In Re: Toshihide Tanimura, And Satoko Tanimura

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: March 9, 2026
• Docket: 87760-7
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Marriage of No. 87760-7-I Toshihide Tanimura, DIVISION ONE Respondent, UNPUBLISHED OPINION v.

Satoko Tanimura,

Appellant.

DÍAZ, J. — Toshihide Tanimura petitioned for divorce from his ex-wife,

Satoko Tanimura, and asked the court to distribute their property. The court

credited cryptocurrency which Toshihide 1 had purchased and then lost as part of

his share of the community property. Satoko claims the court erred by setting the

value of the cryptocurrency at its purchase price rather than its alleged market

value at the time of their trial. We conclude the court did not err because it had

substantial evidence for its valuation, and we affirm.

1 Because the parties share a last name, we refer to them by their first names to

avoid confusion. We intend no disrespect. No. 87760-7-I/2

I. BACKGROUND

Toshihide and Satoko married in April 1996 and separated in June 2023.

Trial was held in January 2025.

In the court’s overall distribution of their assets and liabilities, it awarded

Satoko 53% of the total community property and awarded Toshihide 47%. Among

that property was cryptocurrency Toshihide had purchased during the marriage

with community funds without notifying Satoko.

At trial, Toshihide testified he no longer had access to this asset. He

explained he had lost a small physical device containing the code to access the

cryptocurrency because he had forgotten about it after putting it under the seat of

a vehicle which subsequently broke down. For her part, Satoko argued the court

should value the cryptocurrency based on its increased market price at the time of

trial before deciding how to divide it.

Though the court voiced some skepticism with regard to both parties’

presentation of facts about the cryptocurrency, it found Toshihide had credibly

testified the currency was lost and unlikely to be found. And the court decided to

distribute the property as an asset to Toshihide in the amount of shared funds he

had used to buy it, such that he alone absorbed its loss. Thus, under the label

“Crypto Investment (lost),” the court valued the cryptocurrency at “$43,000” and

included it as community property awarded to Toshihide.

II. ANALYSIS

Satoko claims the court erred in distributing the cryptocurrency to Toshihide

at its purchase price of $43,000 rather than at its alleged market value at the time

2 No. 87760-7-I/3

of trial. Her opening brief also argues we should hold that the court erred, as a

matter of law, to the extent it based its reasoning on evidence about the

cryptocurrency’s worth at the time of separation. However, she later concedes,

“the only issue before the Court is about the value at which the cryptocurrencies

should be disposed of under RCW 26.09.080.” We agree that is the dispositive

issue.

Property valuation in marital dissolution proceedings is a question of fact

which we review for substantial evidence. In re Marriage of Porter, 3 Wn.3d 579,

588, 555 P.3d 379 (2024). In reviewing for substantial evidence, we defer to the

factfinder on matters of witness credibility and the persuasiveness of evidence. In

re Marriage of Akon, 160 Wn. App. 48, 57, 248 P.3d 94 (2011). “Substantial

evidence exists if the record contains evidence of sufficient quantity to persuade a

fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the declared premise.” In re Marriage

of Griswold, 112 Wn. App. 333, 339, 48 P.3d 1018 (2002) (quoting Bering v.

SHARE, 106 Wash.2d 212, 220, 721 P.2d 918 (1986)). Under this standard, we

hold that substantial evidence supports the court’s decision to value the

cryptocurrency at its purchase price of $43,000.

First, we note that the court made a number of credibility determinations as

it reached its decision about how to value the cryptocurrency. In particular, it

considered whether Toshihide had credibly explained that he had indeed lost the

currency, contrary to Satoko’s suggestion that he might end up finding it.

“[O]verall, the Court found [Toshihide] sincere in his testimony and therefore

credible.” The court also found that Satoko herself confirmed that the car in which

3 No. 87760-7-I/4

he claimed he left the code to the cryptocurrency had in fact broken down, thereby

partially corroborating his account. We leave these credibility determinations

undisturbed. Akon, 160 Wn. App. at 57. Thus, we do not have an ever-growing

asset.

Instead, we are left to assess whether there is substantial evidence for the

remaining findings the court made to support its decision to value the

cryptocurrency at its purchase price. Namely, the court found it “was not presented

with sufficient proof of the value of the cryptocurrency as of the date of separation”

because “the exhibits presented showed a volatile market for this asset.” It

elaborated that, on the one hand, the trial exhibits had shown “significant changes

in values, showing spikes and valleys” and neither party had provided it with “any

credible testimony attesting to the value of the cryptocurrency . . . on the date of

separation.” “On the other hand,” the court reasoned, it had “received undisputed

testimony that [Toshihide] used $43,000 of community funds to purchase the

cryptocurrency.” Id. We hold that the following evidence provides a basis to

persuade a fair-minded rational person of these findings. Griswold, 112 Wn. App.

at 339.

The court heard testimony that Toshihide purchased the cryptocurrency for

$43,000. It also heard testimony, and the exhibits showed, that the market value

for cryptocurrency fluctuated from when Toshihide purchased it to when he lost it,

and again from the time of the parties’ separation to trial. The court thus had

substantial evidence to conclude that it lacked information as to the value per unit,

4 No. 87760-7-I/5

unless it chose to “speculate on my own as to where it was on the graph,” which it

declined to do.

In short, Satoko has not shown the record lacks a basis for finding the

cryptocurrency’s market price was inconsistent and there was incomplete

information about its value at the date of separation, in contrast to the amount of

communal funds Toshihide had spent which was undisputedly $43,000.

In response, Satoko makes several additional arguments which are

unavailing. First, she repeatedly avers Toshihide committed “fraud” by purchasing

the cryptocurrency without her knowledge, and, therefore, that the court erred in

the “measure of damages” it awarded.

The court, however, was not required to make any finding as to whether

Toshihide committed “fraud.” Nor did the court refuse to base its division of

community property on such a finding. Instead, the court found that Toshihide had

acted in an irresponsible manner and factored that finding into its valuation, stating:

“the Court has accounted for his significant loss in sound judgment in keeping such

a valuable asset in his car by awarding [Satoko] more of the community assets,

about $60,000 more, and making [Toshihide] singularly bear the loss of this asset

in the distribution.”

Satoko next contends that “RCW 26.09.080 required the trial court to

dispose the cryptocurrencies at [their] value as of the date of the trial.” That statute

says no such thing, nor do any of the cases Satoko cites. On the contrary, this

court has held that courts in divorce proceedings have broad discretion to pick an

5 No. 87760-7-I/6

equitable date on which to assign value to property. Koher v. Morgan, 93 Wn. App.

398, 404, 968 P.2d 920 (1998).

Finally, for the first time in reply, Satoko asserts the court erred by awarding

Toshihide the cryptocurrency as his separate property. That is inaccurate in light

of the record which shows it was distributed as his portion of community property. 2

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

2 Satoko also requests fees on appeal under RCW 26.09.140. As the trial court found, she has not established that she is entitled to fees vis-à-vis Toshihide’s financial resources. Thus, fees are not warranted. In re Marriage of Harrington, 85 Wn. App. 613, 635, 935 P.2d 1357 (1997). 6