Filed 6/16/25 In re T.J. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re T.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, E084812 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J268952) v. OPINION T.J.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Charles J. Umeda,
Judge. Affirmed.
Susan S. Bauguess, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Maxine Hart, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 In January 2017, the San Bernardino County District Attorney’s Office alleged that
T.J. (Minor) murdered Rocky Holmes in January 2016, committing the offense two
months before Minor turned 17 years old. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) The murder
allegation was based on eyewitness accounts, including that after the victim survived an
initial salvo of gunfire, Minor returned to the scene and shot him to death at close range.
The prosecutor alleged Minor came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court based on
murder and other charges (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 602, subd. (a)), but sought transfer of
the case to adult criminal court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707. In 2017,
the juvenile court transferred the case to the criminal court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707,
subd. (a)(1).) In 2023, the criminal court transferred the case back to the juvenile court
and, subsequently, the juvenile court again transferred it to the criminal court. (Ibid.)
Minor appealed and this court reversed the transfer order on grounds that included
requiring the juvenile court to consider a then-new 2024 amendment to the transfer rules.
(In re T.J., supra, E081349 [nonpub. opn.].) Upon doing so on remand, the juvenile court
again transferred the case to criminal court, and Minor now appeals.
Minor contends we must reverse the juvenile court’s latest transfer order because
the court misapplied “the most recent amendments to the transfer laws” in 2023 and
2024. According to Minor, the amendments require consideration of a minor’s
amenability to rehabilitation as “a separate and determinative factor” in a transfer
decision—apart from five enumerated statutory criteria. (See § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i),
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 (B)(i), (C)(i), (D)(i), (E)(i).) As we explain more fully below, to the extent Minor is
suggesting that amenability must be assessed in a manner that is, as the People critique
the argument, “divorced” from the five criteria, we find no support in the law for Minor’s
contention. This court’s recent opinion in In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152
(Miguel R.) makes clear that Minor’s statutory analysis is incorrect. Moreover, Minor’s
argument falters as a practical matter because he fails to identify any specific additional
relevant transfer criterion or factor absent from the five the Legislature enumerated, or
that the juvenile court failed to consider. Minor’s argument is therefore merely
speculative or hypothetical. Because Minor fails to demonstrate any error or prejudice,
his appellate challenge is without merit. We therefore affirm the transfer order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Given that the parties are well familiar with the procedural background and
underlying facts alleged, we set them out as briefly as possible—with the case beginnings
largely excerpted from our prior opinion, and brought current with the probation officer’s
new report on remand and the juvenile court’s findings at the new transfer hearing.
A. MINOR’S PRIOR DELINQUENT ACTS
Minor was born in March 1999. Minor is a member of a criminal street gang. In
2011, when he was 12 years old, Minor admitted a misdemeanor battery allegation (Pen.
Code, § 242), which we infer was resolved by diversion or otherwise by an unreported
disposition such as youth court. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 601.5, 654.) At 14 years
old, Minor admitted an allegation of fighting (Pen. Code, § 415, subd. (l)), which was
again settled out of court. Approximately three months later, the juvenile court sustained
3 a first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) allegation against Minor, declared
him a ward of the court and granted him probation. Within three months, the juvenile
court sustained an allegation that Minor acted as an accessory after the fact (Pen. Code,
§ 32) to a robbery. The court ordered Minor to serve 50 days in juvenile hall. In June
2014, when Minor was 15 years old, the juvenile court sustained an unlawful firearm
possession allegation (Pen. Code, § 29610) and ordered him to serve 120 days in juvenile
hall.
B. MURDER ALLEGATION
The prosecutor alleged that in January 2016, under Minor’s instigation and
leadership, a cohort comprised of Minor, a person named Michion Darby, and possibly a
third individual formed a plan to rob the victim, who sold marijuana. Minor or a
coparticipant called the victim to schedule a meeting. When the victim arrived, Minor
asked, “ ‘ “where's the weed at?” The victim responded, “Where’s the money at?” It was
then [that Minor] shot him.’ ” In two separate shootings at the same location, Minor fired
gunshots into the victim’s abdomen, right hip, and right temple. The victim died at the
hospital.
