In re: Troy Robinson

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedApril 19, 2016
Docket16-11304
StatusPublished

This text of In re: Troy Robinson (In re: Troy Robinson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re: Troy Robinson, (11th Cir. 2016).

Opinion

Case: 16-11304 Date Filed: 04/19/2016 Page: 1 of 11

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 16-11304-D ________________________

IN RE: TROY ROBINSON,

Petitioner.

__________________________

Application for Leave to File a Second or Successive Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) _________________________

Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges:

ORDER:

Troy Robinson seeks authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 motion. We can authorize such a filing only if we certify that the second or

successive motion is based on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to

cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.”

28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). Robinson was sentenced using the Armed Career Criminal

Act (ACCA), which requires a minimum 15-year sentence when a defendant with

three “violent felony” or “serious drug offense” convictions commits certain Case: 16-11304 Date Filed: 04/19/2016 Page: 2 of 11

firearms offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). ACCA gives three definitions of “violent

felony.” First, § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) covers any offense that “has as an element the use,

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”

This is known as the “elements clause.” Second, § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) covers any

offense that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or

otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to

another.” The first 9 words of that subsection are called the “enumerated crimes

clause,” and the last 13 are called the “residual clause.”

Robinson’s application is based on Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ___,

135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which held that ACCA’s “residual clause” is

unconstitutional. This Court held months ago that Johnson cannot serve as the

basis for a second or successive § 2255 motion because the Supreme Court did not

“make” Johnson retroactive. See In re Franks, No. 15-15456, __ F.3d __ (11th Cir.

Jan. 6, 2016). The Supreme Court has held that the rule announced in Johnson is

retroactive because it is a substantive rule of constitutional law. See Welch v.

United States, No. 15-6418, 2016 WL 1551144 (Apr. 18, 2016). This means

Franks is no longer good law.

However, even without Franks, the rule announced in Johnson does not

benefit Robinson. Robinson’s ACCA sentence was based on convictions for two

2 Case: 16-11304 Date Filed: 04/19/2016 Page: 3 of 11

serious drug offenses, as well as convictions for armed robbery and for aggravated

battery with a firearm. All these convictions were for Florida offenses. Even if the

armed robbery offense doesn’t count under the residual clause because of Johnson, it

appears to contain “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of

physical force against the person of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i); see

United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 2011). So does the

aggravated battery with a firearm offense. See United States v. Hill, 799 F.3d 1318,

1321–22 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI

(Medium), 709 F.3d 1328, 1341 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). Neither Johnson nor

any other case suggests that Robinson’s armed robbery and aggravated battery

offenses don’t count as ACCA predicates under the “elements clause.” Indeed our

precedent says otherwise. This means Robinson’s sentence is valid even without

ACCA’s “residual clause.”

APPLICATION DENIED.

3 Case: 16-11304 Date Filed: 04/19/2016 Page: 4 of 11

MARTIN, Circuit Judge, concurring in judgment:

I agree that Troy Robinson cannot benefit from Johnson v. United States, 576

U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), because his sentence is valid even without the

residual clause. I write separately to note that Mr. Robinson is one of dozens of

prisoners who has tried to file similar applications based on Johnson. Prior to

yesterday’s decision in Welch v. United States, No. 15-6418, 2016 WL 1551144

(Apr. 18, 2016), all these applicants were turned away from our Court not because

Johnson wouldn’t benefit them but because our Court held that Johnson could not

apply in these cases. Some of those who filed applications in other courts have

already been freed because they were serving an unconstitutional prison sentence.1

As best I can tell, all the prisoners we turned away may only have until June 26,

2016, to refile applications based on Johnson. See Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S.

353, 359, 125 S. Ct. 2478, 2482–83 (2005).

Although I have not taken the time to investigate the merits of these cases,

below is a list of every case I know of in which this court denied an application from

a prisoner seeking to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition based on

1 See, e.g., Rivera v. United States, No. 3:13-cv-1742 (D. Conn. Oct. 6, 2015) (“Rivera’s successive motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is GRANTED. Rivera’s immediate release is ordered, because he has now served more than the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Price, No. 2:15-cv-292 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 25, 2015) (ordering a sentence reduction that “would appear to result in [a successive habeas petitioner]’s immediate eligibility for release from prison”). 4 Case: 16-11304 Date Filed: 04/19/2016 Page: 5 of 11

Johnson. I share this list in the hope that these prisoners, who filed their

applications without a lawyer’s help, may now know to refile their applications. I

have separated out the cases that arise under the residual clause in the Armed Career

Criminal Act (ACCA) and the cases that arise under the identical language in United

States Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.2 (which includes cases for which the

guidelines were mandatory together with those for which the guidelines were

advisory).2 I have also listed the district court in which each sentence was imposed,

to the extent Federal Public Defender and U.S. Attorney offices are monitoring these

cases.

ACCA cases

1. In re McGee, No. 15-13369 (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015) (M.D. Fla.)

2. In re Rose, No. 15-13247 (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2015) (M.D. Fla.)

2 I include this last category of cases even though our Court has ruled that Johnson doesn’t apply to the advisory guidelines. See United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2015).

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Related

United States v. Lockley
632 F.3d 1238 (Eleventh Circuit, 2011)
Dodd v. United States
545 U.S. 353 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Michael Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI (Medium)
709 F.3d 1328 (Eleventh Circuit, 2013)
Johnson v. United States
576 U.S. 591 (Supreme Court, 2015)
Israel Ramirez v. United States
799 F.3d 845 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
United States v. Tywan Hill
799 F.3d 1318 (Eleventh Circuit, 2015)
United States v. Antonio Frazier
621 F. App'x 166 (Fourth Circuit, 2015)
United States v. Calvin Matchett
802 F.3d 1185 (Eleventh Circuit, 2015)
United States v. George Darden
605 F. App'x 545 (Sixth Circuit, 2015)
United States v. Chad Taylor
803 F.3d 931 (Eighth Circuit, 2015)
United States v. Madrid
805 F.3d 1204 (Tenth Circuit, 2015)
United States v. Soto-Rivera
811 F.3d 53 (First Circuit, 2016)
United States v. Dean
169 F. Supp. 3d 1097 (D. Oregon, 2016)

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