NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2020 IL App (3d) 180086-U
Order filed April 6, 2020 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
In re T.M., a Person Found Subject to ) Appeal from the Circuit Court Involuntary Commitment and Involuntary ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit, Medication ) Peoria County, Illinois ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) ) Appeal No. 3-18-0086 Petitioner-Appellee, ) Circuit No. 18-MH-23 ) v. ) ) T.M., ) Honorable ) Alicia N. Washington Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Lytton and Justice Wright concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: Trial court did not err when it granted the State’s petitions to involuntarily admit T.M. where the evidence established that T.M. was mentally ill and due to his mental illness he could harm himself or others or was unable to care for himself. The trial court did err when it granted the State’s petition for involuntary administration of psychotropic medication where the State failed to provide adequate written information about the medication it wished to administer. ¶2 T.M. was the subject of petitions for involuntary admission and involuntary administration
of psychotropic medication. The trial court granted both petitions. T.M. appealed. We affirm the
trial court’s grant of the petition for involuntary admission and reverse its order granting the
petition for involuntary administration of psychotropic medication.
¶3 FACTS
¶4 The State filed petitions for involuntary admission and involuntary administration of
psychotropic medication concerning T.M. and a hearing took place on the State’s petitions on
January 23, 2018. T.M.’s mother, Debbera H., testified. T.M., who was 30 years old, had a history
of mental illness and was treated with medication for attention-deficient/hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD) from the age of 6 to the age of 15, when he stopped taking his medication. He engaged
in criminal activities when he was young, such as robbing the neighbors’ houses and spent the last
15 to 16 years in and out of prison. He had recently been doing alright until he started smoking
crack cocaine and K2, a synthetic cannabinoid. At this point in the testimony, T.M. inserted that
he liked K2 because it allowed him to zone out.
¶5 Debbera continued. T.M. had been working at Burger King but quit after he started
smoking the drugs. T.M. interjected that he quit his job because everyone was talking and tripping
him out. Debbera described that in the last three months, T.M.’s troubling behaviors included
threatening to blow his head off, stating Satan took his soul and talking improperly about the Bible.
He had previously made threats about a gun, which he knew how to use. T.M. had been living with
her until four months earlier when she kicked him out because he had been smoking K2 in her
garage. T.M. again interjected, stating that he also stole money from her, which he said was the
main reason she kicked him out.
2 ¶6 On cross-examination Debbera admitted T.M. had been bathing and eating and had not
caused any physical harm in the last three months, although she expressed that she had seen a
deterioration in T.M.’s ability to reason or communicate in that time period.
¶7 Thomas Boyd, a second-year resident training to be a psychiatrist, testified that he had
examined T.M. that morning and every day for the past eight days. He shared his personal
observations of T.M. and stated that he was treating T.M. for unspecified psychosis. Boyd
prescribed Zyprexa for T.M., who refused to take it.
¶8 Narayan Reddy, a medical doctor and psychiatrist, testified. He was T.M.’s treating doctor
during his involuntary hold. T.M. was admitted by his mother because of his delusions. He needed
prompting to bathe and eat and was helped by aids. T.M. had a history of mental illness and he
submitted that his drug use might have caused a “flair of the underlying [mental illness]
symptoms.” Reddy believed a six-month period was needed to reach a diagnosis. He also stated
that T.M.’s behaviors in the hospital supported a mental illness diagnosis. However, Reddy could
not determine whether T.M. was suffering from the side effects of K2 or from mental illness. He
opined that were T.M. not admitted, he would engage in harmful activities. Reddy specifically
mentioned T.M. might follow through with his threats to acquire a gun to blow out his brains if
released.
¶9 T.M. moved for a directed verdict, arguing the State had not proved T.M. suffered from
mental illness because the doctors did not know if T.M.’s psychotic behavior was caused by mental
illness or was a side effect from using K2. The trial court granted the directed verdict, finding that
T.M.’s behavior was caused by either mental illness or the drug’s side effects. T.M. was discharged
following the hearing.