C. 2017 TRANSFER TO CRIMINAL COURT
In January 2017, the district attorney filed a petition in juvenile court, alleging
Minor committed murder, robbery, and other offenses. In February 2017, the juvenile
court ordered the case transferred to the criminal court. Applying the preponderance of
the evidence standard, the juvenile court concluded, “ ‘The choices made by [Minor]
have consistently reflected his commitment to pursuing a life of crime, such that he is not
4 amenable to the care, treatment and training programs of the juvenile system.’ ” The
juvenile court dismissed the petition. Minor was transferred to the county jail.
D. 2023 TRANSFERS TO JUVENILE COURT AND BACK TO CRIMINAL
COURT
Effective in 2023, the Legislature changed the law regarding transfer of juvenile
cases to criminal court, including by increasing the prosecutor’s burden of proof for
transfer from a preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence. (Assem.
Bill No. 2361 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), ch. 1012, § 1 (hereafter Assem. Bill No. 2361); see
also § 707, subd. (a)(3).)
Under the new legislation, the criminal court in January 2023 transferred Minor’s
case back to the juvenile court, where the 2017 juvenile petition was reinstated. At that
point, Minor was 23 years old and had been confined in the county jail for six years. The
juvenile court ordered the probation department to investigate whether Minor was
amenable to rehabilitation under juvenile court jurisdiction if the petition allegations were
found to be true. The ensuing probation report indicated, incorrectly as it turned out, that
Minor “ ‘would only be under the Juvenile Court’s jurisdiction until the age of 25, which
is a little more than one year from now, as [Minor] will turn 24 years old in six days.’ ”
The probation officer’s report also recounted that Minor “ ‘has been terrorizing the
county jail staff and inmates over the past six years. [Minor] is fully indoctrinated and
engaged in the life and politics of the adult county jail. He has been exposed to various
types of adult criminals, participated in assaults, and initiated a riot.’ ” The probation
officer reiterated the department’s 2017 criminal court transfer recommendation.
5 The juvenile court adopted the recommendation, in part based on the probation
officer’s estimate of the available rehabilitation period in juvenile facilities. The juvenile
court’s findings in its transfer order to criminal court included that a secure youth
treatment facility, “ ‘Gateway to Arise[,] would be a possible option if [Minor’s] case
were to remain in the juvenile justice system.’ ” However, given Minor’s age and that
less than a year remained before the court believed it would lose jurisdiction over Minor
at age 25, Minor would not serve his “ ‘youth baseline term [of] seven (7) years.’ ” The
court concluded: “ ‘Because of [Minor’s] current age, the court believes that [Minor’s]
potential to grow and mature is limited. Furthermore, [Minor]’s incarceration for
approximately six years, acts of violence in county jail and lack of treatment while
housed at county jail leads the court to conclude that he would require extensive
rehabilitation over a long period of time for him to realistically be considered
rehabilitated sufficiently for safe reentry into the community. At this time, if [Minor]
remains within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, he would be committed to a secured
youth treatment facility (SYTF) for less than a year before reaching his [maximum] age
of commitment. The court finds the evidence is clear and convincing that [Minor] cannot
be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.’ ”
E. MINOR GAINS REMAND AND A NEW TRANSFER HEARING
Minor appealed his re-transfer to criminal court. In In re T.J., supra, E081349,
this court reversed the second transfer order, holding that the juvenile court had
incorrectly calculated the expiration of juvenile jurisdiction. The opinion also noted that
newly enacted legislation made consideration of sexual abuse of the minor, if any,
6 mandatory. Effective January 1, 2024, Senate Bill No. 545 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.)
(hereafter Sen. No. 545) mandated that juvenile courts consider certain factors, including
a minor’s childhood trauma and status as a victim of sexual abuse when assessing
amenability to rehabilitation.
On appeal in In re T.J., the parties recognized there was some evidence in the
record that an adult woman engaged in a sexual relationship with Minor, which the
juvenile court had not considered in making its transfer order. Consequently, we reversed
the second transfer order so that the juvenile court could reconsider Minor’s amenability
to rehabilitation, both under the amended law and with a correct understanding of the
remaining time under juvenile jurisdiction. As we explained, “A juvenile court retains
jurisdiction over a murderer until the murderer ‘attains 25 years of age, or two years from
the date of commitment to a secure youth treatment facility . . . whichever occurs later.”
(§ 607, subd. (c) [eff. through Sept. 12, 2023]; see also § 1769, subds. (b) & (d)(2).)
