In Re Tripplet

84 B.R. 84, 2 Tex.Bankr.Ct.Rep. 291, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 408, 1988 WL 26642
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Texas
DecidedJanuary 11, 1988
Docket19-50427
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 84 B.R. 84 (In Re Tripplet) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Tripplet, 84 B.R. 84, 2 Tex.Bankr.Ct.Rep. 291, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 408, 1988 WL 26642 (Tex. 1988).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

R. GLEN AYERS, Jr., Chief Judge.

Once again, this Court must attempt to determine the effect of an assignment of *86 rents clause in a deed of trust coupled with a collateral document assigning rents upon stated events of default. The dispute arises in the context of a rather ordinary Chapter 11 case involving rental property. Max Triplett (hereinafter “Debtor”), borrowed large sums from the creditor, Principal Mutual Life Insurance Company (hereinafter “Creditor”). The debt is secured by real property which produces an income stream. The security interest is properly perfected by a Deed of Trust and a “Collateral Assignment of Lease and Rents.” The Deed of Trust contains a clause allowing the creditor to collect rents on default. The “Collateral Assignment” is a separate document, purporting to assign all rents as of the inception of the lending transactions. However, the Debtor, under the terms of the “Collateral Assignment,” was granted a license to collect rents until default.

Prior to the petition in bankruptcy, default was declared, the license to collect rents was revoked, the creditor demanded that the tenants pay the rents over to it, and the creditor actually collected some rents. Now, the Debtor seeks to use the rents as “cash collateral” under 11 U.S.C. § 363. The Creditor’s response is simple; it claims to own the leases and rents and alleges that the rents are no longer collateral.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The facts, as should be evident from the introduction, are not in dispute. The notes, deed of trust, and “Collateral Assignment” are stipulated to be valid. Demand was made on the Debtor on August 27, 1987; the notes were accelerated on September 25, 1987. Thereafter, demand was made directly on the tenants by the creditor. The parties stipulate that the assignment was valid and that the license was revoked.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

There are essentially two ways to approach this issue. One is by analogy to Article 9 and has the advantage of simplicity and predictability. To do so would ignore the language of the agreements (contracts) between the parties. The second is to attempt to deal with the actual contractual language of the documents and apply the existent cases to that language.

A. The Article 9 Analogy

To set the stage, it is necessary to return briefly to the documents and see what the documents purport to do. The documents create, in the deed of trust, a security interest or lien in both realty and rents derived from realty. However, because Texas is a “lien theory” state, a mortgagee has no right to collect rents until foreclosure. See Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex.1981). Pending foreclosure, rents may be garnished (from tenants) or subjected to other equitable proceedings such as a receivership. 1 See Betzen v. Exxon Corp., 699 S.W.2d 352, 354-55 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1985).

However, the documents in this case purport to transfer an increment of ownership in leases and rents to the Creditor. The “Collateral Assignment,” on its face, states that, as of the inception of the lending transaction, the leases and rents have been alienated by the mortgagor and that the Creditor “owned” those assets from the inception of the lending relationship. Pending default, the debtor/mortgagor collected the rents under a license granted by the “Collateral Assignment.” In similar cases, some courts have given effect to the language and found a “sale” or “transfer” of ownership, rather than a pledge of rents as collateral. See e.g., Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating Corp., 18 Cal.2d 256, 115 P.2d 450, 453-54 (1941).

Other courts have refused to find anything other than a form of pledge of collateral. See cases cited at id., 115 P.2d 453. The analogy to Article 9 is apparent. Section 9-102(l)(a) reads as follows:

(1) Except as otherwise provided ..., this Article applies
*87 (a) to any transaction (regardless of form) which is intended to create a security interest in personal property or fixtures ...

By ignoring the language of the contracts between the Debtor and Creditor, it is clearly possible to argue that the legal intent of the transaction reflected by the deed of trust and “Collateral Assignment” was to make rents collateral for the debt and to create a mechanism allowing the creditor to collect rents pending foreclosure without resort to equity.

Thus, irrespective of the actual verbage of the contract between the parties to the agreements concerning assignment, license, etc., all that is present is a security interest in rents. The rents remain collateral, and 11 U.S.C. § 363 would allow use of cash collateral if the statutory requirement of “adequate protection” could be shown.

This approach has advantages. First, it is simple and predictable. Rents are always treated as collateral (or almost always collateral, unless extremely persuasive facts are present). 2

Further, it makes reorganization more likely, for to give effect to the agreements makes reorganization impossible. As my opinion in In re Fry Road Assoc’s Ltd., 66 B.R. 602, 604-05 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1986) stresses, without the income stream, most real property reorganizations must fail. If the documents are given effect in this case, the rents have been finally and irrevocably alienated. Unless the Debtor can find operating expenses from some other source (including new or replacement leases, one supposes), there is no fund for use by the Debtor. 3 Bankruptcy policy, then, would encourage use of the Article 9 analogy.

However, the Article 9 analogy is lacking in several respects. Section 9-102, as quoted above, is a statement of public policy by the legislature. Where security interests in personalty are concerned, the legislature has created a single mechanism for perfection of security interests as a matter of policy. This is a proper and arguably exclusive legislative function. It is not necessarily a proper judicial function. Therefore, the Article 9 analogy suffers from the weakness of being judge-made law. Such judge-made law violates the fundamental tenets of Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 917-18, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979):

“Congress has left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankruptcy’s estate to state law.
Property interests are created and defined by state law.

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Bluebook (online)
84 B.R. 84, 2 Tex.Bankr.Ct.Rep. 291, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 408, 1988 WL 26642, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-tripplet-txwb-1988.