3 ¶ 10 On January 24, 2018, the State filed another petition for the involuntary commitment of
T.M. and a petition for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. The admission
petition alleged that T.M. suffered from mental illness and as a result of his mental illness; he was
likely to harm himself or others; he could not provide for his basic needs; he was unable to
understand the need for treatment; and he was in need of immediate hospitalization. The petition
further provided that T.M. heard voices telling him to rape a nurse; he believed that people were
pursuing him; he was on a high security alert by the government; he was being pursued by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and needed to flee; he was able to hear everyone’s thoughts;
and he was in need of immediate hospitalization.
¶ 11 The petition for involuntary administration of psychotropic medication stated that T.M.
had a mental illness with active psychosis and threats of harm to himself and others and that T.M.
lacked the capacity to give informed consent to his treatment. The petition referred to Zyprexa,
Haldol and Risperidone as preferred drugs to treat T.M. The petition also requested the following
tests as necessary for safe administration of the drugs: complete blood count, comprehensive
metabolic panel, drug levels, and an electrocardiogram. The drugs were antipsychotic drugs used
to treat schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Attached to the petition was a supplemental petition
referencing the following drugs as treatment options for T.M.: Prolixin, Thorazine, Invega,
Zyprexa, Abilify, Depakoke, Ativan, Cogentin. The list included dosage ranges and treatment
periods. The drugs included antipsychotic medication and medications designed to combat the side
effects from the other medications. T.M. was provided information on all the drugs and their side
effects except Thorazine but he refused the information.
¶ 12 Two inpatient certificates of examination were included with the petitions. The first one
described T.M. as delusional and paranoid. It stated the same circumstances as the petition and
4 added that he said he would acquire a gun and rob someone and “shoot stuff up” in order to obtain
money to buy K2. The second certificate referenced T.M.’s delusional thoughts, sexual threats to
others and suicidal comments, noting that T.M. authored a suicide note during his last admission.
The certificate further provided that T.M. groped a nurse while being admitted and laughed about
his actions.
¶ 13 A bifurcated hearing took place on both petitions on January 30, 2018. T.M.’s mother,
Debbera, testified in accord with her prior testimony at the earlier hearing. She also described that
T.M. had recently been threatening to hurt himself and other people, saying he would blow off his
head if he had a gun and would rob a bank. He had blisters the size of her hand from physically
running away from imaginary law enforcement he believed were shooting at him. Debbera opined
that the K2 caused T.M. to snap back into mental illness. After T.M. was released from the recent
attempted admission, he went to her friend’s house and told her he needed to go to the courthouse
to talk to the FBI. The friend decided to take T.M. to the local Salvation Army shelter and called
Debbera in route. During the conversation, Debbera overheard T.M. saying he needed a gun to rob
a bank and kill himself. On cross-examination, Debbera admitted she had no firsthand knowledge
of T.M.’s interactions after he was discharged. Debbera explained T.M. had been out of prison for
two years and had served time in the regular penitentiary, not in a secured mental health facility.
¶ 14 The next witness was Andrew Lancia, the medical director at Unity Point Behavioral
Health and the attending physician on the psychiatric floor where T.M. was staying. He had
examined T.M. that morning. He had significant concerns about T.M.’s recent discharge because
of T.M.’s psychotic beliefs and suicidal and homicidal comments. He outlined T.M.’s prior
hospitalizations, including in 1997, 2000 and 2017. During the immediate prior involuntary
temporary hold, T.M. wrote a suicide note and held ongoing psychotic beliefs about the FBI. His
5 current symptoms included delusions about the FBI, his belief that he had undergone surgery
where “fruity crack smoke” was blown into his chest resulting in the implementation of some sort
of device. T.M. told Lancia that T.M. did not have to answer Lancia’s questions because Lancia
was reading T.M.’s mind and knew the answers.
¶ 15 Lancia stated T.M.’s behavior was a sign and symptom of mental illness. He diagnosed
him with unspecified schizophrenic spectrum and other psychotic disorder, commonly referred to
as psychosis unspecified, as set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-5). It was the same diagnosis as the first admission. T.M. lacked any insight into his illness.