Thus, the juvenile court would have had jurisdiction over T.J. until two years after
committing him to a juvenile facility, if the allegations were found true.” (In re T.J.,
supra, E081349, p. 6, italics added, fns. omitted.)
F. PROBATION REPORT FOLLOWING REMAND
On remand, the juvenile court directed the probation department to prepare a new
transfer hearing report. The department’s report classified Minor as “legally eligible, but
unsuitable for the SYTF-ARISE program based upon the criteria described in section 875
of the Welfare and Institutions Code.”
7 The report acknowledged Minor had been jailed since March 3, 2017, “but prior to
his original transfer from Juvenile Hall to San Bernardino County Jail, he consistently
attended school, was close to graduating, and usually earned high behavior dollars each
week. He was involved in one code red on October 20, 2016, and had some negative
behavior write ups.” (CT 33.)
The report reflected that since his transfer to county jail, Minor engaged in
“numerous” behavioral incidents requiring discipline. Further, he committed multiple
new offenses for which he was being prosecuted in criminal court, including two pending
cases for battery on fellow inmates (case Nos. FWV18000882 & FSB19001186) and one
for robbery (case No. FWV20001539). He was also reportedly active in smuggling drugs
into three San Bernardino County jails.
According to the department’s report, Minor enrolled in some jail programming
starting in May 2023, completing a substance abuse program that month, a living skills
class in August 2023, and a program called “FAITHS Throughcare Program” in
December 2023. Minor attended weekly counseling through the FAITHS program and
was waitlisted for an employment readiness and journaling class.
The probation department concluded Minor was “not considered to be a suitable
subject to be dealt with under juvenile court law.” The probation officer who prepared
the report testified at the transfer hearing. She noted Minor completed his high school
graduation requirements in jail. His discipline record in jail included assaults, failure to
obey direct orders, and destroying bedding and clothing. Minor began attending
substance abuse classes but still engaged in drug sales.
8 G. JUVENILE COURT’S NEW TRANSFER ORDER AND FINDINGS
Following a hearing, the juvenile court issued a detailed written order in which the
court concluded Minor was not amenable to rehabilitation under the court’s supervision,
and transfer to criminal court was therefore appropriate.
The court’s findings included details concerning Minor’s alleged criminal offenses
committed in jail. The offenses included battery on a fellow inmate soon after Minor’s
transfer from juvenile hall, multiple batteries and assaults over the next several years in
which the respective victims were hospitalized or lost consciousness, and a mutual
combat incident in which Minor’s face was cut. The court also noted that Minor was
being prosecuted for his significant role in the drug smuggling operation. The court
found that Minor used his jail phone calls to arrange to import the drugs through priority
mail in which paperwork was sprayed or infused with illegal drugs, cut into pieces, and
sold to other inmates to be ingested orally. The court also observed that Minor did not
enroll in any rehabilitative programming in jail for more than six years, between 2017
and May 2023.
The court made detailed findings regarding each of the transfer criteria set forth in
section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(A)-(E), as follows:
1. DEGREE OF CRIMINAL SOPHISTICATION EXHIBITED BY THE
MINOR
On the first criterion, the court found Minor’s high level of criminal sophistication
weighed against his amenability to rehabilitation. The court’s findings included that
Minor prepared for the robbery in which the victim was killed by procuring firearms, and
9 he did not panic or flee the scene after shooting the victim but returned to ensure the
victim’s death by shooting him again. Further, Minor took “a lead role in planning and
facilitating the robbery” and “acted on his own accord in shooting and killing the victim,”
“not as the result of peer or adult pressure.” Minor also admitted participating in a
previous robbery-shooting and, having done so, knew to take steps to “avoid[] capture
and being connected to the murder weapon.” The court found that “evidence that [Minor]
was the victim of sexual abuse is inconclusive,” but, even assuming it occurred, nothing
suggested it “contributed to his criminal sophistication.”
The court expressly found: “As to this criterion, the high level of the youth’s
criminal sophistication weighs against [his] amenability to rehabilitation in the juvenile
justice system.”
