In Re Tomlan

88 B.R. 302, 19 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 783, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 1221, 62 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5719, 1988 WL 80751
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Washington
DecidedAugust 1, 1988
Docket19-00484
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 88 B.R. 302 (In Re Tomlan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Tomlan, 88 B.R. 302, 19 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 783, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 1221, 62 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5719, 1988 WL 80751 (Wash. 1988).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION

JOHN M. KLOBUCHER, Bankruptcy Judge.

The issue in this case is whether a Chapter 13 debtor is entitled to the discharge of an 11 U.S.C. section 507 priority debt when the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has not timely filed a proof of claim.

THE FACTS

The debtor, Betty Tomlan, filed her petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on September 19, 1984. 11 U.S.C. section 1301 et seq. The notice sent to her creditors provided that proofs of claim were to be filed on or before January 16, 1985.

Tomlan proposed a plan which provided for payments to the IRS of $39,975, to a secured creditor of $4,200, and to the debt- or’s attorney for attorney’s fees. Payments to other creditors would be paid outside the plan. The plan provided that section 507 priority claims were to be paid in full in deferred cash payments.

The IRS filed its proof of claim in the total amount of $49,277.70 on January 21, 1985, five days after the last date to file a proof of claim. The proof of claim filed by the government was divided into three separate claims consisting of a secured claim, an unsecured priority claim, and a general unsecured claim. 1

Tomlan filed an Objection to the IRS claim on May 31, 1985. The debtor alleged that the amount claimed by the IRS was incorrect and that part of the secured claim would be unsecured. On June 3, 1985, Tomlan filed a Modified Plan which provided that the debtor would pay 100% of “allowed claims” to the IRS.

On June 13, 1985, after filing both the Objection to Claim and the Modified Plan, the debtor filed an Amended Objection to the IRS proof of claim. In the Amended Objection, the debtor alleged, among other things, 2 that since the proof of claim was *304 filed after the January 16, 1985 deadline, the IRS claim should be disallowed. The IRS responded to the debtor’s Amended Objection. In order to delineate the issues, the debtor filed a Second Amended Objection on August 2, 1985, reiterating the debtor’s objection to the timeliness of the filing of the IRS claim and asserting that the entire claim should be disallowed and discharged upon completion of the debtor’s plan.

DISCUSSION

The discharge provisions in a Chapter 13 case are set forth in 11 U.S.C. section 1328. 3 With the exception of two types of debt not relevant to this case, 4 section 1328(a) provides for the discharge of all debts which are either “provided for by the plan or disallowed under section 502.” 11 U.S.C. section 1328(a). Thus, the code section sets forth two conditions, either of which, when met, will result in the IRS claim being discharged. If the IRS claim is either “provided for by the plan” or “disallowed under section 502,” the claims of the government will be discharged upon the debtor’s completion of her plan. The IRS admits that its claim was not timely filed under Bankruptcy Rule 3002(a). Nevertheless, the IRS asserts that its claim will not be discharged.

Was the IRS Claim Disallowed Under Section 502?

The filing of proofs of claims is provided for in 11 U.S.C. section 501. 5 While the section states who may file claims, it does not establish what makes the filing of a proof of claim timely. In a Chapter 13 case, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c), 6 a proof of claim must be filed within 90 days of the first meeting of creditors. Fed.R.Bankr.P. 3002(c). Although Rule 3002(c)(1) permits the Court to extend the time for filing a claim by the United States on motion of the United States before the expiration of the time and for cause shown, the Court does not have dis *305 cretionary authority 7 to enlarge the time after the period has expired. Fed.R. Bankr.P. 3002(c)(2) and 9006(b)(3); In re Chirillo, 84 B.R. 120 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1988). Such a rule is necessary for the efficient administration of the estate because it establishes a specific time after which the debtor, creditor, trustee, and the Court know that the last claim has been filed. The IRS did not move for an extension of time to file its claim and acknowledges that its proof of claim was filed after the January 16, 1985 bar date. Therefore, under Rule 3002(c), the IRS claim, which is untimely, cannot be allowed. However, whether the IRS claim should be discharged because it is not allowed is a different issue.

Section 502 8 provides for both allowance and disallowance of claims. Un *306 der subsections (a), (b), and (c), claims are either deemed allowed, allowed after notice and hearing, or estimated for purposes of allowance respectively. Subsection (d) disallows the claim of a party who has received an avoidable preference or failed to turnover property of the estate. Subsection (e) disallows claims by co-debtors, sureties, and guarantors to the extent the claim of the creditor is disallowed. Both subsections are inapplicable to the IRS claim. Various factual circumstances are set forth in subsections (f) through (i) relating to involuntary cases, rejection of exec-utory contracts, claims arising from the recovery of property, and post-petition tax claims. Again, these sections which refer to the allowance of a claim under subsections (a), (b) or (c) and the disallowance of a claim under subsections (d) or (e) are not-relevant to this case. Subsection (j) provides for the reconsideration of claims which have been allowed or disallowed.

The debtor asserts that the IRS claim is disallowed under section 502(a) because it was untimely filed under section 501 and Bankruptcy Rule 8002. In essence, the debtor contends that the claim is disallowed under section 502 because it was not allowed under Rule 3002. In order for the IRS claim to be “disallowed under section 502,” the claim must be disallowed under subsection (d) or (e). Since the claim is not one of a co-debtor, surety or guarantor, and the IRS is not a party who has received a preference or failed to turnover property belonging to the estate, there is no basis to disallow the claim under section 502.

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Related

Daniel v. United States (In Re Daniel)
107 B.R. 798 (N.D. Georgia, 1989)
Matter of Ungar
104 B.R. 517 (N.D. Georgia, 1989)
Ledlin v. United States (In Re Tomlan)
102 B.R. 790 (E.D. Washington, 1989)
Matter of Miller
100 B.R. 898 (N.D. Ohio, 1989)

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Bluebook (online)
88 B.R. 302, 19 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 783, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 1221, 62 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5719, 1988 WL 80751, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-tomlan-waeb-1988.