He would engage in future conduct that would harm himself or others if he were released. Lancia
pointed to T.M.’s comments about suicide, his desire to rape a nurse and his desire for a gun as
support that T.M.’s behavior would be harmful. Lancia opined that T.M.’s threat to harm himself
or others negated his actual ability to care for his basic needs. T.M. could not hold a job. T.M. did
not have Social Security disability but did have a Link card. According to Lancia, T.M.’s mental
illness caused him to be unable to provide for his basic needs, and without medications, T.M.’s
condition would continue to deteriorate. Lancia opined there was a real likelihood that T.M. would
carry out his threats. For example, he could go to the courthouse to find the FBI. Lancia opined
that T.M.’s mental illness prevented him from understanding the need for medication. A less
restrictive option was not appropriate under the circumstances.
¶ 16 On cross-examination, Lancia said he could not necessarily discount drugs as the cause of
T.M.’s mental illness. He discussed the link between cannabis smoking at an early age and
schizophrenia and suggested that T.M.’s use of K2 could have lowered the threshold and brought
out the symptoms of mental illness. T.M.’s symptoms could be the lingering effect of using K2 or
actual schizophrenia. On redirect, Lancia explained that K2 is a compounding factor that can cause
6 psychosis and dangerous behavior. The psychotic behaviors could disappear once the K2 left his
system or T.M.’s symptoms could be caused by an underlying psychotic disorder. Lancia clarified
that T.M. qualified for a diagnosis of schizophrenia. He also pointed to the “compounding factors”
of K2, which could cause psychosis and dangerous behaviors. His preferred course would be to
give T.M. sufficient time and see if the psychotic behaviors disappeared or continued. He could
not offer a specific date but suggested that if T.M.’s behaviors did not disappear after two months
sober and he remained at the same level of psychosis, the likelihood was that T.M. suffered from
a “true underlying psychotic disorder such as schizophrenia.”
¶ 17 The State rested and T.M. moved for a directed verdict. He argued that the State again
failed to offer clear and convincing evidence that he suffered from mental illness. The trial court
denied the motion and granted the petition for involuntary commitment.
¶ 18 A recess was taken and the hearing on the petition for the involuntary administration of
medication took place. Lancia again testified. Medication was part of T.M.’s treatment plan. T.M.
was provided a list of the medication options, their side effects and benefits from the different
medications Lancia would use to regulate his behavior. T.M. had previously taken some of the
medications without any side effects. In Lancia’s opinion, the benefits from the medications
outweighed any harm from them. T.M. refused to take the medication, saying he did not need
them. T.M.’s mental illness prevented him from making an informed decision regarding
medications. No other alternatives to treatment were available. T.M. should improve with the
medications and would deteriorate without them. On cross-examination, Lancia explained that the
multiple medications on the list were suggested medications and may be tried to determine which
gave T.M. the best results with the least side effects. The trial court granted the State’s petition for
involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. T.M. appealed the grant of both petitions.
7 ¶ 19 ANALYSIS
¶ 20 T.M. raises five issues on appeal: whether the case is moot; whether the trial court erred in
granting the State’s petitions for involuntary commitment and for involuntary administration of
psychotropic medication; whether the petition for medication administration must be reversed if
the commitment order is reversed; and whether T.M. was denied effective assistance of counsel.
¶ 21 We begin with the first issue, whether our review is precluded because the case is moot.
T.M. argues that although he was subjected to 90-day orders which have since elapsed, making
the case moot, all three exceptions to the mootness doctrine: the public interest exception, the
capable of repetition yet evading review exception and the collateral consequences exception,
apply.
¶ 22 We agree the case is moot and reviewable under the mootness exceptions. Both orders
expired in April 2018. Generally, Illinois courts will not decide moot questions, render advisory
opinions or consider issues where the court’s decision will not affect the result. In re Mary Ann P.,
202 Ill. 2d 393, 401 (2002). The exceptions to the mootness doctrine enable a court to consider an
otherwise moot issue. In re Vanessa K., 2011 IL App (3d) 100545, ¶ 14. This court reviews
de novo whether a case is moot. Id. ¶ 13.