2. REHABILITATION BEFORE EXPIRATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT’S JURISDICTION
The juvenile court determined that now 25 years old, Minor would remain subject
to the court’s jurisdiction for two years if he were committed to a juvenile facility, such as
the secure youth treatment facility known as ARISE. (§ 607, subd. (c).) The court noted,
“the ARISE program offers a wide range of courses including counseling and therapy
opportunities, educational and job training classes, gang prevention and anger
replacement therapy (ART).” Minor had participated in life skills classes, anger
management, community service, and ART while at juvenile hall before his transfer to
county jail, to no effect.
10 The court observed that after the transfer, Minor “engaged in numerous acts of
violence against other inmates” and “failed to make any attempt[] at rehabilitation
[despite] more than 20 programs available to all inmates.” Even once he enrolled, “he
participated in a sophisticated conspiracy to import . . . and distribute illegal drugs.”
Given this history and based on Minor’s age, the court concluded his “potential to grow
and mature is limited.” The court found Minor’s “numerous acts of violence in county
jail, participation in the importation and distribution of illegal drugs [scheme] and
apparent lack of demonstrated reduction in criminal behavior while participating in
programming, lead the court to conclude that he cannot be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the court’s juvenile jurisdiction.”
The court found more generally: “As to this criterion, the unlikelihood of [Minor]
being rehabilitated prior to expiration of the court’s jurisdiction weighs against his
amenability to rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system.”
3. PREVIOUS DELINQUENT HISTORY
The court found Minor’s previous delinquent history, while serious, “weighs in
favor of his amenability to rehabilitation.” That history included residential burglary
(Pen. Code, § 459), purse snatching in a supermarket parking lot (Pen. Code, § 211),
resisting or obstructing a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)) and possession of
a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29610). The court concluded that though these offenses were
serious, they were “similar to, if not less serious than, the delinquency of other youth who
have been dealt with under juvenile law.”
11 4. PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS AT REHABILITATION
The juvenile court found that previous attempts at rehabilitating Minor had been
unsuccessful. This included settling some misdemeanor matters out of court that Minor
admitted to, yet within a year he committed the felony burglary. Within two months of
receiving formal probation for that offense, he was charged with second degree robbery
for the purse snatching and then was continued on probation after admitting to being an
accessory after the fact to yet another offense. While he did complete probation in
March 2015 for his firearm possession offense, less than a year later he committed
murder. The court found: “As for this criterion, the juvenile court’s lack of success in
previous attempts to rehabilitate [Minor] weighs against his amenability to
rehabilitation.”
5. CIRCUMSTANCES AND GRAVITY OF OFFENSE
As the juvenile court had done for each of the previous criteria regarding its
transfer decision, the court’s findings on this criterion tracked statutory factors noted for
the court’s consideration, where relevant. (See § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii),
(D)(ii), (E)(ii).)
The court noted the allegations against Minor consisted of “the most serious
criminal offense; the killing of another human being.” The court found: “The evidence
showed the cold-blooded nature of the youth when he returned to the scene after
wounding the victim and proceed[ed] to shoot and kill the victim, then search[ed] the
victim’s car for valuables and marijuana.” Minor was directly involved in the planning
and execution of the robbery and shooting. Minor’s actions showed “a high level of
12 callousness and total lack of regard for human life in his behavior during and after
committing the robbery and murder. There was very little, if any evidence, regarding the
mental and emotional development of the youth at the time of the incident.” The court
found no mitigation of the gravity of the offense. No evidence suggested the victim
trafficked, sexually abused, or sexually battered Minor.
The court determined, “As to this criterion, the court finds that the circumstances
and seriousness of the offense weighs against [Minor’s] amenability to rehabilitation.”
At the close of its transfer order, the juvenile court found, “[b]ased upon all the
foregoing reasons [and] after considering the [section] 707(a) transfer criteria, . . . the
People have met their burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that [Minor] is
not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” The
court ordered transfer of Minor’s case to criminal court, to be set for an initial hearing
regarding bail.
DISCUSSION
Minor does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile
court’s transfer decision. Instead, Minor asserts that the court applied the wrong legal
standard in making its decision. We disagree with Minor; the court did not err.
A. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Section 707 sets forth the procedures for transferring a minor from juvenile court
to criminal court. It provides that whenever a minor aged 16 years or older is alleged to
have committed a felony, the prosecutor may move “to transfer the minor from juvenile
court to a court of criminal jurisdiction.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(1); see Miguel R., supra,
13 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 164.) The prosecution bears the burden of proving that the minor
should be transferred. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.770(a).)
