankruptcy estate and is wholly distinct from the individual for income tax purposes, and each entity must file separate income tax returns for the period of the bankruptcy proceeding. 26 U.S.C. § 1398. With regard to the individual debtor, once the bankruptcy estate is established, the debtor may irrevocably elect to close his or her taxable year at the date of bankruptcy. 26 U.S.C. § 1398(d)(2).

If the election under § 1398(d)(2) is made, the debtor’s taxable year, which otherwise would include the commencement date of the bankruptcy, is divided into two “short” taxable years of less than twelve months. The first such year ends on the day before the commencement date and the second such year begins on the commencement date. 26 U.S.C. § 1398(d)(2)(A). If the election were not made, the commencement of the bankruptcy case does not affect the taxable year of an individual debt- or. 26 U.S.C. § 1398(d)(2).

As a result of a debtor’s making the election, his or her Federal income tax liability for the first short taxable year becomes (under bankruptcy law) an allowable claim against the bankruptcy estate as a claim arising before bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
93 B.R. 523, 3 Tex.Bankr.Ct.Rep. 24, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 1982, 1988 WL 128338, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-turboff-txsb-1988.