¶ 23 The first exception we examine is the public interest exception. Under the public interest
exception, a moot case may be considered when “(1) the question presented is one of a public
nature; (2) there is a need for an authoritative determination for future guidance of public officers;
and (3) there is a likelihood of future recurrence of the question.” In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d
345, 355 (2009). The procedures to be followed and the proofs to be required in mental health
proceedings are matters of a public nature and public concern. Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d at 402.
The same failures by the State continue to occur in mental health commitment and medication
8 administration proceedings such that continued guidance to public officials may abate the
problems. In re Sharon H., 2016 IL App (3d) 140980, ¶ 31.
¶ 24 T.M. has been involved in prior mental health proceedings and will likely continue to be
such that resolution of the claims on appeal will provide direction to him and to others subject to
involuntary commitment and administration of medication proceedings in the future. We find T.M.
has satisfied the requirements for the public interest exception to apply. We will address his claims
on appeal under this mootness exception.
¶ 25 We next address whether the trial court erred when it granted the State’s petition for
involuntary commitment. T.M. submits that the State’s petition for involuntary commitment was
res judicata as the court had found the week before that the State did not prove T.M. suffered from
mental illness and his diagnosis had not changed in the interim. According to T.M., the trial court’s
prior finding that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was mentally
ill prohibited the State from presenting the commitment petition at issue on appeal.
¶ 26 “The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction bars any subsequent actions between the same parties or their
privies on the same cause of action.” Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill. 2d 325, 334 (1996).
The doctrine bars not only what was actually decided in the first action but also what could have
been decided. Hudson v. City of Chicago, 228 Ill. 2d 462, 467 (2008). The three requirements for
res judicata to apply are (1) a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) identity of cause of action; and (3) identity of parties or privies. Id. We review
de novo whether a claim is barred by res judicata. Lutkauskas v. Ricker, 2015 IL 117090, ¶ 43.
¶ 27 The parties do not dispute that the first res judicata requirement is met. We agree. At the
first hearing, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of T.M., which constitutes a final judgment
9 on the merits. See In re L.R., 106 Ill. App. 3d 244, 249 (1982) (“allowance of a motion for a
directed verdict is a final, non-appealable judgment of acquittal”). We also agree with the parties
that the third requirement is met. The State and T.M., identical parties, were involved in both
proceedings. In re Connors, 255 Ill. App. 3d 781, 783 (1994) (the State is the real party in mental
health proceedings). The second requirement is in dispute.
¶ 28 T.M. argues that he satisfied the second requirement. He submits that the same allegations
that he suffered from mental illness requiring hospitalization were presented in the prior petition
and the instant one and rejected by the trial court at the hearing on the first petition. He further
submits that the experts at both hearings testified that they could not determine mental illness or
effects from K2 as the cause of T.M.’s psychosis. He maintains there was no change of
circumstances between the denial of the first petition and the submission of the second petition,
making res judicata applicable and barring the second petition.
¶ 29 A second petition is res judicata in the absence of any change of circumstances since the
discharge order on the first petition. Id. at 784. However, the person discharged from the first
proceeding is not immune from subsequent petitions for involuntary admission. Id. The State must
demonstrate a change of circumstances before the person subsequently may be involuntarily
admitted. Id. A change of circumstances involves “ ‘[m]aterial operative facts occurring after the
decision of an action with respect to the same subject matter [that] may in themselves, or taken in
conjunction with antecedent facts, comprise a transaction which may be made the basis of a second
action not precluded by the first.’ ” Id. at 785 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 24,
Comment f, at 203 (1982)). Even a slight change of circumstances may be adequate for a second
petition. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 24, Comment f, at 203 (1982)).
10 ¶ 30 Debbera, T.M.’s mom, testified at both hearings. At the second hearing, she explained T.M.
had shown up at the friend’s house after his discharge and sought a ride to the courthouse so he
could confront the FBI. The friend decided to take T.M. to the local Salvation Army shelter and
called Debbera in transit. During the phone call, Debbera overheard T.M. state he needed a gun to
rob a bank and to kill himself. T.M. objected to this testimony as hearsay. The trial court overruled
the objection, supporting our interpretation that the testimony demonstrated that Debbera actually
overheard T.M. make the comments at issue and negating T.M.’s claim of hearsay.