The Legislature amended section 707 in 2023 and 2024. Effective January 1,
2023, Assem. Bill No. 2361 amended section 707, subdivision (a)(3), by adding a new
sentence and clause, shown in italics here: “Following submission and consideration of
the [probation officer’s] report [ordered by the juvenile court upon a prosecutor’s transfer
motion], and of any other relevant evidence that the petitioner or the minor may wish to
submit, the juvenile court shall decide whether the minor should be transferred to a court
of criminal jurisdiction. In order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of
criminal jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor
is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In
making its decision, the court shall consider the criteria specified in subparagraphs (A) to
(E), inclusive. If the court orders a transfer of jurisdiction, the court shall recite the basis
for its decision in an order entered upon the minutes, which shall include the reasons
supporting the court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3), italics added.)
The five statutory criteria listed in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of section 707,
subdivision (a)(3), were not amended by Assem. Bill No. 2361. Those criteria are:
(1) “the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor” (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3)(A)(i)); (2) “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(i)); (3) “[t]he minor’s previous
delinquent history” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)); (4) “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the
14 juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)(i)); and (5) “[t]he
circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed
by the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(i)). The statute sets forth a nonexhaustive list of
relevant factors for the court to consider with respect to each of the five criteria. (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii).) For example, in evaluating the second
criterion regarding a minor’s prospects for rehabilitation within jurisdictional time limits,
the juvenile court must consider “the minor’s potential to grow and mature.” (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii).)
Effective January 1, 2024, Sen. No. 545 amended section 707 to require that in
considering the five criteria identified in subparagraphs (A) to (E), the juvenile court
“shall give weight to any relevant factor,” including the specific factors listed as relevant
to each criterion. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii).) The
previous version of the statute made consideration of those factors discretionary, not
mandatory. (Former § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii).) With
respect to the degree of criminal sophistication, Sen. No. 545 also added new mandatory
factors for the court to consider: whether the minor has had any involvement in the child
welfare or foster care system and whether the minor has been “a victim of human
trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).)
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer motion for abuse of discretion.
(Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) “The abuse of discretion standard is not a
unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s
15 ruling under review.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712.) As
pertinent here, a lower court’s “conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its
application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Ibid,
fns. omitted.) We interpret the governing law de novo. “In interpreting a statute, our
primary goal ‘ “is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s
purpose.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “Because the statutory language is generally the most reliable
indicator of that intent, we look first at the words themselves, giving them their usual and
ordinary meaning.” ’ ” (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 294.) “ ‘ “If the
statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
C. MINOR’S CONTENTIONS AND OUR ANALYSIS
Minor argues that under Assem. Bill No. 2361 and Sen. No. 545 “ ‘amenability to
rehabilitation’ is a separate and determinative factor” in the juvenile court’s transfer
decision. (Underscore omitted.) Minor’s briefing repeatedly emphasizes amenability to
rehabilitation as “a separate factor,” “in addition to the other considerations set forth in
section 707, subdivision (a)(3),” i.e., the five enumerated criteria the juvenile court must
also consider. Minor acknowledges the juvenile court “is still required to consider those
five factors,” but insists that “a separate determination the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation” is also necessary. Minor asserts the juvenile court “fail[ed] to make a
separate finding [that he] was not amenable to rehabilitation,” which “requires . . .
reversal of the transfer order.”
We first address Minor’s contention the juvenile court failed to make a separate
finding regarding his amenability to rehabilitation. Minor is factually incorrect. As set
16 out in the juvenile court’s transfer order, the record reflects that after discussing its
findings regarding each of the five enumerated criteria in subparagraphs (A) to (E) of
subdivision (a) of section 707, and identifying how each criterion and relevant subfactors
weighed in the court’s transfer decision—whether for or against—the court in a separate
paragraph made a separate finding regarding Minor’s ultimate amenability to
rehabilitation. Namely, the court found: “Based upon all the foregoing reasons, after
considering the 707a transfer criteria, the Court finds that the People have met their
burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Youth is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” At bottom, therefore,
Minor’s bid for reversal on grounds that the juvenile court did not make a separate
finding that he was not amenable to rehabilitation is unsupported by the record. That
distinct finding is embodied in the quoted paragraph.
