In Re Tony W. H.

CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedDecember 12, 2012
DocketM2012-01526-COA-R3-PT
StatusPublished

This text of In Re Tony W. H. (In Re Tony W. H.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Tony W. H., (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs October 31, 2012

IN RE TONY W. H. ET AL.1

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Dickson County No. 1111099CC A. Andrew Jackson, Judge

No. M2012-01526-COA-R3-PT - Filed December 12, 2012

Mother of two children appeals an order terminating her parental rights. Both children were taken into Department of Children’s Services custody after they tested positive for cocaine. The trial court found several grounds for termination and determined that termination is in the children’s best interests. Mother contends the trial court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence that termination of her rights is in the best interest of the children. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed

A NDY D. B ENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which F RANK G. C LEMENT, J R., and R ICHARD H. D INKINS, JJ., joined.

Peggy R. Smith, White Bluff, Tennessee, for the appellant, Candace H.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter, and Aaron E. Winter, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services.

OPINION

F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL H ISTORY

Tony H. (“Father”) and Candace H. (“Mother”) are the parents of Tony H., Jr. and Madison H. born August 11, 2004 and March 22, 2006, respectively. The children were taken into Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) custody on March 17, 2011, after both children tested positive for cocaine. On September 14, 2011, the Dickson County Juvenile

1 This Court has a policy of protecting the identity of children in parental termination cases by initializing the last names of the parties. Court entered an order adjudicating the children “dependent, neglected and severely abused.” The Family Permanency Plan attached to the September 14 order included a section describing the events or conditions leading to DCS custody as follows:

When interviewing [Mother], she stated that there was no need for a drug screen, that she would test positive for cocaine and opiates. A urine drug screen was completed and she tested positive for methadone in addition to cocaine and opiates. During the interview, [Mother] relayed that the only time cocaine was in their home was when her husband received a large load, and that he then took the cocaine to another location. . . . She denied knowing how her son would test positive for cocaine . . . [Tony H., Jr.] told a DCS worker on 03/17/2011, that he knew how to roll the “green crumbly stuff” in a cigarette. He also said that you could take a pill and pour the white stuff out, and use a straw to suck it up your nose. . . .

On November 9, 2011, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents.2 On June 1, 2012, the juvenile court held a hearing on the petition at which the DCS caseworker, Father, and Mother testified. The court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights on June 20, 2012. Specifically, the court found the following grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence: severe abuse, under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(4), substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2), and persistence of conditions, under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3). The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the best interests of the children. Mother appeals.

S TANDARD OF R EVIEW

A parent’s right to the care, custody, and control of their child is a recognized liberty interest protected by the federal and state constitutions. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Nash-Putnam v. McCloud, 921 S.W.2d 170, 174 (Tenn. 1996). Consequently, the state may interfere with parental rights only if there is a compelling state interest. Nash- Putnam, 921 S.W.2d at 174-75 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)).

Tennessee’s termination statutes identify situations in which the state’s interest in a child’s welfare justifies interference with a parent’s constitutional rights. In re W.B., IV, No. M2004-00999-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 1021618, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2005) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)). To support the termination of parental rights, petitioners must prove both the existence of at least one of the statutory grounds for termination and that

2 This appeal only concerns Mother.

-2- termination is in the child’s best interest. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(1); In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 860 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

Because of the fundamental nature of the parent’s rights and the grave consequences of the termination of those rights, courts require individualized decision making and a higher standard of proof in deciding termination cases. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769; In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 188 (Tenn. 1999); In re M.W.A., Jr., 980 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). Thus, both the grounds for termination and the best interest inquiry must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c); In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002). Clear and convincing evidence “establishes that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable, and eliminates any serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.” In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 653 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citations omitted). Such evidence “produces in a fact-finder’s mind a firm belief or conviction regarding the truth of the facts sought to be established.” Id.

In light of the heightened burden of proof required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(c)(1), a reviewing court must adapt the customary standard of review set forth by Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Id. at 654. First, we review the trial court’s findings of fact de novo with a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise, in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Id. Next, we must determine whether the facts, as found by the trial court or as supported by the preponderance of the evidence, clearly and convincingly establish the elements necessary to terminate parental rights. Id.

A NALYSIS

Mother contends the trial court erred in holding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the children.

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Related

Stanley v. Illinois
405 U.S. 645 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Santosky v. Kramer
455 U.S. 745 (Supreme Court, 1982)
In Re Giorgianna H.
205 S.W.3d 508 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 2006)
In Re Swanson
2 S.W.3d 180 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1999)
In Re Audrey S.
182 S.W.3d 838 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 2005)
Nash-Putnam v. McCloud
921 S.W.2d 170 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1996)
In Re Valentine
79 S.W.3d 539 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2002)
In re M.W.A.
980 S.W.2d 620 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 1998)
In re M.J.B.
140 S.W.3d 643 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 2004)

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In Re Tony W. H., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-tony-w-h-tennctapp-2012.