In Re Trumbas

245 B.R. 764, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 254, 35 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 231
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedMarch 14, 2000
Docket19-10764
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 245 B.R. 764 (In Re Trumbas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Trumbas, 245 B.R. 764, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 254, 35 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 231 (Mass. 2000).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION’S MOTION TO MODIFY CHAPTER 13 PLAN

CAROL J. KENNER, Bankruptcy Judge.

The issue before the Court is whether the post-petition appreciation in the value of a chapter 13 debtor’s real property, in the absence of its sale or refinance, warrants approval of an unsecured creditor’s proposed modified plan pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a). For the reasons set forth below, I hold that, under the facts of this case, the mere increase in value of a chapter 13 debtor’s home, without more, is not cause to allow an unsecured creditor’s motion to modify a post-confirmation chapter 13 plan.

BACKGROUND

The underlying facts are not in dispute. Maria Trumbas (“Debtor”) filed for relief under chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code on February 8, 1995. According to her bankruptcy schedules the Debtor works in the laundry department of the Hebrew Rehabilitation Center where, in 1995, she earned $1,618.00 gross per month. She owns and lives in a three-family house at 82 Wyman Street in Brockton, Massachusetts. 1 When the Debtor filed her petition in 1995, she valued the house at $35,000.00.

The Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA”) is the holder of a $180,-737.57 first mortgage on the property. 2 On November 2, 1995, FNMA and the Debtor entered into a stipulation valuing the property at $40,000.00 and bifurcating FNMA’s claim into a secured claim of $40,000.00 and an unsecured claim of $140,737.57.

The Court confirmed the Debtor’s chapter 13 plan (“Plan”) on February 21, 1996. The effective date of the sixty-month Plan is April 1, 1995. About four years into her Plan, on July 19, 1999, the Debtor filed a motion for authority to incur secured debt to refinance her home in which she states the fair market value of the property is $131,000.00. 3 The Debtor sought to borrow $104,800.00 against the property to pay off the remaining cram-down balance of FNMA’s mortgage ($9,805.41) and the total due to unsecured creditors under the Debtor’s Plan ($15,366.00), thereby obtaining her discharge. The Chapter 13 Trust *766 ee and FNMA both filed objections to the motion, which the Debtor then withdrew.

On November 3, 1999, FNMA filed a motion to modify the Debtor’s Plan under § 1329(a) and a proposed plan. FNMA’s plan envisions that the Debtor will make a lump sum payment of $131,000.00 which would provide a 90.69% dividend to unsecured creditors. See Proposed Plan at p. 4, ¶ VI(i). According to the new plan “the funds to be paid to unsecured creditors should be obtained by the Debtor’s refinancing the property.” See id. at p. 1.- The Debtor filed an objection to FNMA’s motion. On December 13, 1999, the Court held a hearing. The Court ordered the Debtor to file an affidavit with respect to her intentions to refinance or sell the property; the Debtor filed her affidavit on December 16, 1999. 4 In her affidavit, the Debtor swears that she does not intend to either sell or refinance her house in the future; that it is her permanent home; and that she is in the process of retiring from her employment. The parties filed supplemental memoranda and the Court took the matter under advisement.

DISCUSSION

Section 1329(a) of the Bankruptcy Code permits the debtor, the chapter 13 trustee, and the holder of an allowed unsecured claim to request modification of a chapter 13 plan prior to the completion of payments for three purposes:

a.[to] increase or reduce the amount of payments on claims of a particular class provided for by the plan;
b. [to] extend or reduce the time for such payments; or
c. [to] alter the amount of the distribution to a creditor whose claim is provided for by the plan to the extent necessary to take account of any payment of such claim other than under the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a) (West, 1994).

Courts have struggled with the proper interpretation and application of this provision. 5 See In re Barbosa, 236 B.R. 540, 546-47 (Bankr.D.Mass.1999) order aff'd 243 B.R. 562 (D.Mass.2000) and cases cited therein. The fundamental difficulty in this section is its lack of a standard to determine when and whether an upward or downward modification of a post-confirmation chapter 13 plan is appropriate. By its terms, § 1329 does not provide any guidance for modification and some courts have interpreted the statute as granting the parties an absolute right to request modification. See In re Barbosa, 236 B.R. at 547 adopting approach set forth in Matter of Witkowski, 16 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir.1994); but see Arnold v. Weast (In re Arnold), 869 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.1989); see also In re Rangel, 233 B.R. 191 (Bankr.D.Mass.1999).

Although there may be an absolute right to request modification of a plan between confirmation and completion of plan payments, it does not necessarily follow that there is an automatic right to have the request allowed. As a practical matter, a party requesting modification of a post-confirmation chapter 13 plan must *767 have a legitimate reason for doing so, and the party must strictly conform to the three limited circumstances set forth in the statute. In re Barbosa, 236 B.R. at 548. Furthermore, a modified plan must otherwise be confirmable and cannot exceed the Court’s authority over the debtor or creditors. See, e.g., In re Barbosa, 236 B.R. at 556; In re Martin, 232 B.R. 29, 37 (Bankr.D.Mass.1999). Thus, for example, a bankruptcy court cannot confirm a modified plan that does not provide a secured creditor with the full value of its claim as required by § 1325(a)(5). Similarly, a court cannot confirm a modified plan that exceeds the sixty-month limit of § 1322(d) or that forces the debtor to obtain a second job or to involuntarily incur new debt.

Unlike chapter 7 which contemplates payment of creditors from the liquidation of assets, the chapter 13 statutory scheme is oriented toward the payment of creditors from projected future earnings of debtors who have regular income. See In re Barbosa, 236 B.R. at 545; City of Chicago v. Fisher (In re Fisher), 203 B.R. 958, 959-60 (N.D.Ill.1997). It provides a vehicle through which an honest debtor can achieve fiscal rehabilitation by devoting all disposable income into a plan to pay creditors. Section 1329 is intended to promote.

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Bluebook (online)
245 B.R. 764, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 254, 35 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 231, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-trumbas-mab-2000.