Regarding Minor’s more general contention concerning the governing law for the
juvenile court’s decision, Minor’s argument can be interpreted as noncontroversial and
correct, in a certain sense. That is, a minor’s amenability to rehabilitation is a separate
factor or component in the trial court’s calculus of its transfer decision. It is distinct from
any single enumerated criterion. As this court has recently explained, the juvenile court’s
“ultimate” amenability determination is “not the same as” any single criterion or factor,
but rather “concerns a global assessment of the minor’s suitability to rehabilitation within
the juvenile court system.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 166-167, italics
added.) We have no quarrel with Minor’s contention when read in that sense.
17 But we think Minor meant something else. By a repeated, italicized emphasis on
amenability to rehabilitation as a separate factor in the trial court’s transfer decision—
essentially a sixth factor “in addition to” and thus suggested to be unmoored from the five
statutory criteria enumerated by the Legislature—Minor seems to argue that the juvenile
court’s amenability determination must be made apart from or divorced from those five
criteria. To the extent that is what Minor argues, he is wrong. As Miguel R. explained
regarding the juvenile court’s “global” assessment of amenability: “Section 707(a)(3) (as
amended by Assembly Bill 2361) mandates that the juvenile court ‘shall consider the
criteria specified in subparagraphs (A) to (E), inclusive’ in determining whether ‘the
minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.’
Thus, according to the statute’s plain language, the court is required to consider each of
the five listed criteria in determining whether the prosecution has carried its burden of
proof to transfer a juvenile to criminal court.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
p. 166, italics added.)
Minor disagrees, but simply points to the existence of the language in section 707,
subdivision (a)(3), prohibiting transfer unless the juvenile court “find[s] by clear and
convincing evidence that a minor was not amenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” Minor invokes legislative history restating this
statutory language in the following manner: “the court [must] find that the minor is not
amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in order to
transfer the minor to a court of criminal jurisdiction.” (Assem. Com. On Pub. Saf. Com.
on Assem. Bill No. 2361 (2022 Reg. Sess.), p. 7.) Minor views the addition of this
18 statutory language in Assem. Bill No. 2361 as a “further requirement” in addition to the
five statutory factors, “result[ing] in a separate and distinct factor to be considered by the
juvenile court.”
In essence, Minor’s position is that because the amenability to rehabilitation
language was added to section 707, subdivision (a)(3), in a different grammatical
sentence than the Legislature’s reference to the five criteria for making that
determination, the amenability determination is an additional criterion that is separate
from the other five. This manner of statutory construction is wholly incorrect. Statutory
language must be “read as a whole, not as individual words in isolation.” (People v.
Ledesma (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 97.) We avoid interpretations that render other,
accompanying statutory language surplusage. (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
p. 166.) The statute plainly specifies, as noted in Miguel R., that “[i]n making its
[amenability] decision, the court shall consider the criteria specified in subparagraphs (A)
to (E).” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3), italics added.) Thus, “the express terms of section 707(a)(3)
require the court to evaluate [the] five criteria in determining whether ‘the minor is not
amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.’ ”
(Miguel R., at p. 167.) Minor’s suggestion that amenability is a separate, sixth criterion
to be made without reference to the five enumerated criteria is without merit.
Minor makes the same interpretative error in relying on California Rules of Court
(CRC), rule 5.770(b). Minor observes that in restating “Criteria to consider (§ 707)” for a
19 juvenile court’s transfer decision, the rule lists amenability to rehabilitation in a different
paragraph than the criteria specified in section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(A)-(E).2
Minor argues that this grammatical division of amenability and the five statutory
criteria into different paragraphs “makes it clear unamenability to rehabilitation is a
separate factor the prosecution is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence, in
addition to the other considerations set forth in section 707, subdivision (a)(3).” Not so.
