In re: T.K.R.

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: May 20, 2026
• Docket: 25-617
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Judge Chris Dillon

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-617

Filed 20 May 2026

Forsyth County, No. 24JA000231-330

IN THE MATTER OF:

T.K.R.

Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 5 March 2025 by Judge

Thomas W. Davis, V in Forsyth County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals

10 March 2026.

Theresa A. Boucher, Deputy County Attorney for petitioner-appellee Forsyth County Department of Social Services.

Sean P. Vitrano for appellant-respondent mother.

Matthew D. Wunsche for Guardian ad Litem.

DILLON, Chief Judge.

I. Background

Tom1 was born to Respondent-Mother (“Mother”) who had five older children,

all of whom were removed from her custody prior to the birth of Tom. Her parental

1 A pseudonym. IN RE: T.K.R.

Opinion of the Court

rights to several of her older children have previously been terminated. See, e.g., In

re A.J., L.J., A.V., 295 N.C. App. 587 (2024) (unpublished). Here, she appeals from a

disposition order eliminating reunification efforts as part of the permanency plan

with respect to Tom.

Forsyth County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) received a report with

allegations that Tom was born prematurely at 34 weeks and was currently in the

NICU. The report was made due to Mother’s extensive history with DSS. When

Mother met with the DSS Social Worker, she admitted to using marijuana during the

pregnancy. During the investigation, the Social Worker also discovered that Mother

had engaged in multiple risky behaviors and was not in compliance with her mental

health and substance abuse treatment required by her current DSS plan for one of

her older children.

On 8 October 2024, DSS filed a Juvenile Petition alleging Tom to be an abused

and neglected juvenile pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-101. Six days later, on 14 October

2024, the trial court entered an order granting DSS non-secure custody. On 13

December 2024, after a hearing on the matter, the trial court adjudicated Tom to be

an abused and neglected juvenile. On 5 March 2025, the trial court entered a

disposition order relieving DSS of the requirement to make reunification efforts with

Mother and Tom pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-901(c). Mother appealed.

II. Analysis

The trial court adjudicated Tom to be neglected and abused. The trial court

-2- IN RE: T.K.R.

then entered a disposition order eliminating reunification efforts as part of the

permanency plan. Mother argues the trial court erred in eliminating reunification

efforts as part of the permanency plan. We disagree.

Our General Assembly provides that a trial court may cease reunification

efforts if it finds one of three grounds exists as codified in G.S. 7B-901(c). One of these

statutory grounds is that “[a] court of competent jurisdiction has terminated

involuntarily the parental rights of the parent to another child of the parent.”

N.C.G.S. § 7B-901(c)(2).

Here, the trial court based its order eliminating reunification efforts as part of

the permanency plan based on subsection (c)(2) as well as under subsections (c)(1)(b)

and (c)(1)(f).

The record shows that Mother’s rights to several of her older children had been

terminated previously. Accordingly, we conclude a ground existed to support the trial

court’s order.

We note Mother’s contention that the trial court erred at the adjudication

stage, specifically that there was no evidence to support the trial court’s

determination that she had abused Tom.

An “[a]bused” juvenile is one “whose parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker”

either “[i]nflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the juvenile a serious physical injury

by other than accidental means.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(1)(a). “There is a commonality

present in these criteria. Each definition states that a juvenile is abused when a

-3- IN RE: T.K.R.

caretaker harms the juvenile in some way, allows the juvenile to be harmed, or allows

a substantial risk of harm. The harm may be physical; emotional; or some

combination thereof.” In re M.G., 363 N.C. 570, 573 (2009). “At its core, the nature

of abuse, based upon its statutory definition, is the existence or serious risk of some

nonaccidental harm inflicted or allowed by one’s caretaker.” In re A.J.L.H., 384 N.C.

45, 53 (2023) (internal quotation omitted). “The allegations in a petition alleging that

a juvenile is abused, neglected, or dependent shall be proved [by the petitioner] by

clear and convincing evidence.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-805.

Here, the trial court made no finding that Mother abused Tom specifically or

allowed a substantial risk of harm to Tom in any way. Because abuse of a sibling

alone is not sufficient to adjudicate a child as abused without some additional factors,

we vacate the trial court’s decision adjudicating Tom as abused. However, Mother

does not contest the trial court’s decision adjudicating Tom as neglected; and we

conclude there is sufficient evidence to support this determination. Thus, the trial

court did not err in proceeding to the disposition phase. Therefore, we affirm the trial

court’s order eliminating reunification as a part of the permanency plan.

AFFIRMED.

Judges ZACHARY and COLLINS concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

-4-