¶ 31 We consider this information provided by Debbera to be a change of circumstances from
the last petition. We further consider the fact that T.M. sought a ride to the courthouse to talk to
the FBI as an additional fact demonstrating a change of circumstances. There was no evidence
presented at the first hearing that T.M. took any steps in furtherance of his delusions as he did after
his discharge. Lancia’s testimony also established a change of circumstances. Lancia testified that
he examined T.M. the morning of the second hearing. In addition, he reviewed T.M.’s admission
notes and medical records. They indicated that T.M. continued to make comments about obtaining
a gun and killing himself. T.M. said people were telling him to rape a psychiatric nurse and he in
fact groped a nurse during the admission process. The evening before the hearing T.M. said he saw
military personnel and shadow figures. Based on this information, Lancia opined that there was a
real likelihood T.M. would carry out his threats. In contrast, at the first hearing, Reddy testified it
was unclear whether T.M. was hearing voices and in her opinion, T.M. “might” hurt himself or
someone else. Because a change of circumstances occurred between T.M.’s discharge on the first
petition and the filing of the second petition, res judicata does not apply to bar the second petition.
¶ 32 We now consider whether the trial court erred in entering the commitment order. T.M.
argues that the State failed to prove that he suffered from mental illness as opposed to adverse
11 effects from smoking K2. T.M. contends that because substance abuse cannot form the basis for
involuntary commitment, the petition cannot stand.
¶ 33 To qualify for an involuntary admission for inpatient treatment, the State must prove the
person, because of his mental illness (1) can reasonably be expected to engage in conduct harmful
to himself or others; (2) cannot provide for his basic physical needs to avoid serious harm without
assistance from others; or (3) refuses treatment or to adhere to a treatment plan, cannot understand
the need for treatment because of the mental illness, and if not hospitalized, is reasonably expected
to deteriorate based on behavioral history. 405 ILCS 5/1-119(1)-(3)(i)-(iii) (West 2018). In
determining whether a person satisfies the requirements of paragraphs (1) through (3), the court
may consider “evidence of the person’s repeated past pattern of specific behavior and actions
related to the person’s illness.” 405 ILCS 5/1-119 (West 2018). “ ‘Mental illness’ means a mental,
or emotional disorder that substantially impairs a person’s thought, perception of reality, emotional
process, judgment, behavior, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life, but does not
include *** a substance use disorder ***.” 405 ILCS 5/1-129 (West 2018).
¶ 34 To sustain a petition for involuntary admission, the State must establish that the respondent
suffered from mental illness and because of the mental illness may harm himself or others or is
unable to care for himself. In re Charles K., 405 Ill. App. 3d 1152, 1164 (2010). The State must
prove the petition for involuntary admission by clear and convincing evidence. In re Diana M.,
364 Ill. App. 3d 715, 719 (2006). Where the person’s conduct may be caused by issues other than
mental illness, it is inappropriate for the court to grant a petition for involuntary commitment. Id.
at 720. A trial court’s commitment order will not be reversed unless it is manifestly erroneous.
In re John N. Jr., 374 Ill. App. 3d 481, 486 (2007).
12 ¶ 35 T.M. points to the testimony of Lancia, who discussed the interaction between K2 and
T.M.’s mental illness as support for his claim that the court improperly granted the petition based
on his conduct that was caused by K2 and not mental illness. T.M. misconstrues Lancia’s testimony
and the trial court’s conclusions regarding it. Lancia stated that T.M. was currently suffering from
delusions and believed Lancia could read his mind. Lancia expressly stated that T.M.’s behavior
was a “sign and symptom of mental illness.” Lancia further opined that T.M. lacked insight into
his illness, would likely engage in harmful conduct if released, had expressed suicidal and
homicidal comments, was unable to care for his basic needs as a result of the mental illness, and
that without treatment, T.M.’s condition would further deteriorate. Lancia stated that there was a
real likelihood that T.M. would follow through with his threats.