We agree with respondent that “just because the Judicial Council added amenability to
rehabilitation as a third finding in the wake of AB 2361, rather than incorporating it into
the second finding, does not mean it is divorced from the five criteria.” Rather, we regard
the Judicial Council’s decision to use multiple paragraphs instead of a single, longer one
to be a drafting choice for brevity and convenience. In other words: a choice similar to
the Legislature’s use of more than one sentence in articulating transfer considerations in
section 707, subdivision (a)(3). In any event, the rule of court furnishes no support for
Minor’s construction of the statute, given the statute’s “express terms” tying amenability
to consideration of the five criteria. (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 167; see In
2 CRC rule 5.770, regarding “Conduct of transfer of jurisdiction hearing under section 707,” provides in pertinent part under “Criteria to consider (§ 707)”: “Following receipt of the probation officer’s report and any other relevant evidence, the court may order that the youth be transferred to the jurisdiction of the criminal court if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence each of the following: [¶] (1) The youth was 16 years or older at the time of any alleged felony offense . . . ; [¶] (2) The youth should be transferred to the jurisdiction of the criminal court based on an evaluation of all the criteria in section 707(a)(3)(A)-(E) as provided in that section; and [¶] (3) The youth is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
20 re Richard S. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 857, 863 [court rules may have “force of [a] statute,” but
only “to the extent that they are not inconsistent with legislative enactments”].)
Minor’s citation to legislative history mentioning Kevin P. v. Superior Court of
Contra Costa County (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173 (Kevin P.) is also unconvincing. Minor
cites Kevin P. as “illustrative of the Legislature’s concerns” in stating expressly in
section 707, subdivision (a)(3), the centrality of a minor’s amenability to rehabilitation in
a juvenile court’s transfer decision. Minor then quotes the reviewing court’s decision in
Kevin P., which predated the enactment of Assem. Bill No. 2361. The Kevin P. court
stated: “Although the trend in the law is clearly toward retaining more minors in juvenile
court, nothing in section 707 supports the notion that the rehabilitation criterion is now
determinative regardless of the other criteria that must be considered. Thus, even though
the evidence of Kevin’s amenability to rehabilitation in juvenile court is compelling, we
are unable to say as a matter of law that ‘[n]o juvenile court could reasonably conclude,
based on all of the evidence presented,’ that he should be transferred to criminal court.”
(Kevin P., at p. 201.) Next, Minor also excerpts legislative history critical of Kevin P., as
follows: “Absent statutory guidance, the appellate courts have been unwilling to find that
youth amenable to rehabilitation must be retained in juvenile court. (See Kevin P. v.
Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 201.)” (Assem. Com. on Pub. Saf. com. on
Assem. Bill No. 2361, supra, p. 6.)
Minor then reaches the conclusion from these respective case and legislative
history excerpts: “The amended language of section 707 is clear. The juvenile court still
should consider the five statutory factors, but the court must also make a separate
21 determination that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation prior to ordering transfer to
adult court.” Minor’s conclusion that the amenability determination is entirely separate
from the five statutory criteria is a bare assertion; it does not follow from the excerpts.
Again, moreover, Minor does not address the statutory language as a whole, including the
Legislature’s plain directive that “[i]n making its [amenability] decision, the court shall
consider the criteria specified in subparagraphs (A) to (E).” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3); Miguel
R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 166-167.) The statutory language is thus clear in a
manner exactly contrary to Minor’s construction. Hence, Minor’s bare gloss on the
statute is not only unsupported by his excerpted language, there is no need to resort to
legislative history given the statute’s clear terms. (People v. Mendoza, supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 294.)
Finally and independently, Minor’s appellate challenge fails for lack of prejudice.
(See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [“No judgment shall be set aside . . . unless, after an
examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion
that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice”].) Minor fails to
identify any specific evidence or consideration the juvenile court should have weighed
regarding amenability as a hypothetically separate, sixth criterion that the court did not
otherwise consider in weighing the Legislature’s five enumerated criteria. Under a
heading asserting that reversal is required because the juvenile court “fail[ed] to make a
separate [amenability] finding,” Minor complains only that “[i]t was not until he was
transferred to county jail that his behavior changed,” and he similarly highlights that “he
was doing well in juvenile hall before the original transfer hearing.” But the juvenile
22 court expressly considered this and similar evidence under criterion (B) of section 707,
regarding Minor’s prospects for rehabilitation under juvenile court jurisdiction. (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(B)(i).) The court concluded that criterion as a whole “weigh[s] against his
amenability” and Minor does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
court’s conclusion—which we may not reweigh. (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
p. 165 [“we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the court's findings”].)
For all of the foregoing reasons, Minor’s challenge to the juvenile court’s transfer
order is without merit.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s transfer order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER Acting P. J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON J.
MENETREZ J.