In Re Trueman

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

In Re Trueman

393 S.E.2d 569, 99 N.C. App. 579, 1990 N.C. App. LEXIS 520

CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina

DecidedJuly 17, 1990

Docket8930DC671

StatusPublished

Cited by9 cases

This text of 393 S.E.2d 569 (In Re Trueman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In Re Trueman, 393 S.E.2d 569, 99 N.C. App. 579, 1990 N.C. App. LEXIS 520 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).

Pincite

Opinion

PHILLIPS, Judge.

That under the provisions of G.S. 7A-289.23 and G.S. 50A-3 the District Court of Jackson County has jurisdiction over this proceeding to terminate respondent’s parental rights to the subject child — which is a resident of that county and in the custody of his mother there pursuant to a decree of that court — is manifest and not contested. It is also clear that the action is in rem, as the court ruled. For the parent-child relationship is a status, as *581 is that of husband and wife, Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws Secs. 69-79 (1971), and under G.S. l-75.3(c) a suit to adjudicate a “status” is an in rem proceeding. But that an action is in rem does not dispense with the constitutional requirement that a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident must be consistent with due process under the standard established by International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977); Balcon, Inc. v. Sadler, 36 N.C. App. 322, 244 S.E.2d 164 (1978). See Note, Miller v. Kite: Should Domestic Disputes Require the Maximum of Minimum Contacts?, 64 N.C.L. Rev. 825 (1986). The first requirement of that long-established standard statutory authority to exert jurisdiction is clearly present in this instance; but the other requirement, that the person sued has had enough minimum contacts with the state to satisfy due process standards if required to defend the action here, is not. Respondent’s only contact with this state, according to the record, is that his child was brought here by his former wife, is in her custody here, and such support payments as he has made under the Wisconsin court order have been sent here by the court. In Miller v. Kite, 313 N.C. 474, 329 S.E.2d 663 (1985), the defendant, whose contacts with the state greatly exceeded those of the respondent and included several visits to the child here, was deemed not to be subject to the jurisdiction of our courts. In view of that decision, we are obliged to hold that the meager contacts this respondent has had with the state are insufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction over him in this proceeding, and therefore reverse the order appealed from.

Reversed.

Judges EAGLES and ORR concur.

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PHILLIPS, Judge.

That under the provisions of G.S. 7A-289.23 and G.S. 50A-3 the District Court of Jackson County has jurisdiction over this proceeding to terminate respondent’s parental rights to the subject child — which is a resident of that county and in the custody of his mother there pursuant to a decree of that court — is manifest and not contested. It is also clear that the action is in rem, as the court ruled. For the parent-child relationship is a status, as *581 is that of husband and wife, Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws Secs. 69-79 (1971), and under G.S. l-75.3(c) a suit to adjudicate a “status” is an in rem proceeding. But that an action is in rem does not dispense with the constitutional requirement that a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident must be consistent with due process under the standard established by International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977); Balcon, Inc. v. Sadler, 36 N.C. App. 322, 244 S.E.2d 164 (1978). See Note, Miller v. Kite: Should Domestic Disputes Require the Maximum of Minimum Contacts?, 64 N.C.L. Rev. 825 (1986). The first requirement of that long-established standard statutory authority to exert jurisdiction is clearly present in this instance; but the other requirement, that the person sued has had enough minimum contacts with the state to satisfy due process standards if required to defend the action here, is not. Respondent’s only contact with this state, according to the record, is that his child was brought here by his former wife, is in her custody here, and such support payments as he has made under the Wisconsin court order have been sent here by the court. In Miller v. Kite, 313 N.C. 474, 329 S.E.2d 663 (1985), the defendant, whose contacts with the state greatly exceeded those of the respondent and included several visits to the child here, was deemed not to be subject to the jurisdiction of our courts. In view of that decision, we are obliged to hold that the meager contacts this respondent has had with the state are insufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction over him in this proceeding, and therefore reverse the order appealed from.

Reversed.

Judges EAGLES and ORR concur.

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Bluebook (online)

393 S.E.2d 569, 99 N.C. App. 579, 1990 N.C. App. LEXIS 520, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-trueman-ncctapp-1990.

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