¶ 36 Lancia considered that drugs could not be discounted as a cause of T.M.’s mental illness.
He explained that K2 may have brought out T.M.’s mental illness and clarified that K2 is a
“compounding factor” that can cause psychosis and dangerous behaviors. He noted that T.M.’s
behaviors had lasted at least six months, a longer period than the three months he had been smoking
K2 and indicating mental illness was the basis for T.M.’s behaviors. Lancia classified T.M.’s
diagnosis as schizophrenic spectrum and other psychotic disorders, referred to as psychosis
unspecified, a diagnosis in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5).
The trial court’s decision to grant the petition for involuntary commitment was supported by the
evidence. Lancia testified that T.M. suffered from a mental illness and because of his mental
illness, he could harm himself or others and would be unable to care to his own needs. We find the
trial court did not err in granting the petition for involuntary admission.
¶ 37 The next issue is whether the trial court erred when it granted the State’s petition for
involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. T.M. argues that the State failed to meet
13 the statutory requirements, asserting the State did not prove he had a serious mental illness and
lacked capacity to make a reasoned treatment decision. T.M. further argues the State failed to
provide him written information on the proposed medications and their side effects.
¶ 38 A person may involuntarily be given psychotropic medication if the State has proven the
person meets the following criteria: (A) has a serious mental illness; (B) and because of the mental
illness, the (i) person’s ability to function has deteriorated as compared to prior to the onset of
symptoms; he is (ii) suffering; or (iii) engaged in threatening behavior; (C) the illness has existed
for a period that included the symptoms set out in (B) or a repeated cycle of their occurrence;
(D) treatment benefits outweigh any harm; (E) the person is without the capacity to make a
reasoned decision about treatment; (F) less restrictive services have been considered and rejected
as inappropriate; and (G) any testing and procedures requested are “essential” to safely and
effectively administer the treatment. 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1 (4)(A)-(G) (West 2018).
¶ 39 Where proposed mental health services include the involuntary administration of
psychotropic medication, the recipient must be advised in writing of the side effects, risks and
benefits of the treatment and any alternatives to it “to the extent such advice is consistent with the
recipient’s ability to understand the information communicated.” 405 ILCS 5/2-102(a-5) (West
2018). The recipient’s doctor must determine and verify in writing whether the recipient has the
capacity to make a reasoned decision about treatment. 405 ILCS 5/2-102(a-5) (West 2016). Unless
the risks and benefits are explained to him, a person cannot make a reasoned decision on a course
of treatment. Vanessa K., 2011 IL App (3d) 100545, ¶ 20. We review de novo whether the State
complied with the statutory requirements for the involuntary administration of psychotropic
medication. In re Maureen D., 2015 IL App (1st) 141517, ¶ 26. We will not reverse a trial court’s
14 order granting a petition for involuntary administration of psychotropic medication unless it was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.
¶ 40 We find the State established the criteria for the administration of psychotropic
medications. Lancia testified to the severity of T.M.’s mental illness and how it negatively affected
his ability to function and caused him to engage in threatening behavior. That fact that T.M. was
interested in killing himself suggests that he was suffering. T.M.’s mother testified that he had
experienced mental health issues throughout his life and had recently been smoking K2 for several
months, although his behaviors had existed for at least six months. Lancia reviewed records from
T.M.’s prior hospitalizations. Treatment with medication would alleviate some, if not all, of T.M.’s
symptoms and in Lancia’s opinion, would be preferable to any harm that would result from
medication’s side effects. Significantly, Lancia testified that without treatment, there was a real
likelihood that T.M. would engage in behavior harmful to himself and others. Lancia opined
T.M.’s mental illness kept him from making reasoned decisions about treatment. Less restrictive
services were not appropriate and medications were needed.
¶ 41 Notwithstanding the State’s satisfaction of the above criteria, it did not follow the statute’s
mandate that T.M. be provided written information on all of the listed medications Lancia wished
to administer. T.M. was provided information on the preferred medication and all the alternative
medications except one, Thorazine. Because the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs
implicates liberty interests, we must strictly construe the statute allowing it. In re Bobby F., 2012
IL App (5th) 110214, ¶ 26. The State was required to present evidence that T.M. was provided
written notification of the side effects, risks and benefits of all the proposed medication. In re A.W.,
381 Ill. App. 3d 950, 957 (2008). It did not do so. We acknowledge that T.M. refused any of the
information regarding the medications. Nevertheless, the State is statutorily required to provide
15 information on all possible medications the treating doctor is considering in order that the recipient
be able to make an informed decision whether to take the medication. Without adequate
information, the recipient has no opportunity to determine his mental health treatment as to
medications. The statute required that T.M. be advised of the side effects, risks and benefits of the
treatment and any alternatives. While the State proved T.M. met the criteria for involuntary
administration of medication and he received the bulk of the required information on the
medications, he did not receive all of the mandated information. We do not consider the State’s
burden to be onerous in complying with the statute and emphasize that the State must satisfy the
statutory requirements before it can administer drugs to a mentally ill person. Accordingly, we
reverse the trial court’s order granting the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication
to T.M. Because of our disposition of this issue, we need not consider the fourth issue on appeal,
whether the petition for administration of medication must be reversed if the order for commitment
is reversed. Because we have reversed the order allowing involuntary administration of
psychotropic medication, we need not resolve this issue.
¶ 42 The final issue is whether T.M. was denied effective assistance of counsel. T.M. argues
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming his attorney failed to hold the State to
its requirement to submit a predispositional report to the court.
¶ 43 A person who is the subject of petitions for involuntary commitment or administration of
psychotropic medications is statutorily entitled to the assistance of counsel. 405 ILCS 5/3-805
(West 2018). The Strickland standard is used to determine if counsel provided effective assistance
in mental health proceedings. In re Carmody, 274 Ill. App. 3d 46, 55 (1995). Under Strickland,
the person claiming ineffective assistance must prove that his attorney performed deficiently, the
errors were serious such that counsel was not functioning as contemplated and counsel’s errors
16 prejudiced the person such that he was deprived of a fair hearing. In re Jessica H., 2014 IL App
(4th) 130399, ¶ 23. In commitment hearings, the question is “ ‘whether the respondent’s counsel
acted so as to hold the State to its burden of proof and its procedural requirements.’ ” Id. ¶ 25
(quoting Carmody, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 56).
¶ 44 The State must prepare a predispositional report in civil commitment hearings. 405 ILCS
5/3-810 (West 2018). The report must include “information on the appropriateness and availability
of alternative treatment settings, a social investigation of the respondent, a preliminary treatment
plan, and any other information” ordered by the court. Id. The plan must describe the problems
and needs of the recipient, treatment goals and proposed treatment methods as well as a timetable
for the treatment plan. The report shall be considered in determining an appropriate disposition if
the court finds the respondent is subject to involuntary admission. Id. Section 3-810 requires a
written report. In re Robinson, 151 Ill. 2d 126, 132-33 (1992). However, the absence of a report is
harmless error where the testimony presented includes the required information. Id. at 135.
¶ 45 The record includes a treatment plan with goals and timetables to meet them. Other
information as required in the report was provided to the court by the testimonies of T.M.’s mother
and Lancia. They both described T.M.’s behavior, his inability to function and his need for
hospitalization and medication. Lancia used T.M.’s prior records in assessing him and determining
a course of treatment. Lancia explained that he had explored less restrictive options and they were
not appropriate for T.M. The information provided on alternative options to committing T.M. was
that he was homeless; had quit his job to smoke K2 and was not currently capable of holding down
a job; and was without resources besides his Link card to care for himself. The testimonial and
other documentary evidence was sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements for a written
17 predispositional report. Accordingly, we consider counsel did not fail to hold the State to its burden
and was not ineffective.
¶ 46 CONCLUSION
¶ 47 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed
in part and reversed in part.
¶ 48 Affirmed in part and reversed in part.